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General Introduction 
This doctoral dissertation consists of three chapters on the impact of corporate 
governance on mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Each of these chapters can be read as 
a stand-alone article, but the dissertation as a whole provides a comprehensive 
discussion of the impact of corporate governance on mergers and acquisitions.  Within 
the finance literature, corporate governance has been narrowly defined as the ways in 
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The advantage of this narrow definition is that 
it brings a focused framework to interpret the corporate reality. Within this doctoral 
dissertation, we focus on three levels of corporate governance. The first chapter deals 
with country-level governance legal structures and their mitigating impact on the 
potential expropriation behaviour of large blockholders. The second chapter provides 
insight in the ways in which the size and composition of the board of directors impacts 
M&A announcement returns. The third and final chapter of this dissertation focuses on 
family ownership and how it impacts M&A announcement returns. 
The remainder of this introduction is organized as follows.  First, we show how 
European M&A activity has grown over the last two decades and why research on M&A 
activity is important. Second, as the agency theory has been fruitful in explaining M&A 
failure, we inquire this agency conflict and provide an introduction to the principal-
principal agency conflict of interest which is likely to be more important than the earlier 
theories concerning the principal-agent conflict in Continental Europe, characterised 
by a concentrated ownership structure.  Third, we discuss the datasets within the 
chapters of this dissertation.  Finally, we introduce the three chapters of this doctoral 
dissertation. 
 
European M&A activity 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, European merger and acquisition (M&A) activity has 
shown a tremendous growth.  While previous M&A waves were especially important 
in the United States, the European takeover market reached about the same size as its 
US counterpart in the waves of the 1990s (fifth wave) and the mid-2000s (sixth wave).  
These recent waves were driven by deregulation, technological changes, globalisation, 
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and favourable financial market conditions.  In Europe, the integration towards a single 
market further strengthened the consolidation process (Ilzkovitz et al., 2007).  The 
decision to acquire another company is typically motivated by the possible realization 
of synergies.  Yet, a lot of expected synergies do not materialize afterwards (Trautwein, 
1990).  There is a huge amount of literature available that points to M&A failure.  
Pautler (2003) summarizes results from business consulting studies on US M&As 
between 1990 and 2000.  Overall, these studies report failure rates within the range from 
11% up to 75%.  In the finance literature, a number of articles have also pointed out that 
a lot of M&As do not create shareholder value for the bidder in the long run.  Agrawal 
et al. (1992) study cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using monthly data for a 
sample of 937 mergers and 227 tender offers in the USA during 1955–1987.  Their 
findings indicate that stockholders of acquiring firms lose on average 10% in the five 
years following deal completion.  Gregory (1997) examines 452 large domestic UK 
transactions in 1984–1992 and documents average shareholder wealth losses within the 
range of 10 to 18 per cent between the announcement month and two years following 
deal completion. Craninckx and Huyghebaert (2011) developed measures of M&A 
failures: inferior long-term stock performance, inferior operating performance and 
target divestment. They show that M&A failure rates are 50%, both for listed as private 
targets. 
 
An important stream of literature refers to Principal–Agent (PA) problems 
between managers and shareholders to explain these high failure rates.  Instead of 
focusing on shareholder value creation, managers may have other incentives to engage 
in M&As.  The reason is that growth generally increases managerial power and 
compensation (Jensen, 1986).  Moreover, it may enable managers to diversify their 
wealth (including human capital) and improve job security when the target’s cash flows 
are less than perfectly correlated with those of their own firm (Morck et al., 1990).  
However, in order to protect the shareholders, effective corporate governance measures 
should prevent managers from undertaking these value-destroying M&As.  
Nonetheless, this dominant principal-agent view in the literature is based on the Anglo-
Saxon corporate governance model that is characterized by highly dispersed ownership 
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and a huge managerial power.  It is not sure – it is even unlikely – that these same 
conclusions would apply in a Continental European context, where ownership is 
typically much more concentrated (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998).  Large reference 
shareholders indeed monitor their firm’s management more closely, thereby reducing 
ex ante the likelihood of non-value maximizing behaviour.  Huyghebaert and Luypaert 
(2010) conclude that agency problems between managers and shareholders do not play 
an important role in the M&A decisions of a sample of Belgian companies.  
Nevertheless, also in Continental Europe many bad takeovers are observed.  For a 
sample of European M&As during the period 1997–2006, Craninckx and Huyghebaert 
(2011) show that about 50% of European M&As fail to create value for the shareholders 
of the combined firm when considering a two-year post-M&A integration window.  
Furthermore, at the end of the second year following deal completion between 30% and 
40% of transactions result in a decline in operating performance.  Interestingly, the 
authors show that at the M&A announcement date stock market investors were able to 
already anticipate to some extent which transactions were more likely to fail later on.  
This finding raises serious questions about the functioning of corporate governance in 
a European context.  While agency problems between managers and shareholders may 
induce value-destroying decisions, conflicts of interest between majority and minority 
investors (so-called principal–principal (PP) conflicts of interest) can lead to the 
expropriation of minority shareholders in settings characterized by (1) concentrated 
ownership, (2) poor institutional protection of minority investors, and (3) indicators of 
weak governance (Enriques and Volpin, 2007).  Young et al. (2008) argue that such 
expropriation can be achieved by putting less-than-qualified friends or family members 
in important positions, by purchasing at too high prices or selling at too low prices to 
entities (partly) owned by the controlling shareholder, and by engaging in strategies for 
personal benefits instead of value creation (e.g., risk reduction through corporate 
diversification).  We contend that these principal-principal conflicts of interest might at 
least in part explain why M&A failure rates are also substantial in countries outside the 
Anglo-Saxon corporate world. 
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For this research, we make use of a large M&A dataset where the deals are 
initiated by European acquirers. While the origins of each dataset are the same, some 
differences can be observed. The first chapter incorporates data from 2005 to 2013, 
excluding acquisitions from acquirers that are headquartered in the United Kingdom or 
Ireland, since these countries have a common-law legal tradition, in combination with 
a more dispersed ownership structure and families hold less voting shares in the 
companies they have founded, which would bring additional complexity to the main 
story of this research. Chapter two uses transactions in the timeframe 2007-2013, again 
leaving out M&A transactions initiated by acquirers from the UK or Ireland. As we 
don’t have sufficient board-level data available for the years 2005-2006, we exclude 
these years from our analysis. The third chapter incorporates data from the years 2005-
2013, including acquirers that are headquartered in the United Kingdom and Ireland. 
 
In the first chapter of this dissertation, the interplay between ownership 
concentration and country-level corporate governance (shareholder rights, investor 
protection, and law enforcement) is explored and how this country-level corporate 
governance determines shareholder value examining a sample of 5,139 M&As initiated 
by listed firms in Europe.  Specifically, we investigate whether stronger country-level 
investor protection mechanisms can mitigate the principal-principal conflict of interest 
between large blockholders and minority investors in the context of major strategic 
decisions, like mergers and acquisitions.  Our results show that the fraction of voting 
rights controlled by the acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder significantly negatively 
affects acquirer shareholder abnormal returns surrounding the M&A announcement 
date.  This finding therefore indicates that on average large acquirer blockholders are 
perceived to expropriate value from minority investors through M&As.  However, we 
also find that this expropriation effect is only weakly mediated by better country-level 
corporate governance regulation. 
 
In the second chapter of this dissertation, we empirically explore how the size 
and composition of acquirer boards are associated with acquirer shareholder abnormal 
returns at deal announcement for a sample of 2,230 M&As initiated by listed firms in 
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Continental Europe.  We find that the number of directors on acquirer boards is not 
related to M&A announcement returns.  Next, our results provide mixed conclusions as 
to a beneficial effect of board diversity on M&A value creation.  While we find some 
weak evidence that gender and age diversity are positively associated with acquirer 
shareholder abnormal returns, we also note that the fraction of foreign directors has a 
significant negative effect, which appears to be driven by the domestic takeovers in our 
sample.  Next, we show that the fraction of directors with multiple board appointments 
is positively associated with M&A value creation, particularly in cross-border and 
industry-diversifying deals.  Also, boards with a larger fraction of independent directors 
are associated with higher M&A announcement returns.  Finally, and in contrast to 
earlier studies on US M&As, CEO duality is only detrimental for shareholder value in 
industry-diversifying M&As by firms that are not controlled by an individual or a family 
shareholder.  Within this chapter, we extend the current literature on the effects of board 
size and composition on firm performance by exploring its role in a Continental 
European M&A setting, which is characterized by powerful shareholders and poor 
investor protection.  While prior research has examined the role of specific board 
construct variables, particularly in a US context, only few studies have investigated the 
role of board structure in its various aspects.  Our mixed findings indicate a need for 
future research to better delineate the conditions under which board diversity is likely 
to be valuable for firms and their shareholders. The results of our study question the 
recent call from the public and regulation-shaping bodies for more diversity in board 
composition, at least in an M&A setting.  In contrast, we do show that director networks 
and independence have important beneficial effects.  Our study also identifies a number 
of board characteristics that stock market investors in Continental Europe may consider 
when forming investment portfolios 
 
In the third chapter of this dissertation, we investigate how family ownership 
influences the industry-diversifying nature of M&As by listed companies in Continental 
Europe and the corresponding shareholder value effects at deal announcement. For a 
large sample of 3485 M&As during 2005–2013, we observe that acquirers having a 
family as the largest shareholder are less inclined to take over an unrelated target firm 
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than lone-founder and other types of non-family firms. However, as the size of the 
family ownership stake increases, family firms become more eager to follow an 
industry-diversifying M&A strategy. While industry-diversifying M&As are associated 
with lower abnormal returns for acquirer shareholders on average, we also observe that 
family ownership fully reverses this negative effect. We therefore conclude that those 
unrelated M&As, although still representing a conflict of interest with the family firm’s 
minority investors, do not destroy shareholder value on average.   
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Chapter 1: Minority-investor expropriation and country-
level corporate governance: Results from a study on 
corporate takeovers. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Research has shown that listed firms in Europe, particularly in Continental Europe, 
often have a highly-concentrated ownership structure (see Faccio & Lang, 2002; Franks 
et al., 2009; Martynova & Renneboog, 2010).  While this concentrated ownership helps 
to curb the agency problems between managers and shareholders, it may also result in 
another conflict of interest.  Indeed, dominant owners could abuse their power in the 
firm to pursue their own interests, to the detriment of the firm’s minority investors, 
known as a principal–principal conflict of interest.  Not surprisingly, the ‘Europe 2020’ 
plan of the European Commission (2010) has devoted a lot of time and efforts in trying 
to improve the business environment in the EU, thereby also proposing a modern and 
efficient company law and corporate governance (CG) framework for listed companies.  
As an example, as of 2006, listed firms in Europe became required to include a 
comprehensive CG statement in their annual report; it should cover the key elements of 
their CG structures and practices and is to be based on a ‘comply or explain’ principle 
(2006/46/EC).  Although shareholders should have similar rights throughout the EU 
(2007/36/EC), the heterogeneity in CG legislation and practices across the various EU 
countries remains quite extensive (e.g., Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Lubatkin et al., 
2005; Renders et al., 2010).  Whereas the United Kingdom and Ireland operate under a 
common-law legal system, characterized by the notion of fairness, countries in 
Continental Europe typically rely on a civil-law legal system that strongly emphasizes 
the predictability of the law (e.g., Enriques & Volpin, 2007; Johnson et al., 2000).  Even 
among civil-law countries, important differences are observable across the French, 
German, and Scandinavian legal families (see La Porta et al., 1998).  Each of these legal 
families indeed has its own applications of the concepts ‘shareholder rights’, ‘investor 
protection’, and ‘law enforcement’. 
In this article, we are particularly interested in how the conflict of interest that 
originates from a disproportionate distribution of power among a listed firm’s various 
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shareholders affects that firm’s minority investors.  To that end, we investigate how the 
largest utlimate blockholder may expropriate value from stock market investors through 
mergers and acquisitions, which are often major strategic decisions for listed companies 
(Harris & Shimizu, 2004; Masulis et al., 2012).  While large family shareholders could 
use their power to induce their listed family firm to engage in industry-diversifying 
M&As in order to diversify the family wealth (see Aktas et al., 2016; Defrancq et al., 
2016; Miller et al., 2010), large institutional shareholders may consent to lower-value 
M&As if doing so is beneficial for their current and future business relations (see Chen 
et al., 2007; Duggal & Millar, 1999).  In a similar spirit, large corporate shareholders 
could abuse their power to tunnel profits and assets away from the listed firm’s minority 
investors to other firms they control (e.g., Bae et al., 2002; Faccio & Stolin, 2006; 
Johnson et al., 2000).  In addition, we wish to explore whether strong country-level 
corporate governance mechanisms can mediate those detrimental blockholder effects.  
The answer to this question may provide clear directions as to how public policy 
agencies could further fine-tune their future policies and actions to better protect 
minority investors against expropriation by large shareholders.  As M&A transactions 
are typically unexpected corporate events with a potentially large impact on the 
combining companies, they provide a fertile ground for an event study that empirically 
investigates the influence of acquirer ownership concentration, country-level corporate 
governance, and their interaction on acquirer shareholder value.  To that end, we rely 
on a large dataset of 5,139 M&As initiated by 1,648 listed acquirers in Europe between 
January 1, 2005 and April 30, 2013.  First, we investigate whether blockholders who 
control a significant fraction of voting rights are associated with M&A abnormal returns 
for acquirer shareholders.  In addition, we examine whether country-level CG 
characteristics that represent shareholder rights, investor protection, and law 
enforcement have an influence on M&A value creation for acquirer shareholders.  
Finally, we analyse whether strong country-level minority-investor protection has a 
mitigating effect on the value-expropriation behaviour by large blockholders. 
Only a few studies have explored the role of major shareholders in M&A 
transactions.  In general, this research has found a significant negative effect of the stake 
controlled by the acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder on acquirer M&A 
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announcement returns.  This finding is consistent with the view that firms with 
dominant owners may engage in M&As that do not necessarily maximize shareholder 
value as the voting power of their largest shareholder increases.  Bigelli and Mengoli 
(2004), who study 280 takeovers by Italian listed firms in the period from 1989 to 1996, 
find a significant negative effect of acquirer ownership concentration on M&A 
announcement returns, thus indicating that acquirers with a higher likelihood of 
shareholder entrenchment engage in M&As that are less valuable for the firm’s minority 
investors.  Ben-Amar and André (2006) investigate 327 Canadian M&As during 1998–
2002 and detect a non-linear relation between the stake controlled by the acquirer’s 
largest ultimate blockholder and acquirer shareholder abnormal returns at M&A 
announcement, suggesting that publicly listed firms make sub-optimal investment 
decisions as the ownership stake of their largest shareholder increases.  Bhaumik and 
Selarka (2012) investigate 123 M&As in India between 1995 and 2004, demonstrating 
that acquirers with a concentrated ownership structure experience lower three-year post-
M&A performance, as measured by their earnings before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation.  This result again suggests that acquirer ownership concentration 
facilitates the expropriation of minority investors by controlling blockholders, 
particularly in a context of weak country-level corporate governance. 
As far as the relation between country-level corporate governance and firm value 
is concerned, La Porta et al. (2002) and Maury (2006) identify a positive association.  
La Porta et al. (2002) investigate 539 large firms from 27 wealthy countries in the year 
1995, and find evidence of higher firm valuations in countries with better minority 
investor protection.  They therefore argue that investors are more willing to finance 
firms in countries that are more protective of minority investors.  The idea is that those 
investors in countries with better corporate governance can be sure that more of their 
firm’s profits will flow back to them in the form of dividends, which allows them to 
value corporate assets more highly.  Maury (2006) argues that blockholder ownership 
is more beneficial to firm value in legal environments where minority shareholders can 
better protect themselves against blockholder expropriation.  His argumentation is 
based on the finding that, for a sample of 1,672 non-financial firms in Western Europe 
during the year 1998, family-controlled firms, which comprise a subset of blockholder-
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controlled firms, only have a significant positive effect on Tobin’s Q in countries with 
strong investor protection (antidirector rights above the median score).  Hillier et al. 
(2011) investigate the influence of country-level legal protection, control mechanisms, 
and financial systems on firm-level investment in R&D, for a sample of firms from 9 
EU countries, Japan and the USA.  The authors show that firm-level R&D investment 
is less sensitive to internal cash flow generation in countries with stronger corporate 
governance, adding to the argument that country-level corporate governance is a key 
determinant of corporate investments and growth. 
The literature on the influence of country-level corporate governance on M&As 
has shown that the degree of investor protection in the acquirer country has a significant 
positive impact on M&A announcement returns for acquirer shareholders.  Bris and 
Cabolis (2008) investigate the effects of acquirer country-level investor protection for 
a sample of 506 takeovers in 39 countries between 1989 and 2002 and find that better 
(above median) investor protection in the acquirer country on average results in higher 
acquirer M&A announcement returns.  Delving somewhat deeper into this topic, 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008) explore the spillover effects of corporate governance 
practices between acquirer and target firms in a sample of 737 cross-border M&As in 
Europe during 1993–2008.  To that end, they conduct interviews with 150 corporate 
lawyers from 32 European countries.  They also investigate the impact of country-level 
corporate governance regulation on the acquirer CAR for this sample of cross-border 
M&As.  For the M&As where the acquirer is from a country with above median 
shareholder rights and the target comes from a country with below median shareholder 
rights, Martynova and Renneboog find a significant positive effect of the difference in 
shareholder rights between acquirer and target firms on acquirer announcement returns.  
As such, the authors provide evidence that the takeovers of firms with a poor 
shareholder orientation by firms with a strong shareholder orientation generate 
abnormal returns for the acquirers through the imposition of better corporate 
governance practices on the target firm. 
Our research contributes to the current literature by investigating the role of large 
shareholders in M&As and the potentially mitigating impact of country-level corporate 
governance regulation on the expropriation behaviour by large blockholders in 
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European M&A transactions.  We are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to also 
empirically investigate this interaction effect between ownership concentration and 
measures of country-level corporate governance on M&A announcement returns.  To 
that end, we rely on an extensive deal sample, spanning 5,139 transactions initiated by 
listed acquirers in Europe between 2005 and 2013.  Our empirical results point at a 
significant negative effect of ownership concentration on acquirer M&A announcement 
returns.  Further, we find evidence of a significant positive impact of two sub-indices 
of minority investor protection on acquirer M&A announcement returns.  The first sub-
index reflects minority-investor appointment rights (i.e. including minority-shareholder 
representation on the board, rules allowing voting caps, and a ban on dual-class shares).  
The second sub-index covers minority-investor decision rights (i.e. introduction of 
supermajority approval for major corporate decisions, such that minorities with a 
blocking minority are able to impede corporate policies that could harm their interests).  
However, we find only weak evidence that country-level minority-investor protection 
mitigates the expropriation behaviour by large blockholders.  Empirical evidence from 
a subsample analysis shows that there is a strong negative effect of large blockholders 
for industry-diversifying M&As, adding to the argument that industry-diversifying 
takeovers may be used by blockholders to expropriate value from minority investors.  
Consequently, they send the stock price lower upon the announcement of an industry-
diversifying transaction.  We also find evidence that the interaction effect has a 
significant positive impact on acquirer announcement returns in diversifying M&As, 
showing the mitigating effect of strong country-level corporate governance on 
blockholder expropriation incentives manifesting in diversifying M&As.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  First, we present an 
overview of the relevant literature and develop our hypotheses.  We thereafter introduce 
the sample and variable measurements, and report and discuss the results from our 
empirical analyses.  Finally, the last section of the paper offers our conclusions and 
launches areas for future research. 
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1.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
In this section, we first review the literature on agency theory and on how concentrated 
ownership may induce a specific conflict of interest between a listed firm’s controlling 
shareholder and its minority investors.  Next, we present what the literature so far has 
argued and found as regards the role of country-level corporate governance.  In addition, 
we develop our own hypotheses as to the impact of large blockholders, country-level 
corporate governance, and their interaction on acquirer shareholder abnormal returns at 
the deal announcement date.  As minority investors likely factor in whether and how 
the legal environment will protect them against any expropriation by a company’s 
dominant owners, it can be expected that stock market investors’ reaction to an M&A 
announcement will reflect the effects of the offered investor protection on this PP 
conflict of interest. 
 
1.2.1 Ownership 
Jensen and Meckling introduced the agency theory in 1976 and until recently, most of 
the attention in the literature has gone to the principal–agent (PA) conflict of interest 
that is driven by a separation of ownership and control.  When firm ownership is widely 
dispersed, firm management may have the power as well as the incentives to pursue its 
own interests (e.g., Enriques & Volpin, 2007; Morck et al., 2005).  However, when a 
major shareholder controls a large fraction of a listed firm’s voting rights, it may be able 
to curb such managerial entrenchment.  At the same time, a new conflict of interest may 
arise, between this dominant owner and the firm’s minority investors.  As argued by 
Morck et al. (2005), an unequal balance in voting rights may create the conditions for 
a new agency problem, as the interests of the firm’s controlling and minority 
shareholders may no longer be aligned.  In a similar spirit, Young et al. (2008) point 
out that a principal–principal (PP) conflict of interest may arise when control is not 
equally shared among a firm’s various shareholders.  Such PP conflicts of interest may 
result in the expropriation of minority investors by the appropriation of firm value by 
the firm’s dominant owner or even by the destruction of overall firm value (see also 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  In this respect, McConnell and Servaes (1990) find that 
corporate value (Tobin’s Q) tends to decline with ownership concentration as ownership 
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becomes too concentrated (the turning point equals 50% for listed firms in the year 1976 
and 40% for listed firms in the year 1986).  Likewise, Anderson and Reeb (2003) and 
Maury (2006) conclude that Tobin’s Q gradually decreases when ownership 
concentration grows too large, that is above 30%.  The authors explain this outcome by 
a changing incentive structure as the firm’s largest shareholder becomes too powerful, 
away from firm-value maximization. 
This changing incentive structure has also been noticed in prior literature 
investigating the effects of ownership concentration on M&A value creation for 
acquirer shareholders.  In companies that are ultimately controlled by an individual or 
a family, the incentive to preserve control and/or protect the family wealth may overtake 
the incentive to maximize the firm’s stock market valuation as blockholder ownership 
increases.  Individuals or families likely have a substantial fraction of their wealth 
invested in their listed company.  Hence, these owners often adhere to a wealth-
preservation strategy in order to transfer their business to the next generation (Aktas et 
al., 2016; Defrancq et al., 2016).  Alternatively, Johnson et al. (2000) argue that these 
large blockholders may use M&As to siphon off resources from their listed firm to 
increase their personal wealth.  Bae et al. (2002) provide empirical evidence, based on 
a sample of 107 takeovers of Korean listed firms in the time frame between 1981 and 
1997, that large Korean business groups have used acquisitions as a tunnelling 
instrument, to transfer wealth from the listed firm’s minority shareholders to its 
controlling shareholder.  While minority investors in these acquirers on average lose, 
the controlling shareholder of that firm on average benefits because of the value 
enhancement of other firms in the group.  Institutional investors are likely to rely on the 
firm’s management to take strategic decisions (Daily et al., 2003; Graves & Waddock, 
1990).  Hence, they may consent to lower-value deals if doing so is beneficial for their 
current and future business relations (Chen et al., 2007; Duggal and Miller, 1999); e.g. 
insurance companies may have business relations with firms whose stock they also own, 
and as such prevent them from being active corporate monitors (Duggal and Miller, 
1999).  In line with those arguments, Craninckx and Huyghebaert (2015) find that 
institutional ownership is significantly negatively associated with the acquirer CAR for 
a sample of 342 intra-European takeovers of listed target firms announced between 
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1997 and 2007; also, they show that large family owners as well as large institutional 
owners tend to put their firm in a weaker negotiation position when it comes to dividing 
M&A value creation, as the fraction of total M&A gains realized by acquirer 
shareholders is significantly smaller for acquirers with such a dominant owner.  Bigelli 
and Mengoli (2004), who study 280 acquisitions by Italian listed firms in the period 
from 1989 to 1996, find a significant negative effect of ownership concentration on 
M&A announcement returns, meaning that acquirers with a higher likelihood of 
shareholder entrenchment experience lower M&A announcement returns.  In 
subsequent analyses, the authors find a non-linear effect, claiming that as the stake of 
the controlling shareholder grows, the likelihood of entrenchment by the firm’s 
controlling blockholder is larger. 
Based upon the above review of the literature, we expect that large shareholders 
may use their power in the firm to pursue other goals than shareholder value 
maximization.  The positive effects of having a major blockholder in controlling 
managerial agency problems thus taper off as this controlling shareholder’s voting-
rights stake in the firm grows.  So, as the acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder controls 
a larger faction of voting rights, a conflict of interest with the firm’s minority investors 
may engender.  We therefore put forward: 
Hypothesis 1: The ownership stake of the acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder 
is negatively associated with acquirer shareholder abnormal returns at the deal 
announcement date. 
 
1.2.2 Country-level corporate governance 
Corporate governance is the set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect 
themselves against expropriation by both managers and major shareholders (La Porta 
et al., 2000).  As such, corporate governance deals with both principal–agent and 
principal–principal conflicts of interest.  Martynova and Renneboog (2010) reflect on 
the quality of national laws aiming at protecting stock market investors from being 
expropriated by a firm’s management (hereafter called ‘Shareholder rights’) as well as 
large shareholders (hereafter called ‘Minority investor protection’).  Moreover, the 
authors factor in that the impact of country-level CG legislation depends on the 
country’s quality of law enforcement (hereafter called ‘Rule of law’).  Shareholder 
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rights represent the rights and attributes that measure a shareholder’s ability to curb 
managerial opportunistic behaviour and capture the extent to which national regulation 
is shareholder oriented (e.g., Do shareholders have the legal provisions that provide 
them with effective power to appoint and dismiss the board of directors and to control 
major corporate decisions, including M&As?).  Minority investor protection 
specifically relates to the regulatory provisions that increase the relative power of 
minority investors in the presence of a strong dominant owner (e.g., Do minority 
investors have board representation?;  Is there a supermajority requirement for approval 
of major corporate decisions in order to induce a compromise between the firm’s 
various shareholders?;  Are there minority claims that grant minority investors the right 
to exit from the company on fair terms in case they fear their rights are expropriated?;  
Do companies have to adhere to the one-share-one-vote principle?;  Do companies have 
to be transparent about their ownership structure and are blockholders with a 
sufficiently large stake required to make this public?).  Finally, the Rule of law refers to 
the influence and authority of law within society, particularly as a constraint upon 
agents’ behaviour (Kaufman et al., 2010).1 
Overall, stock market investors should be able to rely upon the prevailing CG 
regulation and on the application of the law within a certain jurisdiction.  Also, the legal 
environment and how the laws are enforced shape the business and contract 
environment in which firms operate.  Listed firms in countries with strong country-level 
CG laws tend to experience higher stock market valuations, which can be explained by 
the reduced risk of agency conflicts (both PA and PP).  La Porta et al. (1998) examine 
the legal rules covering the protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin 
of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries in the 1990s.  They 
                                              
 
1 According to La Porta et al. (2000), common-law countries have the strongest protection of minority investors, 
whereas French civil-law countries have the weakest.  German and Scandinavian civil-law countries fall in 
between.  The authors also find significant differences across countries in terms of quality of law enforcement, as 
measured by the efficiency of the judiciary, corruption, and the quality of accounting standards.  Unlike legal 
rules, which do not appear to depend upon the level of economic development, the quality of law enforcement is 
higher in German and Scandinavian civil-law countries, as compared to French civil-law countries.  Particularly, 
the richer Scandinavian and German legal origin countries receive the highest scores on the efficiency of the 
judicial system.  Of the four legal traditions, the French legal origin countries have the worst quality of law 
enforcement. 
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find that investor protection at the country level is positively correlated with the size of 
securities markets and thus the ability of companies to raise finance and stock market 
prices.  Also, country-level investor protection is negatively correlated with ownership 
concentration.  These findings support the idea that legal systems matter for corporate 
governance and that firms (have to) adapt to the limitations of the legal systems under 
which they operate.  The authors reach a similar conclusion in their 2002 paper, using 
a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies in the year 1995.  So, La Porta 
et al. (2002) argue that investors are more willing to finance firms and that financial 
markets are both broader and more valuable in countries that are more protective of 
minority investors and where the laws are better enforced.  This finding is also 
confirmed by Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013), who examine country-level governance 
indicators, macroeconomic and financial variables for 72 countries over the period 
2000-2010.  Specifically, they show that firms operating under stronger country-level 
governance rules have better access to financing, a lower cost of capital, and a better 
performance.  For a sample of 495 firms in 25 emerging markets, Klapper and Love 
(2004) find that the overall level of firm-level corporate governance is significantly 
positively associated with three proxies of country-level investor protection.  Firm-level 
governance is inferred from the results of a survey, covering seven broad firm-level CG 
categories, filled out by Credit Lyonnais analysts who provide research coverage for 
the sample firms.  The three country-level CG variables include Judicial Efficiency 
(International Country Risk Guide, 2000), Antidirector Rights (La Porta et al., 1998), 
and Legality (Berkowitz et al., 2003).  From their findings, the authors infer that firms 
have only limited flexibility to steer their CG profile, which implies that an increase in 
average firm-level CG quality can be achieved by improving the country-level judicial 
efficiency, improving the country’s antidirector rights.  Alternatively, the firms might 
list on a US stock exchange, known for their large analyst coverage and transparency, 
which tends to increase the CG quality of individual firms as well.  Doidge et al. (2007) 
further add to the argument that country-level characteristics play an important role in 
a firm’s overall governance.  They find that country-level characteristics explain much 
more of the variance in governance ratings than observable firm characteristics.  
Moreover, they find that country-specific characteristics related to minority investor 
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protection and the level of economic and financial development influence a firm’s costs 
and benefits from implementing measures to improve its governance and transparency.  
The authors base their findings on three firm-level CG ratings (CLSA, S&P 
Transparency and disclosure, and the FTSE ISS) for up to 1,217 firms from 38 
countries, covering the period 1994–2001. 
In the case of M&As, which are transactions that might be associated with PA 
as well as PP conflicts of interest, country-level corporate governance mechanisms may 
mitigate the number of value-reducing acquisitions and increase the M&A returns for 
acquirers operating in strong CG nations.  When M&As are announced, minority 
investors factor in that acquirers from strong governance countries will negotiate and 
implement transactions that are good for overall shareholder wealth, not just for the 
firm’s management or controlling shareholder.  Hence, the presence of strong country-
level CG rules can build trust among stock market investors, who now anticipate that 
they will not be expropriated.  As the uncertainty surrounding M&A transactions has 
become smaller, the risks involved in owning acquirer stock will be lower as well.  
Ultimately, this will translate into a higher abnormal return for acquirer shareholders 
upon the announcement of an M&A.  The few studies that investigate the impact of 
country-level corporate governance on M&As all focus on the spillover effects in cross-
border transactions.  Rossi and Volpin (2004) find for a sample of 4,007 M&As between 
1990 and 1999 that the volume of M&A activity is significantly larger in countries with 
better accounting standards (i.e. quality of disclosures) and stronger shareholder 
protection (i.e. and index capturing the effective rights of minority investors with 
respect to managers and directors).  Bris and Cabolis (2008) study the effects of changes 
in investor protection and accounting standards on merger premiums by investigating 
506 cross-border acquisitions from 25 acquirer countries and 39 target countries.  They 
find that better accounting standards and shareholder protection in the acquirer country 
are associated with higher M&A premiums paid above target market value in cross-
border M&As relative to matched purely domestic transactions.  This outcome therefore 
suggests a positive valuation effect for target shareholders from improving their legal 
protection.  Martynova and Renneboog (2008) investigate 737 cross-border M&As in 
Europe, relying on their index structured around country-level shareholder rights, 
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minority investor protection, creditor rights, and law enforcement.  They infer that part 
of the total synergy value in M&As by acquirers from countries with a strong 
shareholder orientation arises from the improvement in the governance of the target 
firms, i.e. a positive spillover effect. 
In sum, as the rights of a firm’s minority investors are better protected in 
countries with stronger country-level corporate governance regulation and better law 
enforcement, it can be expected that more of an investment’s profits will flow back to 
a firm’s investors, as opposed to being expropriated by that firm’s controlling 
shareholder.  Therefore, when minority investors factor in the acquirer-country 
shareholder rights, alongside its minority investor protection and rule of law, acquirer 
shareholder abnormal returns from announcing M&As likely are higher in countries 
with stronger country-level corporate governance.  The above arguments result in the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Country-level corporate governance is positively associated with 
acquirer shareholder abnormal returns at the deal announcement date. 
 
Interaction between ownership and country-level corporate governance 
Concentrated ownership structures may give rise to a PP conflict of interest as large 
blockholders have the opportunity to expropriate value from a firm’s minority investors.  
Yet, strong shareholder rights, minority investor protection and the rule of law can 
prevent or at least mitigate possible expropriation behaviour by large blockholders (e.g., 
La Porta et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008), specifically in the case of M&A transactions 
that have a potentially large effect on shareholder value (Schmidt, 2015).  Blockholders 
having their own agenda may be unable to pursue a strategy that maximizes private 
benefits of control when this is detrimental to the wealth of minority investors and when 
formal limits to curb the blockholder’s power are installed (e.g., voting caps that limit 
the power of a large blockholder, the barring of issuing shares with no or multiple voting 
rights, the requirement for supermajority approval (including minority investors) for 
major corporate decisions, the installation of a low fraction of votes needed to call for 
an extraordinary meeting, the mandatory disclosure of large ownership stakes).  The 
more barriers installed at the country level to protect the rights of minority investors, 
the higher the likelihood that large shareholders will not be able to expropriate value 
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from minority investors by following their own agenda.  To the contrary, when there 
are few country-level barriers to expropriation, blockholders are likely to be able to 
expropriate value from minority investors by pursuing their own agenda.  As a result, 
the firm’s operations and ultimately its performance is contingent upon its ownership 
structure and country-level corporate governance.  To a large extent, potential 
shareholders finance firms because their rights are protected by the law (La Porta et al., 
2000).  In the presence of major shareholders controlling the corporate landscape, 
minority investors have to rely on the country-level regulatory provisions (minority 
investor protection) that increase their relative power vis-à-vis dominant owners.  This 
interplay between major shareholders and country-level minority investor protection 
likely influences a firm’s performance and M&A announcement returns.  While prior 
research has argued that both ownership and country-level corporate governance have 
an influence on a firm’s performance and M&A decisions, there is no direct research 
on this relation.  Indeed, only some indirect research on this topic exists.  As an example, 
Maury (2006) finds that ownership only has a significant positive effect on Tobin’s Q 
in countries with strong investor protection (antidirector rights above the median score), 
while Hillier et al. (2011) show that firm-level R&D investment is less sensitive to 
internal cash flow generation in countries with stronger corporate governance.  Yet, 
there is reason to investigate this potential interaction effect between blockholders and 
country-level governance.  If a large shareholder is able to pursue its own agenda and 
heavily influence the strategic direction of a listed company, this may come at a cost 
for the firm’s minority investors.  Indeed, when firm-value maximization is no longer 
the most important corporate goal, the firm’s stock price will be affected once those 
non-value-maximizing deals are being announced.  The only hope for minority 
investors therefore rests in the country’s laws and the enforcement of those laws within 
the corresponding jurisdiction.  As such, it is of utmost importance for minority 
investors that the country-level corporate governance regime can mitigate any 
expropriation incentives on the part of the firm’s blockholders.   
In the presence of a large blockholder, minority investors may be able to rely on 
a good institutional context in order to avoid being expropriated by the firm’s dominant 
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owner.  As such, we expect a mitigating impact of strong country-level corporate 
governance on the blockholder expropriation effect. 
Hypothesis 3: The interaction term between the ownership stake of the acquirer’s 
largest ultimate shareholder and country-level regulation that protects minority 
investors is positively associated with acquirer shareholder abnormal returns at 
deal announcement. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The interaction term between the ownership stake of the acquirer’s 
largest ultimate shareholder and country-level rule of law is positively 
associated with acquirer shareholder abnormal returns at deal announcement. 
 
1.3 Variables and sample 
1.3.1 Sample 
Our initial sample includes all M&As initiated by a European listed acquirer, announced 
and completed between January 1, 2005 and April 30, 2013, and covered by the Zephyr 
database of Bureau Van Dijk.2  To be retained in the sample, the acquiring firm has to 
be registered in one of the 28 countries of the European Union.3  This results in an initial 
sample of 17,786 M&A transactions.  Next, the acquiring firm needs to obtain control 
over the target firm by growing its invested stake from a zero or minority stake to a 
post-deal ownership stake exceeding 50%.  This reduces the sample to 14,278 
observations.  Furthermore, firms active in the Financial Services Industry (US SIC 
code 6) are removed from the sample since those firms are subject to specific 
regulations and since their financial statements are often compiled under different 
accounting standards (2,774 deals).  Finally, we only retain transactions for which the 
                                              
 
2 The Zephyr database is commercialized by Bureau van Dijk and contains information on more than one million 
transactions worldwide, with pan-European deals dating back to 1997 and North American deals included as of 
2001.  There is no minimum deal value in order for an M&A to be included in the database.  Zephyr provides 
information on several firm (e.g., name, industry, country, etc.) and deal (e.g., deal status, hostile bid, contested 
bid, etc.) characteristics.  Furthermore, it can be linked easily to the Amadeus database (also Bureau Van Dijk), 
containing the annual accounts of European companies.  Zephyr has, as compared to Thomson Financial and 
Mergerstat, a larger coverage of European transactions.  We start data collection in 2005 since the ownership data 
in the Amadeus database are only present on a fragmented basis prior to 2005.  Moreover, listed firms in Europe 
all shifted to the IFRS accounting standards as of 2005. 
3 The Amadeus database of Bureau van Dijk (BVD) contains the annual accounts of over 18 million listed and 
non-listed firms in Europe, without specifying size requirements for the companies to be included in the database.  
The database combines the data from over 30 specialist regional information providers and presents all accounting 
items in a uniform format across the various European countries.  The Datastream database of Thomson Financial 
is the world’s largest financial database including, among other things, financial information on listed companies. 
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accounting, ownership, and stock price data are available in the Amadeus and 
Datastream databases.  The above sample selection criteria result in a final sample of 
5,139 M&As, initiated by 1,648 distinctive acquirers. 
Table 1.1 displays the yearly, industry, and geographical distribution for the full 
sample, as well as for the subsamples of industry-diversifying versus industry-related 
M&As.  A deal is categorised as industry-diversifying if none of the acquirer’s three-
digit US SIC industries equals one of the target firm’s three-digit US SIC industries.  
This is the case for 1,914 transactions (37.2% of the sample).  While a non-trivial 
number of transactions took place in each sample year, most deals occurred in the year 
2007.  About half of the acquiring companies are active in manufacturing (22.9%) and 
in personal and business services (24.0%).  The geographical distribution of the 
acquirers is highly dispersed, with a considerable fraction of acquirers domiciled in the 
United Kingdom (29.8%), followed by France (17.3%), Sweden (12.1%), and Germany 
(9.6%). 
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Table 1.1: Time, industry and geographical distribution of the sample 
Table 1.1 displays the absolute and percentage distribution of the year of M&A announcement, acquirer industry, and acquirer 
country for the full sample (Panel A), and for the subsamples of industry-diversifying versus industry-related M&As (Panel B). 
 
 Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Industry-diversifying versus industry-related M&As  
    Industry-diversifying M&As Industry-related M&As  
  N Col%   N Row% N Row%   
Year of announcement 
 
 
     
2005 593 11.54% 
 
207 34.91% 386 65.09%  
2006 716 13.93% 
 
255 35.61% 461 64.39%  
2007 859 16.72% 
 
306 35.62% 553 64.38%  
2008 741 14.42% 
 
298 40.22% 443 59.78%  
2009 412 8.02% 
 
163 39.56% 249 60.44%  
2010 644 12.53% 
 
252 39.13% 392 60.87%  
2011 601 11.69% 
 
211 35.11% 390 64.89%  
2012 274 5.33% 
 
105 38.32% 169 61.68%  
2013 299 5.82% 
 
117 39.13% 182 60.87%  
Acquirer industry 
  
     
SIC 0: Agriculture, Forestry Fishing 58 1.13% 
 
31 53.45% 27 46.55%  
SIC 1: Mining 295 5.74% 
 
136 46.10% 159 53.90%  
SIC 2: Food 657 12.78% 
 
265 40.33% 392 59.67%  
SIC 3: Manufacturing 1,178 22.92% 
 
586 49.75% 592 50.25%  
SIC 4: Transportation 488 9.50% 
 
188 38.52% 300 61.48%  
SIC 5: Wholesale 526 10.24% 
 
251 47.72% 275 52.28%  
SIC 7: Personal and business services 1,232 23.97% 
 
232 18.83% 1000 81.17%  
SIC 8: Health, legal and social services 695 13.52% 
 
223 32.09% 472 67.91%  
SIC 9: Public Administration 10 0.19% 
 
2 20.00% 8 80.00%  
Acquirer country 
  
     
AT: Austria 64 1.25% 
 
26 40.63% 38 59.38%  
BE: Belgium 131 2.55% 
 
42 32.06% 89 67.94%  
BG: Bulgaria 11 0.21%  7 63.64% 4 36.36%  
CZ: Czech Republic 6 0.12%  2 33.33% 4 66.67%  
DE: Germany 491 9.55%  182 37.07% 309 62.93%  
DK: Denmark 78 1.52%  21 26.92% 57 73.08%  
EE: Estonia 6 0.12%  4 66.67% 2 33.33%  
ES: Spain 163 3.17%  46 28.22% 117 71.78%  
FI: Finland 298 5.80%  100 33.56% 198 66.44%  
FR: France 887 17.26%  314 35.40% 573 64.60%  
GB: Great Britain 1,533 29.83%  633 41.29% 900 58.71%  
GR: Greece 1 0.02%  1 100.00% 0 0.00%  
HU: Hungary 1 0.02%  1 100.00% 0 0.00%  
IE: Ireland 121 2.35%  50 41.32% 71 58.68%  
IT: Italy 168 3.27%  62 36.90% 106 63.10%  
LT: Lithuania 6 0.12%  4 66.67% 2 33.33%  
LU: Luxembourg 6 0.12%  2 33.33% 4 66.67%  
LV: Latvia 3 0.06%  0 0.00% 3 100.00%  
NL: Netherlands 300 5.84%  75 25.00% 225 75.00%  
PL: Poland 183 3.56%  92 50.27% 91 49.73%  
PT: Portugal 32 0.62%  12 37.50% 20 62.50%  
RO: Romania 5 0.10%  4 80.00% 1 20.00%  
SE: Sweden 621 12.08%  221 35.59% 400 64.41%  
SI: Slovenia 21 0.41%  13 61.90% 8 38.10%  
SK: Slovakia 3 0.06%  0 0.00% 3 100.00%  
Total 5,139 100.00%   1,914 37.24% 3,225 62.76%   
 
23 
 
1.3.2 Variable measurement 
In this section, we present our variables of interest.  We start by introducing our 
measurement of the dependent variable.  To capture acquirer shareholder abnormal 
returns upon deal announcement, we rely upon the event study methodology.  Next, we 
introduce ownership concentration and the country-level corporate governance 
variables that are used in our study.  Finally, we elaborate on the control variables. 
To evaluate the M&A value creation from the point of view of acquirer 
shareholders, we make use of the event study methodology.  Research in corporate 
finance typically posits that stock market investors impound the economic gains from 
synergies and/or a change in corporate control in the stock price of the combining 
companies at deal notification.  The most important advantage of the event study 
methodology is that it is forward-looking, implicitly accounting for the present value of 
all future M&A gains.  Also, it can be manipulated less easily by managers than 
accounting-based performance metrics and it is unrelated to the quality of deal 
implementation, i.e. post-M&A integration.  To capture the perceived value creation in 
each takeover, we calculate acquirer abnormal returns surrounding the M&A 
announcement date.4  Acquirer abnormal returns are computed as the difference 
between realized returns and expected returns.  Expected returns are obtained from the 
market model, which is estimated over a clean period [-250,-51] relative to the event 
date (day 0): 
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑗𝑡 is the realized return on the stock of company j on day t, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the realized 
return on the MSCI Europe index on day t, 𝛼𝑗 is the intercept and 𝛽𝑗 is a measure of 
firm j’s systematic risk 
The abnormal returns are summed over the event window [𝑇1, 𝑇2] to produce a 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR).  We use the [-1,+1] window in our main test, but 
also work with other event windows to account for a potential stock price run-up before 
                                              
 
4 We do not have any information on M&A transactions that were proposed to but disapproved by the board, as 
data on those proposed M&As is not publicly disclosed.  Hence, in our dataset, we cannot observe the strongest 
expression of the monitoring function, i.e. the disapproval of takeovers perceived to destroy shareholder value. 
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deal notification (e.g., Craninckx & Huyghebaert, 2011; Martynova & Renneboog, 
2011).  We examine the statistical significance of the acquirer CAR by means of the test 
statistic developed by Dodd and Warner (1983).  For each security i, the standardized 
abnormal return on day t (𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) is computed by dividing the abnormal return on that 
date (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) by its standard deviation (𝑠𝑖𝑡).  The standardized CAR over the event 
window [𝑇1, 𝑇2] is then calculated as follows: 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
1
√𝑇2 − 𝑇1 + 1
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
 
For a sample of N events, the test statistic (𝑡) that examines the null hypothesis 
of a zero cumulative abnormal return is obtained as: 
𝑡 = √𝑁
1
𝑁
∑𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
To measure an acquirer’s ownership structure, we consider who holds its direct 
and indirect voting rights (control rights), as recorded in the Amadeus database.  BVD 
collects ownership data, based on voting shares, from official bodies in charge of 
collecting this information, associated information providers, or from the firms 
themselves (Bureau van Dijk, 2008).  The Amadeus ownership data were previously 
used by Faccio et al. (2011) and Franks et al. (2012), among others.  While prior 
research has relied mostly on a static ownership concept, assuming stable ownership 
stakes during two to three years (e.g., Faccio & Lang, 2002; Lin et al., 2011; Maury, 
2006), we collected each acquirer’s actual voting-rights data at the M&A announcement 
date.  In line with the literature, we only consider shareholders controlling at least 5% 
of voting rights to identify an acquirer’s blockholders (see also Faccio et al., 2001; 
Masulis et al., 2007).  BLOCK is defined as the fraction of voting rights controlled by 
the firm’s largest ultimate shareholder, both directly and indirectly.  For the acquirers 
on which Amadeus only reports direct ownership information, we assume that the 
corresponding owners hold no indirect voting rights in the listed firm. 
To examine the influence of country-level corporate governance on M&A value 
creation for acquirer shareholders, we make use of a number of variables.  Following 
the seminal work of La Porta et al. (1998), the academic literature has developed several 
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indices that capture the differences in corporate governance among countries.  Also, 
some index adjustments and updates have been published, both in the cross section (by 
adding more countries) and over time (yearly updates of those country-level CG 
indicators).  For this research project, we start from the study by Martynova and 
Renneboog (2010), who set up a corporate governance structural index that captures the 
conflicts of interest among several types of stakeholders.  SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
PROTECTION captures the agency conflict between shareholders and managers; 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS PROTECTION captures the agency conflict between 
large blockholders and minority investors; LAW ENFORCEMENT is a measure of how 
well the law is applied in a specific country.  In addition, we will disentangle MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS PROTECTION into its four subcomponents originally relied upon 
by Martynova and Renneboog (2010).  The authors structure their minority investor 
protection index around three rights and one strategy, i.e. appointment rights, decision 
rights, affiliation rights, and a trusteeship strategy.  MINORITY APPOINTMENT 
RIGHTS give minority investors a say in the appointment of the management and the 
internal governance system.  Those appointment rights include minority-investor 
representation on the board, rules that allow to apply voting caps, and a ban on dual-
class shares (non-voting and multiple-votes shares).  MINORITY DECISION RIGHTS 
enable minority investors to participate in the governance of their firm, for example by 
introducing the need of a supermajority approval for major corporate decisions.  
Alternatively, regulations that grant shareholders the right to call for an extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting may also strengthen minority investors’ opportunities to make 
sure that their interests are looked after.  The lower the fraction of share capital required 
to call for an extraordinary meeting, the easier a firm’s minority investors can pass on 
their concerns to the company’s management.  MINORITY TRUSTEESHIP RIGHTS 
captures the extent to which the board of directors serves as a trustee for minority 
investors, i.e. the directors are independent from the firm’s controlling shareholder.  
Martynova and Renneboog (2010) argue that some jurisdictions, like The Netherlands, 
restrict shareholders’ election power such that the influence of large blockholders on 
the decision-making process of the board is limited.  As such, potential opportunistic 
behaviour by a large blockholder is strongly reduced, which tends to increase the 
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protection of the firm’s stock market investors. Finally, the MINORITY AFFILIATION 
RIGHTS enhance the power of minority investors by providing them with entry and exit 
rights on fair terms.  Most of the regulatory provisions in this category are part of 
takeover regulation.  The mandatory bid rule requires a large blockholder to make a 
tender offer to all the shareholders once it has accumulated a certain fraction of the 
company’s shares.  Such a bid rule protects minority investors by providing them with 
the opportunity to exit at a fair price.  The equal treatment principle requires controlling 
shareholders, management and other constituencies to equally treat all shareholders 
within each individual class of shares. 
Next to the structure within the country-level corporate governance framework 
that is borrowed from Martynova and Renneboog (2010), also the actual measures 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION and MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
PROTECTION from the study by Martynova and Renneboog (2010) are taken as a 
starting point.  However, their dataset only spans the period from 1990 to 2005 while 
our deal dataset covers the period 2005–2013.  Therefore, we identify similar yet more 
recent governance measures within the Worldwide Governance Indicators, to see 
whether our results are robust.  This WGI dataset is developed by Kaufman et al. (2010) 
with the support of the World Bank and spans from 1996–2014, hence covering our 
entire sample period.  Yet, we opt to use the structure built by Martynova and 
Renneboog (2010) that captures the PP agency conflicts of interest.  Within the 
Worldwide Governance indicators, the rule of law is readily available to measure law 
enforcement on a yearly basis.  Investor protection is not readily available within the 
WGI dataset, yet we make use of two underlying indices of the WGI dataset that provide 
a longitudinal and publicly available dataset.  The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 
from the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the indices from the Heritage Foundation, 
provide a couple of indices that relate to MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS PROTECTION 
(Protection of Minority Interests, Strength of Investor Protection).  The country-level 
corporate governance variables that are used in our study are presented in Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.2: Overview of the country-level corporate governance variables 
Table 1.2 provides an overview of the country-level corporate governance variables that are included in this study.  We borrow the structure and some variables measured in 2005 as measured 
by Martynova and Renneboog (2010), reflecting on both the PA (Shareholder Rights) , PP conflict of interest (Minority Investor Protection) and how the law is enforced (Rule of Law).  
Unravelling the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, these variables are documented by Kaufmann et al., 2010) from the World Bank, we investigate the relevant and publicly available 
indicators and the underlying indices that form the WGI.  GCS is the Global Competitiveness from the World Economic Forum.  The other 6 indices that are used to compile the WGI index are 
not publicly available or do not contain information on shareholder rights, minority investor protection or law enforcement.  As such, these variables are not integrated in this study. 
 
Category 
      Subcomponent 
Question / Definition Source 
Shareholder Rights 
 SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
PROTECTION 
This index reflects the shareholder’s ability to mitigate managerial opportunistic behaviour.  The index is constructed by combining 4 sub-indices: (1) appointment rights index 
(max=12), (2) decision rights index (max=8), (3) trusteeship rights index (max=5), (4) transparency index (max=7) 
Martynova and 
Renneboog (2010) 
Minority Investor Protection 
 MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS 
PROTECTION 
Based on the regulatory provisions aimed at increasing the relative power of the minority shareholders in a context of strong majority shareholders (max=27).  The index is constructed 
by combining 4 sub-indices: (1) minority shareholders appointment rights index (max=5), (2) minority shareholders decisions rights index (max=4), (3) minority shareholders 
trusteeship rights index (max=4), (4) minority shareholder affiliation rights index (max=14) 
Martynova and 
Renneboog (2010) 
 Alternative Measures of Minority Investor Protection.   
PROTECTION OF 
MINORITY INVESTORS 
In your country, to what extent are the interests of minority shareholders protected by the legal system? [1 = not protected at all; 7 = fully protected] GCS (Executive 
Opinion Survey)  
STRENGTH OF 
MINORITY PROTECTION 
Strength of Investor Protection Index on a 0–10 (best) scale GCS (Doing 
Business) 
 Minority Investor Protection subcomponents. 
 MINORITY 
APPOINTMENT RIGHTS  
Is based on the appointment rights that can be used to protect minority shareholders.  These include rights to reserve seats on the board of directors for minority shareholders or to 
limit voting power of large shareholders.  The regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
- Minority representation on the board: 2 if required, 0 otherwise 
- Voting caps limiting power of large shareholders: 1 if voting caps are allowed, 0 if not. 
- One-share-one-vote rule: 0 if both multiple voting rights and non-voting shares are allowed; 1 if one of the two is allowed; 2 if none is allowed. 
Martynova and 
Renneboog (2010) 
 MINOIRTY DECISION 
RIGHTS 
Captures the ability of minority shareholders to affect fundamental corporate transactions that require a shareholder vote.  The regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
- Supermajority requirement for approval of major company’s decisions: 0 if 50% or less; 1 if more than 50%, but less than 75%; 2 if 75% or more. 
- Percentage needed to call for extraordinary meeting: 0 if the rule is not present or required percentage is between 20 and 5%; 2 if the percentage is 5% or less. 
Martynova and 
Renneboog (2010) 
 MINORITY TRUSTEESHIP 
RIGHTS  
Indicates the extent to which the board of directors serves as a trustee for minority shareholder, i.e. the directors are independent from the firm's controlling shareholders.  The 
regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
- Nomination to the board by shareholders: 2 if shareholders voting to elect non-executive directors is not required (2-tier boards); 0 if required or 1-tier board. 
- Board independence: 2 if CEO cannot be the chairman of the board of directors (in 1-tier board structure) or if the overlap between management and supervisory board is forbidden 
(in 2-tier board structure), 0 otherwise. 
Martynova and 
Renneboog (2010) 
 MINORITY AFFILIATION 
RIGHTS 
Remaining regulatory provisions aimed at protecting minority shareholders: the principle of equal treatment (or shared returns) and rights for entry and exit on fair terms.  The 
regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
- Equal treatment rule: 2 if required, 0 if not, 
- Mandatory disclosure of large ownership stakes: 0 if disclosure is not required or the minimum percent is 25% or more; 1 if 10% or more (less than 25%); 2 if 5% or more (less 
than 10%); 3 if less than 5%. 
- Mandatory bid rule: 0 if not required; 1 if 50% or control; 2 if between 50 and 30%; 3 if 30% or less. 
- Sell-out rule: The squeeze-out rule is used as a proxy for the sell-out rule, (assumption: sell-out is always in place if squeeze-out is adopted, with the same terms. 
- as squeeze-out): 0 if no squeeze-out; 1 if squeeze-out at 95% or more; 2 if squeeze-out at 90% or less. 
- Minority claim: 0 if no; 1 if 10% or more; 2 if 5% or more; 3 if less than 5%. 
- Break-through rule: 1 if required; 0 if not. 
Martynova and 
Renneboog (2010) 
Law Enforcement / Rule of Law 
 RULE OF LAW Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.  [-2.5 = weak governance; 2.5 strong governance] 
WGI 
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Table 1.3 provides an overview of our study’s dependent and test variables, 
together with their hypothesized sign on the abnormal returns for acquirer shareholders 
at the M&A announcement date.  Besides, Table 1.3 also reports on our control 
variables, as M&A decisions can be influenced by the firm’s financial strength, 
leverage, size and M/B ratio.  Hence, we specify our models to also control for those 
forces.  As agency problems likely are more severe when firms have plenty of cash that 
can be spent at the discretion of managers or large shareholders, we include CASH 
RATIO.  Conversely, a high debt ratio (LEVERAGE) could reduce those problems, as it 
implies regular debt-service payments (Jensen, 1986).  In line with Moeller et al. (2004), 
we expect conflicts of interest with managers to be more serious in the larger listed 
firms (FIRM SIZE).  In a similar vein, managers of glamour acquirers (high M/B firms) 
are more likely to be infected by hubris (e.g., Rau & Vermaelen, 1998; Roll, 1986).  
Managers who overestimate their own capabilities could then pursue M&As in 
unfamiliar industries. Finally, we include year-, country- and industry fixed effects in 
our analyses. 
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Table 1.3: Explanatory variables 
Table 1.3 shows the definition of the dependent and explanatory variables except for the country-level corporate governance (those 
are included in Table 2), and the hypothesized effect of the explanatory variables on the acquirer shareholder announcement returns. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
    
 CAR The cumulative abnormal return for acquirer shareholders over the [-1,+1] event 
window, with day 0 being the M&A announcement date. 
 
Explanatory variables  CAR 
  
Acquirer ownership characteristics  
 BLOCK Continuous variable measuring the fraction of voting rights controlled by the 
acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder. 
 
 
BLOCK10_20 Dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder 
controls more than 10%, but less than or equal to 20% of acquirer voting rights. 
 
 
BLOCK20_30 Dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder 
controls more than 20%, but less than or equal to 30% of acquirer voting rights. 
 
 
BLOCK30_40 Dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder 
controls more than 30%, but less than or equal to 40% of acquirer voting rights. 
 
 
BLOCK40_50 Dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder 
controls more than 40%, but less than or equal to 50% of acquirer voting rights. 
 
 
BLOCK50_100 Dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder 
controls more than 50%, but less than or equal to 100% of acquirer voting rights. 
 
 
BLOCK30_100 Dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder 
controls more than 30% of acquirer voting rights 
 
Country-level corporate governance characteristics 
 
SHAREHOLDER 
RIGHTS PROTECTION 
This index reflects a shareholder’s ability to mitigate managerial opportunistic 
behaviour.  The index is constructed by combining four sub-indices: (1) appointment 
rights index, (2) decision rights index, (3) trusteeship rights index, and (4) transparancy 
index 
+ 
 
MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS 
PROTECTION 
Regulatory provisions aimed at increasing the relative power of minority shareholders 
in a context of strong dominant shareholders.  This index is constructed by combination 
of four sub-indices: (1) minority shareholders appointment rights index, (2) minority 
shareholders decision rights index, (3) minority shareholders trusteeship rights index, 
(4) minority shareholder affiliation rights index. 
+ 
 
RULE OF LAW Continuous variable ranging from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance 
performance.  This measure reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
+ 
Control variables 
 
DIVERSIFICATION Dummy variable that equals one if none of the three-digit US SIC industries the 
acquirer is active in equals one of the three-digit US SIC industries of the target firm, 
and zero otherwise. 
– 
 CROSS-BORDER Dummy = 1 if the country in which the acquirer has its corporate headquarters is 
different from that of the target firm, 0 otherwise 
 
 
CASH RATIO Cash and cash equivalents / total assets in the year before M&A –  
LEVERAGE Long-term debt / total assets in the year before M&A +  
FIRM SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets (thousands of euro) in the year before M&A –  
M/B Market-to-book ratio: market value of the ordinary (common) equity divided by the 
balance sheet value of the ordinary (common) equity in the last-available financial 
statements in the year before M&A announcement 
– 
        
30 
 
1.3.3 Summary statistics 
Table 1.4 reports the average and median acquirer CAR over different event 
windows.  The largest acquirer stock price reaction takes place in the [-1,+1] window, 
with a significant abnormal price jump of 1.14% on average in the full sample (p < 
0.01).  Over the [-5,+5] window, acquirer shareholders realize a significant average 
CAR of 1.00% (p < 0.01).  This significant positive CAR also arises over the [-35,+5] 
window, averaging to 0.92% (p < 0.01).  The median acquirer CAR is lower, yet still 
significantly different from zero over the [-1,+1], [-5,+5] (p < 0.01) and [-35,+5] 
window (p < 0.10).  Arguably, the above numbers point out that stock market investors 
perceive M&As by listed acquirers in Europe during the 2007–2013 time frame to create 
shareholder value on average (see also Craninckx & Huyghebaert, 2011; Martynova & 
Renneboog, 2011). 
When comparing the subsamples of related versus unrelated acquisitions, Panel 
B of Table 1.4 reveals that the acquirer CAR is not significantly different across the 
industry-related and industry-diversifying M&As in our sample. 
 
Figure 1.1 depicts the average acquirer CAR surrounding the deal announcement 
date.  Before deal notification, it is slightly negative, yet close to zero.  At M&A 
announcement, the average acquirer CAR exhibits a significant upward jump.  This 
pattern is highly comparable to that found by Martynova and Renneboog (2011, p. 232), 
who analyze 2,419 M&As taking place in Europe between 1993 and 2001. 
 
31 
 
Table 1.4: Acquirer CARs over Various Event Windows 
Table 1.4 presents the average and median acquirer CAR for different event windows.  The significance of the average CAR is 
tested by means of the Dodd and Warner (1983) parametric test.  The significance of the median CAR is tested by means of the 
non-parametric Corrado test.  Results are displayed for the full sample (Panel A) and for the subsamples of industry-related versus 
industry-diversifying transactions (Panel B).  The CARs that are significantly different from zero are highlighted in bold.  CARs 
significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively. 
   Event window 
      [-1,+1]   [-5,+5]   [-35,+5]            
Panel A: Full sample      
 Averages       
  CAR% 1.1416 *** 1.0008 *** 0.9260 *** 
  p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0004           
 Medians       
  CAR% 0.3974 *** 0.4299 *** 0.0579 * 
  p-value 0.0000 
 0.0000  0.0673                  
Panel B: Related takeovers versus Diversifying takeovers    
 Related takeovers 
     
 Averages       
  CAR% 1.1977 *** 1.0684 ** 0.7996 
 
  p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0064           
 Diversifying takeovers 
     
 Averages       
  CAR% 1.0470 *** 0.8868 *** 1.1391 ** 
  p-value 0.0000  0.0007  0.0235           
 Comparison of related versus diversifying takeovers (difference in means) 
 Averages 
 
   
 
 
  ΔCAR% 0.1508 
 0.1816  -0.3395  
  p-value 0.4532  0.5453  0.5317  
                  
 
Figure 1.1: Acquirer abnormal returns around the M&A announcement date 
This figure shows the cumulative abnormal return (CAR, vertical axis) for acquirer shareholders to the announcement of an M&A 
from 35 days before to 5 days after the deal announcement date (day 0, horizontal axis).  The benchmark used in the market model 
is the MSCI Europe index; the model parameters are estimated over 200 days, starting 250 days before the event date. 
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Table 1.5 reports summary statistics for all the continuous explanatory variables, which, 
unless stated otherwise, are measured at fiscal year-end before M&A announcement in 
order to avoid reverse causality problems.  To limit the influence of outliers, all the 
variables – except the dummy variables – are winsorized at 1%–99%.  Table 5, Panel 
A shows that the average voting-rights stake of the acquirer’s largest ultimate 
shareholder equals 29.5% (median BLOCK of 23.1%), which differs only weakly 
between industry-diversifying and industry-related takeovers.  If anything, firms 
engaging in industry-diversifying M&As have a larger controlling blockholder.  
Acquirers that engage in industry-diversifying takeovers on average score higher on 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION and MINORITY SHAREHOLDER 
PROTECTION, but lower on RULE OF LAW than acquirers in industry-related 
takeovers.  Next, the CASH RATIO is significantly lower for firms engaging in industry-
diversifying takeovers, while the opposite is true for LEVERAGE.  FIRM SIZE does not 
differ across industry-diversifying and industry-related M&As.  The acquirer M/B ratio 
is significantly larger for firms that pursue horizontal M&As. 
 
The correlation matrix, presented in Table 1.6, shows significant and relatively high 
correlations between the various country-level corporate governance variables. From 
this table, it is clear that SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION, MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS PROTECTION and RULE OF LAW are highly correlated, which is 
evidence that law – making (SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION RIGHTS and 
STRENGTH OF INVESTOR PROTECTION) and –enforcing (RULE OF LAW) are 
developed on an equal basis. Surprisingly, MINORITY AFFILIATION RIGHTS have a 
negative correlation with five of the eight other variables, and RULE OF LAW has a 
negative correlation with half of the other variables. 
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Table 1.5: Summary statistics on the explanatory variables 
Table 1.5 reports summary statistics on the explanatory variables for the full sample, for the subsamples of diversifying and related takeovers.  Table 3 presents definitions of all the variables.  
The last two columns show the p-values of a two-group parametric and non-parametric comparison test.  
Variable   N Mean Median Std.dev   N Mean Median Std.dev   
p-value on 
t-test 
p-value on 
Wilcoxon test 
Panel A: Full sample 
BLOCK  5,139 0.2945 0.2310 0.2089        
 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION  5,139 18.9321 19.0000 4.3391        
 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION  5,139 14.3063 16.0000 2.4132        
 
RULE OF LAW  5,139 1.5659 1.6820 0.3805        
 
CASH RATIO  4,873 0.1215 0.0791 0.1265        
 
LEVERAGE  4,719 0.1367 0.1126 0.1288        
 
FIRM SIZE  4,915 13.1237 13.0893 2.3095        
 
M/B  4,825 2.7156 2.1700 2.2617        
 
              
Panel B: Industry-diversifying versus industry-related takeovers 
  Industry-diversifying takeovers  Industry-related takeovers   
 
BLOCK  1,914 0.3021 0.2357 0.2152 
 3,225 0.2899 0.2289 0.2050  0.0429 0.1580 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION  1,914 19.1447 19.0000 4.3854 
 3,225 18.8059 19.0000 4.3070  0.0068 0.0375 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION  1,914 14.4953 16.0000 2.4143 
 3,225 14.1941 15.0000 2.4060  0.0000 0.0000 
RULE OF LAW  1,914 1.5471 1.6820 0.4005 
 3,225 1.5771 1.6820 0.3677  0.0063 0.0169 
CASH RATIO  1,807 0.1123 0.0745 0.1206 
 3,066 0.1270 0.0838 0.1295  0.0001 0.0000 
LEVERAGE  1,758 0.1440 0.1171 0.1329 
 2,961 0.1323 0.1102 0.1262  0.0024 0.0046 
FIRM SIZE  1,828 13.1719 13.1491 2.3743 
 3,087 13.0951 13.0487 2.2702  0.2600 0.1031 
M/B  1,774 2.6294 2.1200 2.2296 
 3,051 2.7657 2.2100 2.2790  0.0435 0.0388               
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Table 1.6: Correlation table 
Table 1.6 reports the correlation coefficients for the country-level corporate governance explanatory variables for the full sample. Correlations that are significantly different from zero are 
highlighted in bold.  Table 1 presents a definition of all variables. Appendix 2 provides a more extensive correlation table (without p-values and significances). 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION         
2 MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS PROTECTION 0.6188***        
  (0.0000)        
3 MINORITY APPOINTMENT RIGHTS 0.4371*** 0.4532***       
  (0.0000) (0.0000)       
4 MINORITY DECISION RIGHTS 0.5777*** 0.7386*** 0.4279***      
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)      
5 MINORITY TRUSTEESHIP RIGHTS 0.1735*** -0.0323** 0.2766*** 0.4375***     
  (0.0000) (0.0207) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
6 MINORITY AFFILIATION RIGHTS 0.2485*** 0.6804*** -0.1686*** 0.1744*** -0.6596***    
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
7 PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS’ 
INTERESTS 
-0.1805*** -0.4946*** -0.1768*** 0.0556*** 0.4804*** -0.6382***   
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 0.0006 (0.0000) (0.0000)   
8 STRENGTH OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 0.6541*** 0.3333*** 0.4855*** 0.5998*** 0.2025*** -0.0766*** 0.1414***  
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
9 RULE OF LAW -0.1250*** -0.4723*** -0.2998*** 0.0598*** 0.4392*** -0.5486*** 0.8106*** 0.1840*** 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
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1.4 Multivariate regression results 
In the first part of this section, we examine the impact of acquirer ownership structure 
and country-level corporate governance on the acquirer abnormal returns obtained from 
the event study, by means of an OLS regression analysis.  Thereafter, we investigate 
the impact of the interaction between ownership concentration and country-level CG 
measures on short-term M&A announcement returns to better understand the impact of 
country-level CG measures on the principal-principal conflict of interest in a European 
context.  Finally, we implement a subsample analysis in which we investigate industry-
diversifying versus industry-related M&As.5 
 
1.4.1 Impact of ownership and country-level governance on M&A value 
creation 
Table 1.7 reports the OLS regressions results for the acquirer CAR over the [-1,+1] 
event window.  As far as the ownership variables are concerned, model 1 displays the 
results for the impact of the continuous variable BLOCK on the acquirer CAR in the 
full sample of M&As, thereby revealing a significant negative effect (p < 1%).  In line 
with Hypothesis 1, this outcome thus signifies that minority investors perceive M&As 
initiated by firms with a large controlling blockholder to create less shareholder value 
on average.  A negative sign is in line with the idea of minority-investor expropriation, 
providing empirical support for a principal–principal conflict of interest.  Model 2 
accounts for a potential non-linear effect of this ownership stake on M&A value 
creation, for which we fail to find empirical support.  Moreover, as the VIF factors of 
both BLOCK and BLOCK_SQ are above 13, the correlation between those variables 
may be too high to draw any relevant conclusions.  Model 3 therefore relies on dummy 
variables to assess a potential non-linear influence of acquirer ownership concentration 
on M&A value creation for acquirer shareholders.  Firms with a highly-dispersed 
                                              
 
5 In a previous version of this paper, we implemented a split sample approach by investigating CROSS-BORDER 
versus DOMESTIC M&As. Yet, as we analyse those split samples, the results do not confirm that the differences 
between CROSS-BORDER and DOMESTIC M&As can be related to minority investor expropriation, as 
ownership does not have a significant negative impact on the CARs in cross-border deals. 
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ownership structure (voting-rights stake of the acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder 
is less than ten percent) are included in the reference category for this regression 
analysis.  We observe a significant negative effect of the BLOCK30_40 (p < 5%) and 
BLOCK 50_100 (p < 10%) dummy variables.  The coefficient on BLOCK40_50 points 
in the same direction, but is not significant at conventional levels.  Those findings 
further add to the argument that above a certain threshold (i.e. when the voting-rights 
stake exceeds 30%), the ownership incentive structure changes away from firm-value 
maximization, which is felt by a firm’s minority investors by means of less valuable 
M&A strategies.  Model 4 depicts the impact of the ownership dummy BLOCK30_100, 
which equals one for acquirers with a blockholder controlling at least 30% of the firm’s 
voting rights, and zero otherwise.  Here again, we observe a significant negative impact 
of concentrated ownership (p < 1%).  Overall, the above results therefore confirm that 
a firm’s largest ultimate shareholder’s incentives change from shareholder-value 
maximization to a principal–principal conflict of interest as it becomes too dominant. 
As far as country-level corporate governance is concerned, we include 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION, MINORITY SHAREHOLDER 
PROTECTION and RULE OF LAW.  To our surprise, none of these three aggregated 
indices covering shareholder rights, minority investor protection, nor the rule of law are 
significant in models 1 to 4.  We further integrate PROTECTION OF MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS, STRENGTH OF MINORITY PROTECTION, and the four 
subcomponents of MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION: MINORITY 
APPOINTMENT RIGHTS, MINORITY DECISION RIGHTS, MINORITY 
TRUSTEESHIP RIGHTS and MINORITY AFFILIATION RIGHTS.  Yet, when we 
investigate the subcomponents and alternative measures of MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION, we note that MINORITY APPOINTMENT RIGHTS 
and MINORITY DECISION RIGHTS have a significant positive impact on acquirer 
announcement returns.  These outcomes are in line with Hypothesis 2, implying that 
minority investors that are better protected by law, can expect that more of an acquirer’s 
profits will flow back to the investors when an M&A transaction is announced.  The 
three regulatory provisions capturing the appointment rights index for minority 
investors, i.e. minority representation on the board, voting caps limiting the power of 
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large shareholders and the one-share-one-vote rule, are effective in providing a country-
level environment that enables acquirers to undertake value-increasing acquisitions.  
Also, the MINORITY AFFILIATION RIGHTS variable (see model 11) has a significant 
negative impact on acquirer announcement returns (p < 1%), which we cannot explain. 
As to the control variables, we note that DIVERSIFICATION has a significant 
negative effect on the acquirer CAR (p < 1%), a result that is in line with the literature 
(e.g., Amihud & Lev, 1981; Defrancq et al., 2016).  CROSS-BORDER and CASH 
RATIO are never significant.  LEVERAGE is only significant in models 6 and 7 (p < 
10%), having a positive impact on the acquirer CAR.  We further find that FIRM SIZE 
has a highly significant negative influence on acquirer shareholder abnormal returns 
surrounding the deal announcement date (p < 1%), a result that is in line with earlier 
findings by Moeller et al. (2004).  Correspondingly, the larger acquirers in our sample 
engage in M&A transactions that create significantly less value for their shareholders 
than the smaller sample firms.  Finally, the M/B ratio has a significant negative effect 
on acquirer announcement returns (p < 5%).  This outcome indicates that stock market 
investors are highly concerned about managers over-extrapolating past performance 
when subsequently engaging in M&As (see also Rau & Vermaelen, 1998). 
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Table 1.7: Ownership and country-level corporate governance as determinants of M&A announcement returns 
Table 1.7 shows the OLS regression results as to the acquirer CAR over the [-1,+1] window.  Table 3 provides an overview of the dependent and explanatory variables, their measurement, and 
their hypothesized effect on the acquirer CAR.  All control variables are measured at fiscal-year end before M&A and are winsorized at 1%99%.  Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively.  p-values are reported between parentheses.  Fixed effects (Year, Country and Industry) are included in all models. 
             
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
                        
BLOCK -0.0129*** -0.0125 
  
-0.0128*** -0.0055 -0.0057 -0.0128*** -0.0128*** -0.0128*** -0.0128***  
(0.0040) (0.4076) 
  
(0.0042) (0.2974) (0.2859) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
BLOCK_SQ 
 
-0.0005 
         
  
(0.9779) 
         
BLOCK10_20 
  
0.0024 
        
   
(0.3877) 
        
BLOCK20_30 
  
0.0004 
        
   
(0.9059) 
        
BLOCK30_40 
  
-0.0070** 
        
   
(0.0291) 
        
BLOCK40_50 
  
-0.0018 
        
   
(0.6045) 
        
BLOCK50_100 
  
-0.0057* 
        
   
(0.0522) 
        
BLOCK30_100 
   
-0.0063*** 
       
    
(0.0015) 
       
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION -0.0132 -0.0132 -0.0149 -0.0142 
       
(0.2005) (0.2016) (0.1408) (0.1610) 
       
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION 0.0026 0.0026 0.0032 0.0029 -0.0013 
      
(0.4733) (0.4736) (0.3618) (0.4149) (0.3524) 
      
RULE OF LAW 0.0098 0.0098 0.0091 0.0093 
       
(0.5820) (0.5823) (0.6083) (0.5986) 
       
PROTECTION OF MINORITY INTERESTS 
     
0.0088 
     
     
(0.1899) 
     
STRENGTH OF MINORITY  PROTECTION 
      
0.0087 
    
      
(0.2842) 
    
MINORITY APPOINTMENT RIGHTS 
       
0.0117*** 
   
       
(0.0069) 
   
MINORITY DECISION RIGHTS 
        
0.0352*** 
  
        
(0.0069) 
  
MINORITY TRUSTEESHIP RIGHTS 
         
-0.0005 
 
         
(0.9243) 
 
MINORITY AFFILIATION RIGHTS 
          
-0.0088***           
(0.0069) 
DIVERSIFICATION -0.0045*** -0.0045*** -0.0044*** -0.0045*** -0.0045*** -0.0050** -0.0049** -0.0045*** -0.0045*** -0.0045*** -0.0045***  
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0099) (0.0079) (0.0086) (0.0162) (0.0173) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) 
CROSS-BORDER 0.0021 0.0021 0.0020 0.0020 0.0021 0.0014 0.0014 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021  
(0.2916) (0.2932) (0.3197) (0.3153) (0.2939) (0.5611) (0.5576) (0.2939) (0.2939) (0.2939) (0.2939) 
CASH RATIO -0.0159 -0.0159 -0.0153 -0.0159 -0.0160 -0.0175 -0.0175 -0.0160 -0.0160 -0.0160 -0.0160  
(0.1856) (0.1858) (0.2009) (0.1872) (0.1850) (0.1404) (0.1381) (0.1850) (0.1850) (0.1850) (0.1850) 
LEVERAGE 0.0129 0.0129 0.0135 0.0125 0.0128 0.0185* 0.0186* 0.0128 0.0128 0.0128 0.0128  
(0.1463) (0.1467) (0.1295) (0.1575) (0.1472) (0.0987) (0.0973) (0.1472) (0.1472) (0.1472) (0.1472) 
FIRM SIZE -0.0042*** -0.0042*** -0.0041*** -0.0041*** -0.0042*** -0.0043*** -0.0042*** -0.0042*** -0.0042*** -0.0042*** -0.0042***  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
M/B -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0014** -0.0014** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013***  
(0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0064) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0263) (0.0278) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) 
Constant 0.2717** 0.2715** 0.2852** 0.2802** 0.1706*** 0.0062 0.0207 0.1017*** 0.0430 0.1497*** 0.2192***  
(0.0235) (0.0241) (0.0161) (0.0183) (0.0000) (0.8639) (0.5470) (0.0000) (0.2102) (0.0000) (0.0000)             
Observations 4,419 4,419 4,419 4,419 4,419 3,296 3,296 4,419 4,419 4,419 4,419 
Adjusted R² 0.1161 0.1161 0.1173 0.1167 0.1161 0.1323 0.1319 0.1161 0.1161 0.1161 0.1161 
Maximum VIF 2.48 13.58 2.49 2.48 1.32 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.32 1.35 1.36 
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1.4.2 Interaction between ownership concentration and country-level corporate 
governance 
Table 1.8 displays regression models including an interaction effects between ownership 
concentration and the various MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION constructs.  We 
include the dummy variable BLOCK30_100 as a single term in the models in Table 1.8, 
whereas we make use of BLOCK, the continuous variable that captures the ownership stake 
of the acquirer’s largest blockholder, to construct the interaction terms.  Indeed, because of 
multicollinearity, we could not run the models with the variable BLOCK and its interaction 
with the corporate governance variables in one and the same model.  So, we use this dummy 
variable BLOCK30_100 as our findings in Table 1.7 revealed that any positive blockholder 
effects disappears above 30% ownership (see also Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  Except for 
models 3 and 4, all models in Table 1.8 reveal a significant negative impact of 
BLOCK30_100 on the acquirer announcement returns (p <10% for models 1, 2, 6 and 9; p < 
5% for models 5, 7 and 8).  Yet, when we take a look at the interaction terms between 
BLOCK and MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION, we cannot find a single 
interaction variable that has a significant impact on acquirer abnormal announcement 
returns.  We thus cannot confirm Hypothesis 3 that country-level investor protection 
mitigates the expropriation by large shareholders.  Neither can we confirm Hypothesis 4 that 
country-level law enforcement (i.e. rule of law) mitigates the hypothesized expropriation 
effect by large blockholders. 
As far as the control variables are concerned, DIVERSIFICATION has a significant 
negative effect on the acquirer CAR (p < 1%).  The variables of CROSS-BORDER, CASH 
RATIO and LEVERAGE are never significant.  FIRM SIZE and M/B has a highly significant 
negative influence on shareholder abnormal returns surrounding the deal announcement date 
(p < 1%). 
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Table 1.8: Interaction of minority investor protection and ownership as determinants of M&A announcement returns 
Table 1.8 shows the OLS regression results as to the acquirer CAR over the [-1,+1] window. Table 3 provides an overview of the dependent and explanatory variables, their measurement, and their 
hypothesized effect on the acquirer CAR.  All control variables are measured at fiscal-year end before M&A and are winsorized at 1%99%.  Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively.  p-values are reported between parentheses.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                    
BLOCK30_100 -0.0058* -0.0059* -0.0044 -0.0039 -0.0060** -0.0054* -0.0052** -0.0064** -0.0054*  
(0.0669) (0.0664) (0.2632) (0.3309) (0.0376) (0.0877) (0.0362) (0.0336) (0.0894) 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION 
-0.0142 
        
(0.1607) 
        
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION 
0.0030 -0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0012 
(0.4080) (0.3719) (0.6841) (0.6919) (0.4167) (0.3911) (0.3896) (0.3441) (0.3601) 
RULE OF LAW 
0.0094 
        
(0.5970) 
        
BLOCK * MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION 
-0.0001 -0.0001 
       
(0.8505) (0.8572) 
       
BLOCK * PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
  
0.0006 
      
  
(0.7217) 
      
BLOCK * STRENGTH OF MINORITY PROTECTION 
   
0.0002 
     
   
(0.8801) 
     
BLOCK * MINORITY APPOINTMENT RIGHTS  
    
-0.0005 
    
    
(0.8734) 
    
BLOCK * MINORITY DECISION RIGHTS  
     
-0.0011 
   
     
(0.7132) 
   
BLOCK * MINORITY TRUSTEESHIP RIGHTS 
      
-0.0027 
  
      
(0.4610) 
  
BLOCK * MINORITY AFFILIATION RIGHTS 
       
0.0000 
 
       
(0.9700) 
 
BLOCK * RULE OF LAW 
        
-0.0018         
(0.6913) 
DIVERSIFICATION -0.0045*** -0.0045*** -0.0050** -0.0050** -0.0045*** -0.0045*** -0.0045*** -0.0045*** -0.0045***  
(0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0079) (0.0081) (0.0079) (0.0081) (0.0080) 
CROSS-BORDER 0.0020 0.0020 0.0013 0.0014 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020  
(0.3147) (0.3171) (0.5796) (0.5735) (0.3170) (0.3153) (0.3123) (0.3196) (0.3147) 
CASH RATIO -0.0159 -0.0160 -0.0177 -0.0177 -0.0159 -0.0160 -0.0160 -0.0159 -0.0160  
(0.1864) (0.1859) (0.1366) (0.1356) (0.1869) (0.1850) (0.1843) (0.1867) (0.1845) 
LEVERAGE 0.0126 0.0126 0.0185* 0.0185* 0.0126 0.0126 0.0127 0.0125 0.0126  
(0.1550) (0.1559) (0.0986) (0.0975) (0.1566) (0.1542) (0.1521) (0.1580) (0.1550) 
FIRM SIZE -0.0041*** -0.0042*** -0.0043*** -0.0043*** -0.0041*** -0.0042*** -0.0041*** -0.0041*** -0.0042***  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
M/B -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0014** -0.0014** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013***  
(0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0291) (0.0292) (0.0056) (0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0055)  
0.2801** 0.1691*** 0.0689*** 0.0691*** 0.1684*** 0.1689*** 0.1701*** 0.1695*** 0.1698*** 
Constant (0.0185) (0.0000) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)            
4,419 4,419 3,296 3,296 4,419 4,419 4,419 4,419 4,419 
Observations 0.1167 0.1166 0.1320 0.1319 0.1166 0.1167 0.1167 0.1166 0.1167 
Adjusted R² 192 190 176 175 190 190 190 190 190 
Maximum VIF 3.35 3.27 3.04 2.72 1.73 2.78 1.34 2.74 2.34 
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1.4.3 Subsample analysis: Industry-diversifying versus industry-related 
acquisitions 
To further investigate the PP conflict of interest between large shareholders and 
minority investors in Europe, we introduce split-sample analyses in the section 
hereafter.  Specifically, we discuss the results for industry-diversifying versus industry-
related acquisitions. 
Table 1.9 displays the industry-diversifying versus industry-related M&As.  As 
industry-diversifying acquisitions may be used by blockholders to expropriate value 
from minority investors (Defrancq et al., 2016; Kim et al., 1993; Miller et al., 2010), it 
is relevant to split-up between industry-diversifying M&As and industry-related 
M&As.  For the subsample of industry-diversifying subsample, we notice a negative 
impact of the BLOCK30_100 dummy on the acquirer CAR, confirming Hypothesis 1 
that large blockholders are more prone to expropriate value from minority investors 
when they control a substantial part of the acquirer’s voting rights.  From the subsample 
of industry-related acquisitions, we cannot draw a similar conclusion as BLOCK30_100 
is not significant.  Apparently, when acquirers having a concentrated ownership 
structure engage in industry-diversifying transactions, there is a more negative reaction 
in the acquirer firm’s stock price, in line with the idea that concentrated owners 
expropriate value from minority investors by diversifying their concentrated wealth 
through acquisitions with the firm in which their main source of wealth is locked up.  
As far as the interaction effects are concerned, within diversifying deals, we notice a 
significant positive effect (p < 10%) for the interaction BLOCK * PROTECTION OF 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (model 3) and for the interaction BLOCK * MINORITY 
AFFILIATION RIGHTS, in line with Hypothesis 3 that country-level investor protection 
mitigates the expropriation by large shareholders.  For the related subsample, the 
negative interaction effect is only borderline significant.  This result is not found for the 
interaction between BLOCK and RULE OF LAW (models 9 and 18). 
As to the control variables, we find that FIRM SIZE has a significant negative 
impact on bidder CAR (p < 5%) for both industry-diversifying and industry-related 
subsamples.  For the subsample of industry-related acquisitions, M/B has a significant 
negative impact on bidder CAR (p < 1%). 
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Table 1.9: Ownership and country-level governance as determinant of M&A value creation: industry-diversifying vs -related 
M&As 
Table 1.9 shows the OLS regression results as to the acquirer CAR over the [-1,+1] window for the subsamples of industry-diversifying and industry-related subsamples. Table 3 provides an 
overview of the dependent and explanatory variables, their measurement, and their hypothesized effect on the acquirer CAR.  All control variables are measured at fiscal-year end before M&A 
and are winsorized at 1%99%.  Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively.  p-values are reported between parentheses.  
 
Industry-diversifying subsample 
      
Industry-related subsample 
      
G170415v03 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
                                      
BLOCK30_100 -0.0125** -0.0122** -0.0159** -0.0125* -0.0066 -0.0118** -0.0083* -0.0126** -0.0103* -0.0013 -0.0013 0.0020 0.0015 -0.0048 -0.0011 -0.0039 -0.0019 -0.0025 
(0.0200) (0.0224) (0.0202) (0.0799) (0.1749) (0.0265) (0.0578) (0.0132) (0.0547) (0.7539) (0.7598) (0.6938) (0.7690) (0.1980) (0.7970) (0.2235) (0.6240) (0.5366) 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION INDEX 2005 -0.0361*** 
        
0.0130 
        
(0.0058) 
        
(0.3679) 
        
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION INDEX 0.0098** -0.0000 0.0008 0.0010 0.0007 0.0001 0.0005 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0058 -0.0024 -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0028 
(0.0273) (0.9936) (0.6223) (0.5456) (0.7276) (0.9738) (0.7733) (0.9406) (0.7712) (0.2603) (0.2029) (0.5154) (0.4833) (0.1942) (0.2037) (0.1320) (0.1582) (0.1241) 
RULE OF LAW -0.0316 
        
0.0332 
        
(0.1919) 
        
(0.1891) 
        
BLOCK * MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION 0.0011 0.0011 
       
-0.0011* -0.0011* 
       
(0.1481) (0.1621) 
       
(0.0908) (0.0930) 
       
BLOCK * PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
  
0.0051* 
      
  
 
-0.0024 
      
  
(0.0506) 
      
  
 
(0.2723) 
      
BLOCK * STRENGTH OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 
   
0.0029 
     
  
  
-0.0018 
     
   
(0.2777) 
     
  
  
(0.3151) 
     
BLOCK * MINORITY APPOINTMENT RIGHTS 
    
-0.0005 
    
  
   
-0.0026 
    
    
(0.9302) 
    
  
   
(0.5006) 
    
BLOCK * MINORITY DECISION RIGHTS 
     
0.0058 
   
  
    
-0.0070* 
   
     
(0.1977) 
   
  
    
(0.0802) 
   
BLOCK * MINORITY TRUSTEESHIP RIGHTS 
      
0.0030 
  
  
     
-0.0063 
  
      
(0.5709) 
  
  
     
(0.1739) 
  
BLOCK * MINORITY AFFILIATION RIGHTS 
       
0.0019* 
 
  
      
-0.0016* 
 
       
(0.0905) 
 
  
      
(0.0977) 
 
BLOCK * RULE OF LAW 
        
0.0060   
       
-0.0077         
(0.3803)   
       
(0.1838) 
CROSS-BORDER 0.0017 0.0017 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0019 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0026 0.0026 0.0031 0.0031 0.0025 0.0026 0.0025 0.0026 0.0025  
(0.6277) (0.6131) (0.9401) (0.9785) (0.5810) (0.6080) (0.6020) (0.6086) (0.6032) (0.3097) (0.3164) (0.3301) (0.3354) (0.3332) (0.3184) (0.3352) (0.3175) (0.3277) 
CASH RATIO -0.0113 -0.0109 -0.0120 -0.0120 -0.0106 -0.0107 -0.0106 -0.0109 -0.0105 -0.0123 -0.0126 -0.0151 -0.0151 -0.0123 -0.0126 -0.0124 -0.0126 -0.0125  
(0.5264) (0.5392) (0.5635) (0.5657) (0.5488) (0.5441) (0.5500) (0.5371) (0.5530) (0.4477) (0.4379) (0.3290) (0.3286) (0.4479) (0.4377) (0.4450) (0.4362) (0.4401) 
LEVERAGE 0.0110 0.0104 0.0224 0.0229 0.0108 0.0105 0.0105 0.0106 0.0104 0.0165 0.0161 0.0207 0.0207 0.0154 0.0162 0.0157 0.0159 0.0157  
(0.4175) (0.4390) (0.1933) (0.1850) (0.4218) (0.4374) (0.4351) (0.4300) (0.4397) (0.2128) (0.2234) (0.2322) (0.2332) (0.2450) (0.2225) (0.2392) (0.2269) (0.2365) 
FIRM SIZE -0.0023** -0.0022** -0.0026** -0.0027** -0.0023** -0.0023** -0.0023** -0.0022** -0.0023** -0.0055*** -0.0055*** -0.0054*** -0.0054*** -0.0053*** -0.0055*** -0.0053*** -0.0055*** -0.0054***  
(0.0175) (0.0211) (0.0330) (0.0307) (0.0159) (0.0191) (0.0159) (0.0251) (0.0189) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
M/B -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0017*** -0.0018*** -0.0023** -0.0023** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0018***  
(0.7666) (0.8202) (0.7461) (0.7464) (0.8824) (0.8335) (0.8717) (0.8124) (0.8533) (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0245) (0.0246) (0.0099) (0.0091) (0.0087) (0.0100) (0.0096) 
Constant 0.4391*** 0.0467** 0.0273 0.0282 0.0392 0.0453** 0.0407* 0.0461** 0.0399* 0.0120 0.1976*** 0.4506*** 0.4507*** 0.1972*** 0.1991*** 0.2046*** 0.1989*** 0.2041***  
(0.0049) (0.0340) (0.2730) (0.2716) (0.1261) (0.0396) (0.0683) (0.0334) (0.0673) (0.9434) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)           
  
        
Observations 1,627 1,627 1,232 1,232 1,627 1,627 1,627 1,627 1,627 2,792 2,792 2,064 2,064 2,792 2,792 2,792 2,792 2,792 
R-squared 0.1874 0.1864 0.2210 0.2192 0.1852 0.1862 0.1854 0.1868 0.1857 0.1383 0.1376 0.1536 0.1536 0.1370 0.1377 0.1374 0.1376 0.1373 
Maximum VIF 3.45 3.35 3.13 2.93 1.77 2.78 1.28 2.86 2.27 3.31 3.24 3.02 2.62 1.7 2.8 1.37 2.7 2.41 
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1.4.4 Robustness checks 
In order to assess the robustness of our findings, we perform several additional tests, 
for which we discuss the most important findings hereafter.  The output from those extra 
tests is thus not shown in a table, but can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
First, we analyse the results when adding additional variables to the models, i.e. TOTAL 
RISK and INDUSTRY GROWTH.  TOTAL RISK is the standard deviation of monthly 
stock returns (months -60 to -1) before M&A announcement, while INDUSTRY 
GROWTH is the median of the one-year lagged sales growth rate in the acquirer’s 
primary three-digit US SIC industry, constructed from all the consolidated financial 
statements available in the Amadeus database in the year before M&A announcement.  
Managers who overestimate their own capabilities could pursue M&As in unfamiliar 
industries.  The incentives of managers and large shareholders to reduce their firm’s 
risk may also depend on its current risk (Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  After adding those 
extra variables, the tables in Appendix 1 reveal that our main conclusions do not change.  
Second, we leave out the fixed effect variables.  As can be seen from Appendix 2, this 
has only a limited influence on the OLS regression results. 
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1.5 Discussion and conclusions 
The primary objective of this paper was to investigate the potential mitigating impact 
of country-level corporate governance on the principal-principal conflict of interest in  
Europe.  We do find evidence that ownership concentration has a negative effect on 
acquirer announcement returns, indicating that on average large acquirer blockholders 
are perceived to expropriate value from minority investors through M&As.  Moreover, 
we do find evidence that minority appointment rights (including minority-shareholder 
representation on the board, rules allowing voting caps, a ban on dual-class shares) and 
minority decision rights (introduction of supermajority approval for major corporate 
decisions, such that minorities with a blocking minority are able to impede corporate 
policies that could harm their interests) have a significant impact on acquirer M&A 
announcement returns.  Hence, this presence of strong country-level investor protection 
builds trust among stock market investors, who now know that they will not be 
expropriated, inviting policy makers to build strong minority appointment and decision 
rights.  For the interaction effect between ownership concentration and country-level 
investor protection within our European M&A sample, we find evidence that country-
level minority investor protection mitigates the potentially abused powers of large 
blockholders who decide to acquire a target from an unrelated industry, which suggests 
that country-level minority investor protection mitigates the potential expropriation 
behaviour by large blockholders.  An avenue for future research would be to enlarge 
both the geographical scope, the years under discussion and other type of investment 
decisions, other than M&A decisions.  Further research  is needed to really decide what 
country-level factors drive the PP conflict of interest and are worth sharing to policy 
makers and minority stake investors.  These findings further highlight the importance 
of good country-level corporate governance (more specifically: the protection of 
minority investors and the minority affiliation rights) in mitigating the effects of 
expropriation through industry-diversification by large blockholders.  While we are able 
to locate two areas where this mediating effect may come from, we cannot find the 
specific legal driver for this mitigating effect.  As such, future research should 
investigate the specific governance drivers that allow for these mitigating effects. 
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Chapter 2: Influence of Acquirer Boards on M&A Value 
Creation. Evidence from Continental Europe. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
“Over a span of 40 years, I have been on 19 public-company boards (excluding 
Berkshire's) and have interacted with perhaps 250 directors … These people, decent 
and intelligent though they were, simply did not know enough about business and/or 
care enough about shareholders to question foolish acquisitions”. 
Buffett in 2002 to Berkshire’s shareholders 
 
The board of directors is a critical element in a firm’s corporate governance, having two 
major supervisory functions: one is its monitoring and disciplining of senior 
management, which includes hiring, evaluating, and compensating the top 
management; the other is to advise senior management on important strategic decisions 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Masulis et al., 2012).  After some major corporate 
governance scandals, such as the usage of accounting loopholes at Enron in the USA 
(2001), a real debt eight times higher than the reported debt at the Italian Parmalat 
(2005), and the concealment of large invoices at Olympus in Japan (2011), both the 
media and policy-shaping bodies have called for better board monitoring to improve 
board effectiveness in creating and preserving shareholder value.  Thereby a key point 
of attention has been to encourage board diversity.  Likewise, in the aftermath of the 
2008-2009 financial crisis, the G20/OECD has argued that “in order to bring diversity 
of thought to board discussion, boards should consider if they collectively possess the 
right mix of background and competences.”  Also, the European Commission (2011) 
Green Paper states that “diversity in board members’ profiles and backgrounds gives 
the board access to a range of values, views and competencies.  Different lead0ership 
experiences, national or regional backgrounds or gender can provide an effective means 
to tackle ‘group-thinking’ and generate new ideas.  More diversity leads to more 
discussion, more monitoring and more challenges in the boardroom.  It potentially 
results in better decisions.”  Yet, academic research examining in detail how the size 
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and composition of boards influence major corporate decisions is largely missing to 
date. 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) provide an interesting setting to examine the role of 
the board’s supervisory functions, as they present complex corporate events, often with 
huge strategic impact, that require the board’s approval as well as its advice and care 
(Harris & Shimizu, 2004; Schmidt, 2015).  In practice, managers usually initiate and 
negotiate M&As, while the board has to endorse these (monitoring function).  
Correspondingly, the board may prevent the top management from engaging in 
transactions that destroy shareholder value.  The board is also likely to set and influence 
the firm’s external growth strategy (advisory function) and might occasionally even 
assist the management in suggesting potential takeover targets.  As M&A 
announcements are clearly defined and, most often, surprising events for stock market 
investors, they can be used as an experimental setting to investigate the board’s 
influence on shareholder value by means of an event study. 
To date, only a few studies have examined how variables reflecting the size and 
composition of corporate boards impact M&A initiation, M&A acquisition prices, and 
M&A value creation, mostly in a US context.  Masulis et al. (2007) investigate the 
effects of acquirer board structure on the acquirer cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
for a sample of 3,333 M&A announcements by 1,268 different listed US firms during 
1990–2003.  They include board size, director independence, and CEO duality as board 
characteristics in their analyses.  They find a significant negative impact of CEO duality 
on the acquirer CAR.  However, board size and director independence are not 
significant (see also Masulis et al., 2012; Schmidt, 2015).  Levi et al. (2014) examine 
the influence of gender diversity in the board on bid initiation and the bid premium for 
458 acquisitions by US listed firms between 1997 and 2009.  They conclude that firms 
with more female directors are less likely to launch takeover bids (each additional 
female director reduces the number of bids by 7.6%) and if these firms enter into M&As, 
they pay lower premiums (a 15.4% smaller premium per extra female director).  The 
authors explain their findings by a lower overconfidence among female directors.  As 
to the role of foreign directors, Masulis et al. (2012) analyze a sample of 520 cross-
border takeovers by US listed firms between 1998 and 2007, showing that acquirers 
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with foreign independent directors realize significantly higher announcement returns, 
particularly when the takeover target is headquartered in a country in which one of the 
acquirer’s foreign directors resides.  For a sample of 143 large M&As by US firms 
between 1981 and 1989, Harris and Shimizu (2004) show that directors with multiple 
board appointments have a significant positive impact on acquirer abnormal returns at 
deal announcement.  However, not all research points in this same direction (see, for 
example, Ahn et al., 2010; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Masulis et al., 2012). 
Our paper contributes to the limited and fragmented literature on the role of the board 
of directors in M&As by analyzing and interpreting the effects of various board 
characteristics on acquirer shareholder value in a Continental European M&A context.  
As many listed companies in Continental Europe are closely held by an individual or a 
family (e.g., Desender et al., 2013; Enriques & Volpin, 2007), the emergence of a 
principal-agent conflict of interest is less likely than in the Anglo-Saxon corporate 
world.  As such, CEO duality does not necessarily hint at entrenched managers who no 
longer pursue the best interests of the company and its shareholders.  Indeed, those 
combined CEO-chairmen often prove either the firm’s founder and/or a member of the 
controlling family (see also Defrancq et al., 2016).  In line with the above arguments, 
empirical research on M&As in Continental Europe has shown that acquirer shareholder 
announcement returns are significantly positive on average (e.g., Craninckx & 
Huyghebaert, 2011; Martynova & Renneboog, 2011).6  Those findings contrast with the 
results found by research on Anglo-American deals, demonstrating a non-significant 
acquirer CAR at best.  Nonetheless, as controlling shareholders could also abuse their 
power to expropriate value from the firm’s minority investors in a context with poor 
investor protection, a firm’s independent directors may be able to identify and 
ultimately block the M&As that do not add to overall firm and shareholder value.  A 
similar rationale might apply to the firm’s directors with multiple board appointments, 
who could rely upon their knowledge and network to better understand the strategic 
                                              
 
6 For their sample of 2,419 intra-European takeovers during 1993–2001, with both acquirers and targets being 
publicly listed firms, Martynova and Renneboog (2011) report a statistically significant positive acquirer abnormal 
return of 0.72% over the [-1,+1] event window (which is significant at the 1% level). 
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rationale for doing particular deals and rejecting others, in order to create and preserve 
shareholder value.  Finally, Continental Europe is interesting because, despite all EU 
efforts to converge, the business landscape in many industries has kept a notable 
regional dimension, with a non-trivial role of local habits and sometimes even local 
rules and standards.  Over time, convergence in the EU has indeed been hampered by 
cultural differences and language barriers, which could not be addressed through 
legislation.  Hence, when directors with a different national origin are appointed to a 
board, they likely may introduce fresh ideas and bring in their specific local expertise, 
and, as such, help firms identify highly valuable M&As.  Moreover, as these foreign 
directors are less likely to be well-acquainted with the firm’s management and, if any, 
the firm’s controlling shareholder, they may find it easier to express an independent 
opinion, thereby safeguarding the best interests of the company and its shareholders. 
For a sample of 2,230 M&As initiated by listed firms with corporate headquarters in 
Continental Europe, we detect no consistent positive or negative relation between board 
size and acquirer shareholder abnormal returns at deal announcement.  In addition, we 
find mixed evidence as to a beneficial impact of board diversity on M&A value creation.  
Indeed, our results provide some indication that gender and age diversity are positively 
associated with M&A abnormal returns at deal notification.  In line with the existing 
literature, this result might reflect that women pay more attention to monitoring and that 
groups more heterogeneous in terms of age offer more valuable advice to acquiring 
firms.  However, both variables are only weakly significant, in only some of the models.  
Surprisingly, a larger fraction of foreign directors on the board negatively affects M&A 
value creation.  This relation appears to be driven by the purely domestic takeovers in 
our sample.  It is consistent with the idea that those foreign directors encounter more 
difficulties in gathering the information needed to scrutinize a planned transaction and 
closely monitor the management.  Yet, as acquirers expand through cross-border 
takeovers, this negative effect of foreign directors completely vanishes.  The latter 
outcome thus indicates that foreign directors are as good as domestic ones in evaluating 
cross-border deals or that their negative monitoring effect is offset by a positive 
advisory effect.  In general, the above findings incite us to question the recent and one-
size-fits-all call for more diversity in board composition.  We further find that the 
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proportion of directors with multiple board appointments and the fraction of 
independent directors are significantly positively associated with M&A value creation.  
Director experience, networks, and reputation thus prove highly effective deterrents 
against M&As that do not maximize shareholder value.  Interestingly, while the 
influence of independent directors does not seem to depend upon the complexity of the 
deal, we do find that directors with multiple directorships are especially valuable in 
cross-border and industry-diversifying M&As.  Finally, CEO duality is only 
significantly negatively related to M&A announcement returns when the takeover is 
industry-diversifying in nature and when the acquirer is not controlled by an individual 
or a family.  Lone founders or family representatives who combine the positions of CEO 
and board chairman are less likely to pursue objectives that destroy shareholder value, 
as this could jeopardize their control of the company and/or the family’s socioemotional 
wealth (see also Aktas et al., 2016; Defrancq et al., 2016).  This idea could therefore 
explain the lack of a wide-ranging negative CEO-duality effect in Continental European 
M&As, as opposed to the damaging entrenchment effect of combined CEO-chairmen 
found in Anglo-Saxon M&As (e.g., Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Masulis et al., 2007).  
Overall, the above relations prove robust to alternative model specifications, in which 
the effects are incorporated in a non-linear way, to alternative variable measurements, 
and to adding extra control variables. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  First, we present an overview of 
the relevant literature and develop our hypotheses, starting from the idea that board 
diversity adds to corporate value, in line with the view of the media and policy-shaping 
bodies.  Nonetheless, we also wish to acknowledge that counterarguments exist, 
claiming that diversity may indirectly affect firm performance through weaker social 
integration (Harrison et al., 2002).  We thereafter introduce the sample and variable 
measurements, and report and discuss the results from our empirical analyses.  Finally, 
the last section of the paper offers our conclusions. 
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2.2 Literature Review and hypotheses development 
The theoretical framework underlying our research is borrowed from agency theory: the 
agent (management) is expected to act in the best interests of the principal (the firm’s 
shareholders) when directing a company (Muth & Donaldson, 1998); and the board has 
both a monitoring and an advising role in its appointment.  To ensure that the agent 
maximizes the value of the company, the board of directors should establish an overall 
framework and set the boundaries within which the management can operate, thereby 
discouraging managers to extract private benefits.  Also, it should monitor the 
management on behalf of the firm’s shareholders to mitigate agency problems (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976).  Besides, the board should facilitate an effective management 
process by providing valuable counsel, particularly on strategic issues (e.g., Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). 
Mergers and acquisitions present major and complex strategic decisions that require the 
board’s approval as well as its advice/care, having potentially large effects on 
shareholder value (Harris & Shimizu, 2004; Schmidt, 2015).  Harris and Shimizu (2004) 
argue that an acquirer’s ability to create value from M&As is a function of many factors 
(e.g., fit of the target firm, timing of the transaction, acquisition price, the payment and 
financing of the deal) and complacent and/or uninvolved directors can undermine the 
board decision-making process and board effectiveness.  In the following sections, we 
start from the monitoring and advisory functions of the board to develop our hypotheses 
as to how board size, directors’ diversity in terms of gender, national origin, and age,7 
directors’ multiple board appointments and independence, and CEO duality could 
influence a firm’s shareholder value from doing M&As. 
 
Board size.  The role of board size has long been on the research agenda (e.g., Jensen, 
1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996).  A major advantage of larger boards is 
their access to a greater collective body of experience and information, including but 
                                              
 
7 Ethnic diversity is often included in studies on the role of board diversity.  Yet, ethnic diversity is rarely present 
in the boards of listed firms in Continental Europe (see also Sing, 2007; Upadhyay & Zeng, 2014).  As such, we 
chose not to integrate this diversity aspect into our analyses. 
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not limited to product markets, technology, and regulation.  As such, larger boards may 
draw upon their extensive source of knowledge and skills to challenge senior 
management.  Besides, larger boards have a greater number of observers, who can then 
also be assigned to the various board committees (Klein, 2002; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992).  
Consequently, the number of committee assignments per director can decline, which 
may allow directors to execute their duties more thoroughly.  Moreover, larger boards 
provide more opportunities to enhance board diversity, including director gender, 
national origin, age, and ethnicity (e.g., Dalton & Dalton, 2005).  Accordingly, larger 
boards could also be better placed to provide highly qualitative strategic counsel to 
management, potentially resulting in better M&A decisions. 
In contrast, others have argued that the benefits of larger boards, i.e. a better capacity 
for monitoring and strategic counsel, are outweighed by their costs, such as less candid 
board discussions, slower decision-making, and biases against risk-taking (e.g., Guest, 
2009; Yermack, 1996).  Investigating 452 large US industrial corporations between 
1984 and 1991, Yermack (1996) detects an inverse relation between board size and 
Tobin’s Q, from which he concludes that smaller boards are more effective.  Guest 
(2009), who examines the role of board size for a sample of 2,746 listed firms in the 
UK during 1981–2002, finds a strong negative relation between board size and firm 
profitability (ROA), Tobin’s Q, and stock market returns.  Besides, Cheng (2008), 
studying 1,252 US listed firms between 1996 and 2004, concludes that firms with a 
larger board have a lower variability in corporate performance, consistent with the view 
that larger-sized boards need to make more compromises to reach a consensus.  
Consequently, the decisions of larger boards are less extreme, resulting in less volatile 
company results.  For M&A decisions, this could imply that larger boards are less 
willing to engage in highly valuable, but risky takeovers that may fundamentally affect 
a firm’s strategy and market positioning. 
Based upon the above arguments, we put forward the following and opposite 
conjectures as to the relation between board size and M&A value creation: 
Hypothesis 1a. Acquirers with a larger number of directors on their board are 
associated with higher M&A announcement returns. 
Hypothesis 1b. Acquirers with a larger number of directors on their board are 
associated with lower M&A announcement returns. 
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Gender diversity.  The position of female board members has received a lot of attention 
in recent years, as women have been attributed with better monitoring capabilities.  
Croson and Gneezy (2009) review gender differences and emphasize that women are 
more risk-averse than men, which can be explained by their different emotional 
reactions to risky situations (see also Loewenstein et al., 2001).  Arch (1993) contends 
that females interpret risky situations as threats encouraging avoidance, while males are 
more likely to see these as a challenge, calling for participation.  Besides, when faced 
with uncertainties, women show less confidence to succeed than men, also reducing 
their odds of overconfidence (Lundeberg et al., 2000).  Huang and Kisgen (2013) 
examine 1,866 US listed firms, providing evidence that male executives – they focus 
on the CEO and CFO – initiate more acquisitions and issue debt more often than female 
executives.  Those results thus support the idea that females exhibit less overconfidence 
in major corporate decisions than men.  In addition, the authors show that female 
executives place wider bounds on earnings estimates and are more likely to exercise 
their stock options early.  In the accounting literature, Barua et al. (2010) conclude that 
female CFOs are associated with higher-quality earnings, based on a sample of 1,559 
US listed firms.  Levi et al. (2014) find that firms with more female directors are less 
likely to make acquisitions and, once these firms enter into M&As, pay lower bid 
premiums, which again indicates that females exhibit lower overconfidence.  Besides, 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) infer that gender-diverse boards are more likely to hold the 
CEO accountable for poor stock-price performance.  For a sample of 1,939 US listed 
firms between 1996 and 2003, they indeed find that CEO turnover is more sensitive to 
stock returns in firms with relatively more women on the board, hinting at stronger 
board monitoring in such firms.  Hence, boards with a larger fraction of female directors 
could play a more decisive role in preventing value-destroying acquisitions initiated by 
a firm’s management, either because of self-dealing behavior or hubris.  We therefore 
postulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. Acquirers with a larger fraction of female directors are associated 
with higher M&A announcement returns. 
 
53 
 
Nationality diversity.  Mi Choi et al. (2012) point out that foreigners could be better 
monitors since they are not part of the domestic cronyism that exists through 
regionalism, school relations, and kinship with the firm’s management and/or 
controlling shareholder.  So, by involving foreign directors, firms may subject 
themselves to stricter information and monitoring requirements, thereby strengthening 
their commitment to protecting the best interests of the firm’s minority investors.  
Moreover, these foreign directors may introduce other opinions and perspectives in the 
boardroom (Ararat et al., 2015).  Ujunwa (2012) further argues that by including 
foreigners in the board-selection process, firms increase the pool of highly-qualified 
director profiles to choose from.  For a sample of 896 South Korean listed firms during 
2004–2007, Mi Choi et al. (2012) find that the presence of foreign board members has 
a significant positive influence on a firm’s Tobin’s Q.  Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) 
reach a similar conclusion for 225 firms in Norway and Sweden between 1996 and 
1998.  Finally, Masulis et al. (2012) show that acquirers with foreign independent 
directors realize significantly higher M&A announcement returns in cross-border 
takeovers, particularly when the takeover target is from a foreign director’s home 
region.  Based upon the above diversity-related arguments, we put forward the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. Acquirers with a larger fraction of foreign directors are associated 
with higher M&A announcement returns. 
 
Age diversity.  Grund and Westergård-Nielsen (2007) and Wiersema and Bantel 
(1992), among others, argue that groups more heterogeneous in terms of age are more 
productive and consider more perspectives as to a topic/problem.  Age diversity within 
the board could thus prevent group-thinking and lead to a more effective board by 
balancing the enthusiasm, energy, and risk appetite of younger directors with the 
experience, caution, and risk aversion of older ones (Ararat et al., 2015).  Younger 
people are on average more familiar with new technologies and generate more novel 
ideas, whereas older persons usually have developed stronger networks and a better 
knowledge about intra-firm structures and relevant markets (Grund & Westergård-
Nielsen, 2007).  Most often, both kinds of human capital are needed to achieve superior 
performance.  Pelled et al. (1999) analyze 45 teams from three firms and identify a 
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positive correlation between age heterogeneity and group performance as evaluated by 
the team manager.  Likewise, Kilduff et al. (2000) point at a significant positive effect 
of age diversity on firm performance, using data on 159 managers in European firms.8  
So, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. Acquirers with a larger age dispersion among directors are 
associated with higher M&A announcement returns. 
 
Number of directorships.  Directors may not always be good supervisors of a firm’s 
management, particularly when they are too busy.  In this respect, Ahn et al. (2010) 
argue that directors with too many board appointments could be so overloaded that they 
cannot act as effective monitors because of their time constraints and limited attention 
capabilities.  Consistent with this view, Core et al. (1999) show for a sample of 205 US 
listed firms between 1982 and 1984 that the fraction of directors with more than three 
board seats is positively associated with measures of excess CEO compensation.  
Likewise, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find for 508 US listed firms during 1989–1995 
that boards with a majority of directors having three or more board appointments are 
associated with a lower ROA, a lower market-to-book ratio, and a smaller sensitivity of 
CEO turnover to firm performance.  Accordingly, over-boarded directors may prove 
unable to curb managerial agency problems in M&A decisions.  For a sample of 1,207 
M&As in the USA during 1998–2003, Ahn et al. (2010) demonstrate that acquirers with 
a higher average number of outside board seats held by each director are associated with 
lower acquirer shareholder abnormal returns surrounding deal announcement. 
In contrast, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the number of board appointments could 
proxy for director knowledge and expertise, as directors with multiple board seats likely 
have developed more extensive experience in monitoring and advising companies.  In 
addition, Ahn et al. (2010) contend that the number of directorships may act as a signal 
of director quality, as only highly effective board members are offered multiple 
directorships.  Besides, directors with multiple board seats could generate more benefits 
                                              
 
8 Kilduff et al. (2000) rely on a marketing simulation (Markstrat) to investigate the influence of demographic and 
cognitive team diversity on firm performance, which is measured as net market contribution (in dollars) and 
market share (in percentage terms). 
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for a firm, given that such directors likely are well connected; hence, they could exploit 
their network to access strategic resources, customers, and suppliers.  Moreover, these 
well-connected directors likely are also highly motivated to be vigilant and work hard, 
because of their earlier investments in establishing their reputation as decision experts.  
In line with the above arguments, firms announcing their first-time appointment of a 
‘busy’ director experience significantly positive abnormal returns (e.g., Ferris et al., 
2003).  Likewise, Di Pietra et al. (2008) identify a significant positive effect of the 
fraction of ‘busy’ directors on the market performance of 77 Italian firms.  Those 
findings are thus consistent with the view that directors serving on many boards tend to 
be well connected, with reputable human capital at stake.  The above findings therefore 
suggest that directors with multiple board appointments could be better monitors and 
advisors for acquiring companies. 
As the literature purports opposite arguments and results as regards the relation between 
directors with multiple board appointments and shareholder value, we postulate the 
following two alternative conjectures: 
Hypothesis 5a. Acquirers with a larger fraction of directors with multiple 
appointments are associated with lower M&A announcement returns. 
Hypothesis 5b. Acquirers with a larger fraction of directors with multiple 
appointments are associated with higher M&A announcement returns. 
 
Independent directors.  The literature considers boards with a larger fraction of 
independent directors to have better monitoring capabilities (e.g., Bertoni et al., 2014; 
Ferreira et al., 2011).  The idea is that those independent directors, who do not have a 
relationship with the company or its management, can better withstand the potentially 
colored information presented by the senior management and face less pressure from 
the firm’s various stakeholders.  In this respect, Dechow et al. (1996) find that the 
fraction of independent directors is inversely related to the likelihood of financial 
statement fraud.  Besides, Fama and Jensen (1983) emphasize that reputation concerns 
and a desire to obtain future board positions ensure that independent directors are more 
effective monitors.  Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), who conduct an event study around 
1,251 independent director appointments in US listed firms between 1981 and 1985, 
detect a significant positive stock price reaction.  In a Continental European context, 
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characterized by concentrated ownership, we expect those independent board members 
to play a vital role in directing a company’s focus on firm value, to the benefit of all 
shareholders.  Independent directors could indeed provide a valuable counterbalance 
vis-à-vis any self-dealing behavior by the firm’s management or controlling 
shareholder, who may rely on M&As to pursue their own goals.  In this respect, the 
M&A literature has pointed out that managers as well as large family shareholders may 
use their power to engage in industry-diversifying takeovers (Aktas et al., 2016; 
Amihud & Lev, 1981; Defrancq et al., 2016; Miller et al., 2010).  We therefore put 
forward the following hypothesis as to the relation between acquirer independent 
directors and M&A value creation: 
Hypothesis 6. Acquirers with a larger fraction of independent directors are 
associated with higher M&A announcement returns. 
 
CEO duality.  One person combining the positions of CEO and board chairman is often 
seen as an indication of weak corporate governance, since both a firm’s management 
and its supervision are in the hands of the same person.  As argued by Jensen (1993), 
CEOs who are also their board’s chairman cannot objectively judge their own decisions 
and performance.  This duality may also allow those CEOs to advance and endorse their 
personal preferences, without proper monitoring (Rhoades et al., 2001).  For their 
sample of 106 large takeovers in the USA, Hayward and Hambrick (1997) find that 
their three proxies for CEO hubris (i.e. media praise for the CEO, CEO relative 
compensation, and recent acquirer performance) are highly associated with the size of 
the takeover premium paid in subsequent M&As.  Those relations are further 
strengthened when thorough board monitoring is less likely, such as when the CEO is 
also the board chairman and when the board has a high proportion of inside directors.  
Likewise, Masulis et al. (2007) find a significant negative effect of CEO duality on the 
acquirer CAR for their sample of US M&As in the 1990–2003 time frame.  
Correspondingly, the quality of takeovers pursued by firms with such powerful CEOs 
is perceived to be lower.  The above arguments result in the following conjecture: 
Hypothesis 7. Acquirers whose functions of CEO and board chairman are 
combined by the same person are associated with lower M&A announcement 
returns. 
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2.3 Sample, variables and summary statistics 
2.3.1 Sample 
Our sample includes all the M&As covered by the Zephyr database of Bureau Van Dijk 
and initiated by listed acquiring firms with corporate headquarters in Continental 
Europe and announced between January 1, 2007 and April 30, 2013.9  We only keep 
the deals for which the acquirer held a stake less than 50% before deal announcement 
and obtained majority control of the target firm as a result of the transaction.  The above 
criteria generate an initial sample of 9,710 M&As.  We next remove the acquirers active 
in the financial services industry (US SIC code 6), as those firms are often subject to 
specific regulations and as their annual reports are usually compiled under different 
accounting standards (1,888 deals).  Finally, we only retain M&As for which the 
acquirer’s annual reports are available in the Amadeus database and its stock price 
information can be retrieved from Datastream.  The above criteria result in a final 
sample of 2,230 M&As. 
2.3.2 Variable Measurements 
In this section, we first introduce the event study methodology used to capture the 
acquirer shareholder abnormal return upon deal announcement.  Also, we provide more 
details on the board-data collection process and our measurement of the test variables. 
To capture the value creation in each transaction from the point of view of acquirer 
shareholders, we make use of the event study methodology.  Research in corporate 
finance typically posits that stock market investors impound the economic gains from 
synergies and/or a change in corporate control in the stock price of the combining 
companies at deal notification.  The most important advantage of the event study 
methodology is that it is forward-looking, implicitly accounting for the present value of 
all future M&A gains.  Also, it can be manipulated less easily by managers than 
                                              
 
9 The Zephyr database is commercialized by Bureau van Dijk and contains information on more than one million 
transactions worldwide, with pan-European deals dating back to 1997.  Zephyr provides information on several 
firm (e.g., name, industry, country, etc.) and deal (e.g., deal status, hostile bid, contested bid, etc.) characteristics.  
Furthermore, it can be linked easily to the Amadeus database (also Bureau Van Dijk), containing the annual 
accounts and board data of European companies.  Compared to Thomson Financial and Mergerstat, Zephyr has a 
larger coverage of European and smaller transactions. 
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accounting-based performance metrics and it is unrelated to the quality of deal 
implementation, i.e. post-M&A integration.  To capture the perceived value creation in 
each M&A, we calculate acquirer abnormal returns surrounding the deal announcement 
date.10  Acquirer abnormal returns are computed as the difference between realized 
returns and expected returns.  Expected returns are obtained from the market model, 
which is estimated over a clean period from 250 to 51 days prior to the event date (day 
0): 
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑗𝑡 is the realized return on the stock of company j on day t, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the realized 
return on the MSCI Europe index on day t, 𝛼𝑗 is the intercept, and 𝛽𝑗 is a measure of 
firm j’s systematic risk. 
The abnormal returns are summed over the event window [𝑇1, 𝑇2] to produce a 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR).  We use the [-1,+1] window in our main test, but 
also rely on other event windows to account for a potential stock price run-up before 
deal notification (e.g., Craninckx & Huyghebaert, 2011; Martynova & Renneboog, 
2011).  We examine the statistical significance of the average acquirer CAR by means 
of the test statistic developed by Dodd and Warner (1983).  The significance of the 
median CAR is assessed by means of the non-parametric Corrado test.  For each security 
i, the standardized abnormal return on day t (𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) is computed by dividing the 
abnormal return on that date (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) by its standard deviation (𝑠𝑖𝑡).  The standardized 
CAR (𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) over the event window [𝑇1, 𝑇2] is then calculated as follows: 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
1
√𝑇2 − 𝑇1 + 1
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
 
For a sample of N events, the test statistic (𝑡) that examines the null hypothesis of a zero 
cumulative abnormal return is obtained as: 
                                              
 
10 We do not have any information on M&A transactions that were proposed to the board but were disapproved 
by it, as the data on those proposed deals are not available in Zephyr.  Hence, in our dataset, we cannot observe 
the strongest expression of the board’s monitoring function, that is the disapproval of deals perceived to destroy 
shareholder value. 
 
59 
 
𝑡 = √𝑁
1
𝑁
∑𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
To collect the board data, we first access the yearly DVD releases of Amadeus.  Since 
the time window of our M&A sample spans from 2007 to 2013, we download the 
acquirer board data over the period 2006–2012.  So, for each company-year 
combination in the 2006–2012 time frame, we collect the data on the firm’s board 
members, including information on the directors’ given name, last name, company 
function or title, gender, nationality, and date of birth.  In European countries with a 
two-tier board structure, like in Austria, Germany and Poland, we focus on the effects 
of the supervisory board, as the executive board is mostly responsible for the firm’s 
day-to-day management.  While some information, i.e. first name, last name, and 
function is available in Amadeus as from 2006 onwards, other director characteristics 
such as gender, nationality, and date of birth could only be retrieved for some specific 
years.  As these attributes hardly change over time, we complete missing values by 
consulting the Amadeus DVDs in years for which those director characteristics are 
reported.  Besides, to further complete and clean the dataset, we manually collect 
director characteristics from the companies’ annual reports and websites, if disclosed.  
Unfortunately, for a number of board attributes, like the fraction of independent 
directors and CEO duality, the number of missing values in our dataset remains quite 
large. 
Table 2.1 provides more details about how we subsequently measure the explanatory 
variables in our analyses, together with the hypothesized impact of the test variables on 
M&A value creation.  Unless stated otherwise, the explanatory variables are measured 
at fiscal year-end before the M&A announcement date in order to avoid reverse-
causality concerns. 
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Table 2.1: Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
This table shows the definition of the dependent and explanatory variables, and the hypothesized effect of the explanatory variables 
on acquirer shareholder wealth effects around deal announcement. 
Dependent variable Definition 
 
CAR Cumulative abnormal return for acquirer shareholders over the [-1,+1] 
event window, with day 0 being the M&A announcement date 
 
Explanatory variables 
 
CAR 
Acquirer board characteristics 
 
BOARD SIZE Natural log of the number of directors on the acquirer board +/– 
GENDER DIVERSITY Fraction of acquirer board members that are female directors + 
NATIONALITY DIVERSITY Fraction of acquirer board members that have a nationality that differs 
from the country in which the acquirer has its corporate headquarters 
+ 
AGE DIVERSITY Standard deviation of the age of the acquirer board members + 
AVERAGE DIRECTOR AGE Average age of the acquirer board members 
 
MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS Fraction of acquirer board members that have at least three directorships +/– 
INDEPENDENCE Fraction of acquirer board members that are independent, i.e. non-
executive directors.  An independent director is expected to act 
independently from the firm’s management and controlling shareholder 
(European Commission, 2005 and 2007). 
+ 
CEO DUALITY Dummy = 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the acquirer board, 0 
otherwise 
– 
   
Control variables 
 
BLOCK Fraction of acquirer voting rights controlled by the firm’s largest ultimate 
shareholder 
 
CROSS-BORDER Dummy = 1 if the country in which the acquirer has its corporate 
headquarters is different from that of the target firm, 0 otherwise 
 
DIVERSIFICATION Dummy = 1 if none of the three-digit US SIC industries in which the 
acquirer is active equals one of the three-digit US SIC industries of the 
target firm, 0 otherwise 
 
 
RELATIVE DEAL SIZE Ratio of deal value to acquirer market value of equity + book value of 
financial debt 
 
STOCK PAYMENT Dummy = 1 if the M&A was paid at least in part in acquirer shares, 0 
otherwise 
 
TARGET LISTED Dummy = 1 if the target firm is listed on a stock exchange, 0 otherwise  
CASH RATIO Acquirer cash and cash equivalents / total assets  
LEVERAGE Acquirer long-term debt / total assets  
M/B Market-to-book ratio: market value of the acquirer ordinary (common) 
equity at the last day of the year prior to the M&A announcement date 
divided by the book value of the acquirer ordinary (common) equity 
 
FIRM SIZE Natural log of the acquirer market capitalization (in thousands euro) at the 
last day of the year prior to the M&A announcement date 
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2.3.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 2.2 displays the yearly, industry, and geographical distribution for the full sample (Panel A) 
as well as for the subsamples of domestic versus cross-border takeovers (Panel B), and industry-
related versus industry-diversifying M&As (Panel C).  The 2,230 sample deals were initiated by 
835 different acquirers.  Table 2.2, Panel A reveals that every sample year has a non-trivial number 
of M&As, with most deals occurring in the year 2007 (22.4% of the sample).  The acquirers are 
mostly active in personal and business services (26.1%) and in manufacturing (25.9%).  The 
geographical distribution of the acquirers is highly dispersed, with a considerable fraction of 
acquirers domiciled in France (27.9%), Sweden (17.5%), and Germany (15.6%).  Panel B shows 
that 1,203 sample deals (54.0%) are cross-border in nature.  Acquirers active in manufacturing 
(66.9%) and health, legal and social services (64.9%) are more likely to engage in cross-border 
M&As.  Finally, Panel C points out that 900 M&As (40.4%) are targeting a firm that shares no 
three-digit US SIC code with the acquirer.  The fraction of industry-diversifying deals is 
considerably larger for firms active in wholesale (56.7%), mining (51.3%), and manufacturing 
(51.0%), while smaller for firms in personal and business services (20.5%). 
 
Table 2.3 reports the average and median acquirer CAR over different event windows.  The largest 
acquirer stock price reaction takes place in the [-1,+1] window, with a significant abnormal price 
jump of 0.82% on average in the full sample (p < 0.01).  Over the [-5,+5] window, acquirer 
shareholders realize a significant average CAR of 0.77% (p < 0.01).  This significant positive CAR 
also arises over the [-35,+5] window, averaging to 0.70% (p < 0.05).  The median acquirer CAR is 
lower, yet still significantly different from zero over the [-1,+1] and [-5,+5] window (p < 0.01).  
Arguably, the above numbers point out that stock market investors perceive M&As by listed 
acquirers in Continental Europe during the 2007–2013 time frame to create shareholder value on 
average (see also Craninckx & Huyghebaert, 2011; Martynova & Renneboog, 2011). 
When comparing the subsamples of domestic and cross-border transactions in Panel B of Table 3, 
we note that domestic takeovers in general produce a somewhat larger CAR, yet only significantly 
so over the [-5,+5] event window (p < 10%).  Finally, Panel C of Table 2.3 reveals that the acquirer 
CAR is not significantly different across the industry-related and industry-diversifying M&As in 
our sample. 
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Table 2.2: Time, Industry and Geographical Distribution of the Sample 
This table displays the absolute and percentage distribution of transaction year, acquirer industry, and acquirer country for the full 
sample (Panel A), for the subsamples of domestic versus cross-border takeovers (Panel B), and for the subsamples of industry-
related versus industry-diversifying takeovers (Panel C).  All M&As were initiated by listed acquiring firms with corporate 
headquarters in Continental Europe and announced between January 1, 2007 and April 30, 2013.  The acquirer held a stake less than 
50% before deal announcement and obtained majority control of the target firm as a result. 
 
  Panel A: Full sample 
Panel B: Domestic versus cross-border 
transactions 
Panel C: Industry-related versus industry-
diversifying transactions 
   
Domestic 
transactions 
Cross-border 
transactions 
Industry-related 
transactions 
Industry-diversifying 
transactions 
  N Col% N Row% N Row% N Row% N Row% 
Year of announcement           
2007 500 22.42% 239 47.80% 261 52.20% 302 60.40% 198 39.60% 
2008 424 19.01% 181 42.69% 243 57.31% 257 60.61% 167 39.39% 
2009 237 10.63% 111 46.84% 126 53.16% 133 56.12% 104 43.88% 
2010 395 17.71% 208 52.66% 187 47.34% 233 58.99% 162 41.01% 
2011 337 15.11% 146 43.32% 191 56.68% 209 62.02% 128 37.98% 
2012 171 7.67% 72 42.11% 99 57.89% 97 56.73% 74 43.27% 
2013 166 7.44% 70 42.17% 96 57.83% 99 59.64% 67 40.36% 
           
Acquirer industry           
SIC 1: Mining 152 6.82% 91 59.87% 61 40.13% 74 48.68% 78 51.32% 
SIC 2: Food 271 12.15% 125 46.13% 146 53.87% 153 56.46% 118 43.54% 
SIC 3: Manufacturing 577 25.87% 191 33.10% 386 66.90% 283 49.05% 294 50.95% 
SIC 4: Transportation 223 10.00% 141 63.23% 82 36.77% 122 54.71% 101 45.29% 
SIC 5: Wholesale 194 8.70% 106 54.64% 88 45.36% 84 43.30% 110 56.70% 
SIC 7: Personal and business services 582 26.10% 290 49.83% 292 50.17% 463 79.55% 119 20.45% 
SIC 8: Health, legal and social services 225 10.09% 79 35.11% 146 64.89% 145 64.44% 80 35.56% 
SIC 9: Public Administration 6 0.27% 4 66.67% 2 33.33% 6 100.00% 0 0.00% 
           
Acquirer country           
AT: Austria 46 2.06% 12 26.09% 34 73.91% 22 47.83% 24 52.17% 
BE: Belgium 107 4.80% 42 39.25% 65 60.75% 68 63.55% 39 36.45% 
BG: Bulgaria 8 0.36% 6 75.00% 2 25.00% 3 37.50% 5 62.50% 
CZ: Czech Republic 5 0.22% 3 60.00% 2 40.00% 1 20.00% 4 80.00% 
DE: Germany 348 15.61% 177 50.86% 171 49.14% 190 54.60% 158 45.40% 
DK: Denmark 9 0.40% 3 33.33% 6 66.67% 7 77.78% 2 22.22% 
EE: Estonia 7 0.31% 4 57.14% 3 42.86% 1 14.29% 6 85.71% 
ES: Spain 111 4.98% 55 49.55% 56 50.45% 73 65.77% 38 34.23% 
FI: Finland 139 6.23% 47 33.81% 92 66.19% 93 66.91% 46 33.09% 
FR: France 621 27.85% 306 49.28% 315 50.72% 384 61.84% 237 38.16% 
GR: Greece 1 0.04% 0 0.00% 1 100.00% 0 0.00% 1 100.00% 
HU: Hungary 1 0.04% 0 0.00% 1 100.00% 0 0.00% 1 100.00% 
IT: Italy 134 6.01% 74 55.22% 60 44.78% 74 55.22% 60 44.78% 
LT: Lithuania 1 0.04% 1 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 100.00% 
LU: Luxembourg 1 0.04% 0 0.00% 1 100.00% 1 100.00% 0 0.00% 
LV: Latvia 2 0.09% 2 100.00% 0 0.00% 2 100.00% 0 0.00% 
NL: Netherlands 170 7.62% 51 30.00% 119 70.00% 112 65.88% 58 34.12% 
PL: Poland 78 3.50% 58 74.36% 20 25.64% 38 48.72% 40 51.28% 
PT: Portugal 31 1.39% 24 77.42% 7 22.58% 17 54.84% 14 45.16% 
RO: Romania 1 0.04% 1 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 100.00% 
SE: Sweden 391 17.53% 151 38.62% 240 61.38% 238 60.87% 153 39.13% 
SI: Slovenia 18 0.81% 10 55.56% 8 44.44% 6 33.33% 12 66.67% 
           
Total 2,230 100.00% 1,027 46.05% 1,203 53.95% 1,330 59.64% 900 40.36% 
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Table 2.3: Acquirer CARs over Various Event Windows 
This table presents the average and median acquirer CAR for different event windows.  The significance of the average CAR is 
tested by means of the Dodd and Warner (1983) parametric test.  The significance of the median CAR is tested by means of the 
non-parametric Corrado test.  Results are displayed for the full sample (Panel A) and for the subsamples of domestic versus cross-
border transactions (Panel B) and for the subsamples of industry-related versus industry-diversifying transactions (Panel C).  The 
CARs that are significantly different from zero are highlighted in bold.  CARs significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are marked 
with *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
   Event window 
   [-1,+1] [-5,+5] [-35,+5]         
Panel A: Full sample      
 Averages      
  CAR% 0.8246*** 0.7719*** 0.6998** 
  p-value 0.0000 0.0001 0.0301          
 Medians       
  CAR% 0.4322*** 0.4272*** 0.2218 
  p-value 0.0000 0.0001 0.1945          
    
Panel B: Domestic versus cross-border transactions    
 Domestic transactions 
     
 Averages       
  CAR% 0.9625*** 1.1741*** 1.0815** 
  p-value 0.0000 0.0014 0.0409          
 Cross-border transactions 
     
 Averages       
  CAR% 0.7071*** 0.4290** 0.3744 
  p-value 0.0000 0.0356 0.3402          
 Comparison of domestic and cross-border transactions (difference in means) 
 Averages 
 
   
 
 
  ∆CAR% 0.2554 0.7451* 0.7071 
  p-value 0.2419 0.0654 0.2745          
    
Panel C: Industry-related versus industry-diversifying transactions    
 Industry-related transactions 
     
 Averages       
  CAR% 0.9369*** 0.5244** 0.3306 
  p-value 0.0000 0.0269 0.4087          
 Industry-diversifying transactions 
     
 Averages       
  CAR% 0.6577*** 1.1397*** 1.2487** 
  p-value 0.0002 0.0015 0.0204          
 Comparison of industry-related and industry-diversifying transactions (difference in means) 
 Averages 
 
   
 
 
  ∆CAR% 0.2792 -0.6152 -0.9181 
  p-value 0.2081 0.1345 0.1627 
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Figure 2.1 depicts the average acquirer CAR surrounding the deal announcement date.  
Before deal notification, it is slightly negative, yet close to zero.  At M&A 
announcement, the average acquirer CAR exhibits a significant upward jump.  This 
pattern is highly comparable to that found by Martynova and Renneboog (2011, p. 232), 
who analyze 2,419 M&As taking place in Europe between 1993 and 2001. 
 
Figure 2.1: M&A Value Creation of Acquirer Shareholders at M&A 
Announcement 
Figure 2.1 shows the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for acquirer shareholders to the announcement of an 
M&A from 35 days before to 5 days after the deal announcement date (day 0).  The benchmark used in the market 
model is the MSCI Europe index; the model parameters are estimated over 200 days, starting 250 days before the 
event date. 
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Table 2.4 reports summary statistics for all explanatory variables.  To limit the influence 
of outliers, all variables – except dummy variables – are winsorized at 1%99%.  Panel 
A of Table 2.4 shows that the average BOARD SIZE is 2.1, which corresponds to eight 
directors.  This number differs significantly across the firms pursuing domestic (2.0) 
and cross-border (2.2) transactions.  However, it is comparable across the acquirers 
making industry-related and industry-diversifying M&As, as shown in Panel C of Table 
2.4.  As regards board composition, we note that 10.5% of acquirer directors in 
Continental Europe are females, while only 2.2% have another nationality than that of 
the acquirer.  Panel B reveals that firms pursuing cross-border M&As have a 
significantly larger fraction of female board members than firms engaging in purely 
domestic transactions (11.3% vs. 9.9%).  The standard deviation of director age equals 
8.7 years on average, while the average acquirer director is 57.2 years old.  The directors 
of firms engaging in cross-border takeovers are significantly older (57.7 years) than the 
directors of firms making purely domestic deals (56.5 years).  On average, 3.2% of 
acquirer directors hold three or more board positions, a phenomenon that is more 
prevalent among the directors in cross-border M&As than among the directors in 
domestic M&As (3.9% vs. 2.4%).  For the subsample of acquirers with the necessary 
data, we observe that the average board has 54.2% of independent directors.11  Finally, 
the positions of CEO and board chairman are combined by the same person in 17.1% 
of sample transactions.  This percentage does not depend upon whether the deal is cross-
border in nature or not.  However, the firms engaging in industry-diversifying M&As 
have a significantly larger fraction of dual CEOs (22.2%).  Arguably, the above results 
indicate that director attributes differ most importantly depending upon the cross-border 
nature of the sample deals. 
                                              
 
11 Although the European Commission recommended in 2005 (EC/2005/162) that “the (supervisory) board should 
comprise a sufficient number of committed non-executive directors, who play no role in the management of the 
company or its group and who are independent in that they are free of any material conflict of interest”, the 
implementation of this recommendation in legislation was left to the various EU member states.  In a report on 
the application of the recommendation by EU member states in 2007 (SEC/2007/1021), it became clear that the 
independence criterion imposed by the individual member states largely reflected the EC recommendation.  
Nonetheless, some member states had only specified very general independence criteria, while others had 
specified no criteria at all. 
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The average fraction of voting rights controlled by the firm’s largest ultimate 
shareholder amounts to 33.9%.  Non-tabulated results reveal that 1,594 sample firms 
(71.5%) have a shareholder controlling at least 20% of voting rights.  From examining 
those 1,594 firms in more detail, we conclude that this large shareholder is most often 
either an individual or a family (429 firms; 19.2%), an institutional investor (408 firms; 
18.3%), another industrial/ service corporation (624 firms; 28.0%), or a government (47 
firms; 2.1%).  Panel B of Table 2.4 further reveals that acquirers of a domestic takeover 
target have a significantly larger dominant owner than acquirers of a cross-border target 
firm (35.4% vs. 32.7%).  Besides, acquirers of an unrelated target firm have a 
significantly larger blockholder than acquirers of an industry peer (35.6% vs. 32.9%). 
Interestingly, Panel B of Table 2.4 further shows that the industry-diversifying 
takeovers are significantly more likely to occur in the subsample of domestic M&As 
(44.9%) than in the subsample of cross-border M&As (36.5%).  Likewise, Panel C 
reveals that the cross-border deals are significantly more likely to arise in the subsample 
of industry-related M&As (57.4%) than in the subsample of industry-diversifying 
M&As (48.8%).  RELATIVE DEAL SIZE averages to 19.4%.  In line with this finding, 
only 6.4% of takeover targets are publicly listed firms.  The fraction of takeovers that 
are paid at least in part in acquirer shares is 27.4%.  For domestic transactions, 37.4% 
of M&As are partly paid in acquirer shares, which is significantly more than the 18.5% 
in the subsample of cross-border M&As. 
The average acquirer CASH RATIO amounts to 11.4% and is significantly higher for 
acquirers engaging in domestic takeovers (12.4%).  Average acquirer LEVERAGE 
equals 13.6%; it is higher for firms pursuing cross-border M&As (14.5%).  The average 
M/B is 2.6 in the full sample, yet is significantly higher for firms engaging in cross-
border and industry-related M&As.  Finally, FIRM SIZE averages to 20.6 in the full 
sample and is significantly larger for the cross-border acquirers (21.3). 
 
The correlation matrix, presented in Table 2.5, shows relatively small correlations 
among the various explanatory variables, suggesting that our models and estimates will 
not suffer from any multicollinearity problems. 
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics on the explanatory variables for the full sample (Panel A), for the subsamples of domestic 
versus cross-border transactions (Panel B), and related versus industry-diversifying transactions (Panel C).  Table 2.1 presents a 
definition of all variables.  The last two columns show the p-values of a two-group comparison test. 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev.   N Mean Median Std. Dev.   
p-value 
on t-test 
p-value on 
Wilcoxon 
text 
Panel A: Full sample              
BOARD SIZE 2,230 2.0911 2.1972 0.7023         
GENDER DIVERSITY 2,167 0.1051 0.0476 0.1486         
NATIONALITY DIVERSITY 2,227 0.0223 0.0000 0.0841         
AGE DIVERSITY 1,206 8.6846 8.4234 3.4709         
AVERAGE DIRECTOR AGE 1,238 57.2111 57.6349 5.6679         
MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS 2,230 0.0322 0.0000 0.1167         
INDEPENDENCE 674 0.5415 0.5714 0.2568         
CEO DUALITY 450 0.1711 0.0000 0.3770         
BLOCK 1,919 0.3388 0.3000 0.2128         
CROSS-BORDER 2,230 0.5395 1.0000 0.4986         
DIVERSIFICATION 2,230 0.4036 0.0000 0.4907         
RELATIVE DEAL SIZE 1,042 0.1941 0.0378 0.3452         
TARGET LISTED 2,230 0.0637 0.0000 0.2442         
STOCK PAYMENT 766 0.2742 0.0000 0.4464         
CASH RATIO 2,230 0.1139 0.0789 0.1123         
LEVERAGE 2,230 0.1364 0.1145 0.1217         
M/B 2,230 2.6013 2.0900 2.1115         
FIRM SIZE 2,230 20.6359 20.5327 2.3031                      
Panel B: Domestic versus cross-border transactions 
 Domestic transactions  Cross-border transactions    
BOARD SIZE 1,027 1.9746 1.9459 0.7629  1,203 2.1906 2.1972 0.6296  0.0000 0.0000 
GENDER DIVERSITY 982 0.0989 0.0000 0.1490  1,185 0.1103 0.0625 0.1481  0.0767 0.0119 
NATIONALITY DIVERSITY 1,025 0.0223 0.0000 0.0883  1,202 0.0222 0.0000 0.0804  0.9599 0.0626 
AGE DIVERSITY 516 8.6109 8.1413 3.8783  690 8.7397 8.5048 3.1336  0.5238 0.3673 
AVERAGE DIRECTOR AGE 538 56.5270 57.0258 6.1631  700 57.7368 58.1784 5.1994  0.0002 0.0008 
MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS 1,027 0.0243 0.0000 0.1134  1,203 0.0389 0.0000 0.1191  0.0034 0.0000 
INDEPENDENCE 288 0.5540 0.5455 0.2655  386 0.5349 0.5833 0.2536  0.5308 0.5221 
CEO DUALITY 166 0.1928 0.0000 0.3957  284 0.1585 0.0000 0.3658  0.3521 0.3515 
BLOCK 868 0.3538 0.3165 0.2116  1,051 0.3265 0.2900 0.2131  0.0050 0.0019 
DIVERSIFICATION 1,027 0.4489 0.0000 0.4976  1,203 0.3649 0.0000 0.4816  0.0001 0.0001 
RELATIVE DEAL SIZE 451 0.2060 0.0432 0.3509  591 0.1850 0.0327 0.3408  0.3305 0.0529 
TARGET LISTED 1,027 0.0555 0.0000 0.2291  1,203 0.0707 0.0000 0.2564  0.1442 0.1441 
STOCK PAYMENT 361 0.3740 0.0000 0.4845  405 0.1852 0.0000 0.3889  0.0000 0.0000 
CASH RATIO 1,027 0.1240 0.0869 0.1258  1,203 0.1053 0.0753 0.0986  0.0001 0.0321 
LEVERAGE 1,027 0.1260 0.0922 0.1253  1,203 0.1452 0.1307 0.1179  0.0002 0.0000 
M/B 1,027 2.5148 1.9200 2.3480  1,203 2.6752 2.1900 1.8842  0.0737 0.0000 
FIRM SIZE 1,027 19.8254 19.7659 2.2296  1,203 21.3279 21.4377 2.1336  0.0000 0.0000              
Panel C: Industry-related versus diversifying transactions 
 Industry-related transactions  Industry-diversifying transactions    
BOARD SIZE 1,330 2.0949 2.1972 0.6712  900 2.0856 2.0794 0.7463  0.7612 0.8273 
GENDER DIVERSITY 1,296 0.1069 0.0588 0.1466  871 0.1025 0.0000 0.1515  0.4950 0.2231 
NATIONALITY DIVERSITY 1,328 0.0215 0.0000 0.0825  899 0.0234 0.0000 0.0865  0.5895 0.3552 
AGE DIVERSITY 756 8.594 8.3401 3.5421  450 8.8368 8.5153 3.3461  0.2403 0.2295 
AVERAGE DIRECTOR AGE 774 57.131 57.5920 5.6553  464 57.3444 57.7913 5.6924  0.5218 0.2977 
MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS 1,330 0.0327 0.0000 0.1109  900 0.0314 0.0000 0.1248  0.8017 0.1410 
INDEPENDENCE 405 0.5478 0.5833 0.2626  269 0.5308 0.5556 0.2473  0.5690 0.5440 
CEO DUALITY 283 0.1413 0.0000 0.3490  167 0.2216 0.0000 0.4165  0.0291 0.0292 
BLOCK 1,239 0.3293 0.2930 0.2102  680 0.3562 0.3199 0.2165  0.0082 0.0087 
CROSS-BORDER 1,330 0.5744 1.0000 0.4946  900 0.4878 0.0000 0.5001  0.0001 0.0001 
RELATIVE DEAL SIZE 649 0.1936 0.0407 0.3412  393 0.1949 0.0320 0.3520  0.9524 0.6967 
TARGET LISTED 1,330 0.0639 0.0000 0.2447  900 0.0633 0.0000 0.2437  0.9564 0.9564 
STOCK PAYMENT 478 0.2636 0.0000 0.4410  288 0.2917 0.0000 0.4553  0.3996 0.3992 
CASH RATIO 1,330 0.1147 0.0815 0.1122  900 0.1128 0.0758 0.1125  0.7045 0.2639 
LEVERAGE 1,330 0.1337 0.1145 0.1176  900 0.1404 0.1135 0.1275  0.2016 0.5806 
M/B 1,330 2.6622 2.1300 2.1345  900 2.5113 2.0400 2.0751  0.0979 0.0556 
FIRM SIZE 1,330 20.5926 20.4279 2.3194  900 20.7000 20.7266 2.2785  0.2804 0.2353 
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Table 2.5: Correlation Table 
This table reports the correlation coefficients and corresponding p-values for the explanatory variables for the sample of 2,230 M&As initiated by listed acquirers in Continental Europe during 
2007–2013.  Table 2.1 presents a definition of all variables.  Correlations significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively.  p-values are reported between 
parentheses. 
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GENDER 0.0741*** 
                
  DIVERSITY (0.0006) 
                
NATIONALITY  0.0924*** -0.0473** 
               
  DIVERSITY (0.0000) (0.0279) 
               
AGE 0.0880*** 0.0898*** 0.0463 
              
  DIVERSITY (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.1082) 
              
AVERAGE 0.1933*** -0.0429 0.0708** 0.1606*** 
             
  DIRECTOR AGE (0.0000) (0.1317) (0.0127) (0.0000) 
             
MULTIPLE  -0.0248 -0.0811*** -0.0180 -0.0582** 0.0816*** 
            
  DIRECTORSHIPS (0.2411) (0.0002) (0.3957) (0.0435) (0.0041) 
            
INDEPENDENCE 0.0872** 0.1531*** -0.0683* -0.1459*** -0.0227 -0.0933** 
           
 (0.0236) (0.0001) (0.0770) (0.0008) (0.6010) (0.0154) 
           
CEO DUALITY -0.0036 -0.0944** -0.0608 0.1331*** 0.0424 -0.0282 -0.1266*** 
          
 (0.9386) (0.0455) (0.1977) (0.0051) (0.3722) (0.5504) (0.0072) 
          
BLOCK -0.0790*** 0.0772*** 0.0265 0.1623*** -0.0595** -0.0838*** 0.0138 0.3065*** 
         
 (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.2466) (0.0000) (0.0491) (0.0002) (0.7396) (0.0000) 
         
CROSS-BORDER 0.1534*** 0.0380* -0.0011 0.0184 0.1058*** 0.0621*** 0.1226*** -0.0440 -0.0640*** 
        
 (0.0000) (0.0767) (0.9599) (0.5238) (0.0002) (0.0034) (0.0014) (0.3521) (0.0050) 
        
DIVERSIFICATION -0.0064 -0.0147 0.0114 0.0338 0.0182 -0.0053 -0.0572 0.1029** 0.0529** -0.0853* 
       
 (0.7612) (0.4950) (0.5895) (0.2403) (0.5218) (0.8017) (0.1380) (0.0291) (0.0188) (0.0001) 
       
RELATIVE DEAL -0.0174 0.1026*** 0.0088 -0.0541 0.0103 -0.0290 -0.0532 -0.1196** 0.0511 -0.0302 -0.0026 
      
  SIZE (0.5748) (0.0011) (0.7756) (0.1946) (0.8026) (0.3489) (0.3103) (0.0436) (0.1254) (0.3305) (0.9341) 
      
STOCK PAYMENT -0.1269*** -0.1030*** 0.0430 0.0039 -0.1171** -0.0568 -0.0522 0.0527 -0.0563 -0.2112*** -0.0012 0.0249 
     
 (0.0004) (0.0048) (0.2341) (0.9348) (0.0121) (0.1165) (0.3804) (0.4365) (0.1497) (0.0000) (0.9564) (0.5198) 
     
TARGET LISTED 0.0092 -0.0526** -0.0146 -0.0220 0.0222 0.0054 0.0169 0.0953** -0.0284 0.0309 0.0305 0.0639** 0.0296 
    
 (0.6645) (0.0142) (0.4917) (0.4448) (0.4351) (0.7991) (0.6622) (0.0433) (0.2135) (0.1442) (0.3996) (0.0393) (0.4135) 
    
CASH RATIO -0.1222*** 0.0051 0.0232 -0.0386 -0.1122*** -0.0308 -0.1039*** 0.0529 0.0077 -0.0829*** -0.0080 0.0379 -0.0161 0.0465 
   
 (0.0000) (0.8122) (0.2738) (0.1798) (0.0001) (0.1461) (0.0069) (0.2628) (0.7368) (0.0001) (0.7045) (0.2220) (0.4472) (0.1988) 
   
LEVERAGE 0.1688*** 0.0007 -0.0338 0.0279 0.1624*** 0.0038 0.0328 -0.1512*** 0.0003 0.0788*** 0.0271 -0.0690** -0.0065 -0.0475 -0.2941*** 
  
 (0.0000) (0.9746) (0.1103) (0.3338) (0.0000) (0.8581) (0.3945) (0.0013) (0.9883) (0.0002) (0.2016) (0.0259) (0.7607) (0.1888) (0.0000) 
  
M/B -0.0288 -0.0298 0.0028 0.0319 -0.0736*** 0.0455** 0.0823** -0.1360*** 0.0635*** 0.0379* -0.0351* -0.0016 -0.0285 0.0102 0.0834*** 0.0292 
 
 (0.1739) (0.1657) (0.8957) (0.2683) (0.0096) (0.0319) (0.0326) (0.0038) (0.0054) (0.0737) (0.0979) (0.9586) (0.1786) (0.7772) (0.0001) (0.1685) 
 
FIRM SIZE 0.3795*** 0.0455** -0.0227 -0.0200 0.3385*** 0.0396* 0.2285*** -0.1695*** -0.1408*** 0.3253*** 0.0229 -0.1352*** 0.1034*** -0.2704*** -0.2375*** 0.2431*** 0.2169*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0340) (0.2845) (0.4879) (0.0000) (0.0614) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2804) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
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2.4 Empirical results 
We start this section by examining the influence of board size and composition on the 
acquirer CAR obtained from the event study, by means of an OLS regression analysis.  
In addition to reporting results for the full sample (in Table 2.6), we also present the 
regression output for the subsamples of domestic versus cross-border M&As (in Table 
2.7) and industry-related versus industry-diversifying M&As (in Table 2.8).  All models 
always include year, country, and industry fixed effects.  Lastly, we examine the 
robustness of our findings to a number of alternative model specifications and variable 
definitions, along a discussion of potential methodologic issues related to endogeneity. 
 
2.4.1 Impact of Board Characteristics on M&A Value Creation 
Table 2.6 reports the OLS regression results for the acquirer CAR over the [-1,+1] event 
window.  Model 1 shows the results from a model that only includes the control 
variables, except for RELATIVE DEAL SIZE and STOCK PAYMENT, given that a lot of 
data on these two variables are missing (as shown in Table 4).  If anything, we expect 
firms to disclose the transaction size and payment consideration for their largest/most 
valuable M&As.  In model 2, we include all the test and control variables, which 
considerably reduces the sample size.  In model 3, we leave out STOCK PAYMENT, 
while RELATIVE DEAL SIZE is additionally removed from model 4.  Model 5 then 
presents the results from a reduced-form model that now also removes the director age 
characteristics.  In model 6, we introduce an interaction term between NATIONALITY 
DIVERSITY and CROSS-BORDER.  In model 7, we interact NATIONALITY DIVERSITY 
with a dummy that equals one if one of the acquirer’s foreign directors has the same 
nationality as that of the takeover target (OVERLAPPING).  Finally, in model 8 and 9, 
we respectively include BLOCK and ROA to examine the robustness of our findings 
after controlling for the stake held by the firm’s largest ultimate shareholder. 
BOARD SIZE has no significant influence on acquirer shareholder announcement 
returns in Table 6.  So, we find support for neither Hypothesis 1a nor Hypothesis 1b.  In 
line with Hypothesis 2, we do identify a weakly significant positive coefficient on 
GENDER DIVERSITY in models 4, 6, and 7 of Table 2.6 (p < 0.10).  This outcome thus 
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confirms the idea that women are less likely to fall prey to hubris in M&A decisions 
and/or are blessed with better monitoring capabilities than men. 
In contrast to Hypothesis 3, we note a significant negative effect of NATIONALITY 
DIVERSITY on acquirer shareholder abnormal returns in models 2 and 3 (p < 0.05).  
Once we interact the fraction of foreign directors on the board with CROSS-BORDER 
(model 6), we infer that the sum of the coefficients on the simple term and the interaction 
term is 0.0025, which is not significantly different from zero.  Together, those results 
thus indicate that the earlier negative coefficient on NATIONALITY DIVERSITY likely 
is driven by the domestic takeovers in our sample.  Accordingly, a larger fraction of 
foreign directors on the board is detrimental only for acquirers pursuing purely domestic 
takeovers.  Probably, those foreign directors do not have the same knowledge about 
local regulations, industry structures, consumer preferences, and managerial practices 
as domestic ones.  Hence, they may encounter more difficulties in gathering the 
necessary soft information needed to evaluate a purely domestic transaction.  In this 
respect, Masulis et al. (2012) also refer to foreign directors’ inability to attend and 
prepare all board meetings.  However, as acquirers expand through cross-border 
takeovers, this negative effect of foreign directors completely vanishes.  The latter 
outcome thus indicates that foreign directors are as good as domestic ones in evaluating 
cross-border deals or that their negative monitoring effect now becomes offset by a 
positive advisory effect.  Once we interact NATIONALITY DIVERSITY with 
OVERLAPPING (in model 7), we cannot find a significant effect either.  Foreign 
directors are thus not at a strategic advantage to evaluate M&As of takeover targets with 
whom they share their nationality.  The latter outcome is thus not in line with earlier 
research by Masulis et al. (2012), who conclude that firms with foreign independent 
directors are able to capitalize on those directors in their cross-border takeovers of 
targets located in countries in which one of those foreign directors resides.  However, 
Masulis et al. did not carefully disentangle the notions ‘foreign’ and ‘independence’ in 
their variable definition.  Besides, and unlike our approach, they would classify US 
citizens working or living in a foreign country as foreign independent directors at US 
listed firms. 
In support of Hypothesis 4, AGE DIVERSITY has a positive influence on M&A value 
creation, although this variable is only significant at the 10% level in model 3.  So, we 
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find some weak evidence that the age dispersion among directors can add to the 
productivity of director teams (see also Wiersema & Bantel, 1992; Grund & Westergård-
Nielsen, 2007), might prevent group-thinking, and result in more effective boards 
(Ararat et al., 2015).  If anything, the effect of the average age of a firm’s directors, 
which is included as a control variable in our regression models, is positive (yet never 
significantly so in Table 2.6). 
Table 2.6, models 2 and 3 further show that acquirers with a larger fraction of directors 
having at least three board appointments realize a significantly larger CAR (p < 0.01).  
This finding provides empirical validation for Hypothesis 5b and thus also rejects 
Hypothesis 5a.  Arguably, well-connected directors seem able to use their broad 
experience in monitoring and advisory services to make more informed decisions and 
provide more valuable support to firms pursuing external growth.  Having directors with 
multiple board appointments may also point to better director quality on average, as only 
highly effective board members are offered multiple directorships (Ahn et al., 2010).  
As to INDEPENDENCE, we identify a significant positive impact on the acquirer CAR, 
in line with Hypothesis 6 (p < 0.05 in models 2, 3, 6, 8 and 9; p < 0.10 otherwise).  This 
finding is consistent with the idea that independent directors can better withstand the 
potentially colored information presented by the senior management and face less 
pressure from the firm’s various stakeholders.  In addition, reputation concerns and a 
desire to obtain future board positions tend to increase the monitoring effectiveness of 
independent directors, leading to better M&A outcomes.  Lastly, Table 2.6 indicates that 
CEO DUALITY is not significantly associated with acquirer shareholder abnormal 
returns at deal announcement.  This result likely indicates that the conflict of interest 
with minority investors remains limited in acquiring firms with a combined CEO-
chairman.  CEO duality in Continental Europe indeed often indicates that a firm’s 
founder or a member of the controlling family combines both positions; and those types 
of major owners also care about maintaining control of their firm and preserving the 
family’s socioemotional wealth (see also Aktas et al., 2016; Defrancq et al., 2016).  In 
contrast, in an Anglo-Saxon environment, CEO duality more likely reflects managerial 
entrenchment, which often goes hand in hand with investor expropriation behavior (e.g., 
Rhoades et al., 2001). 
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Interestingly, once we include BLOCK (ROA) in the regression model, we find that our 
earlier results as to the test variables – parameter estimates and significance levels – are 
not affected; compare models 5 and 8 in Table 2.6 for this purpose.  This same 
conclusion also arises when we introduce BLOCK (ROA) in models 2 and 3 of Table 2.6 
(not reported in a table).  The results from those extra tests are important, as they suggest 
that controlling shareholders, who may have a large say in the composition of the board 
of directors, are not the main reason for the relations that we document in Table 2.6.  A 
similar reasoning holds for ROA, a measure of firm performance, which may, as 
suggested by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), impact the composition of the board, yet 
does not influence the modeled relations in Table 2.6. In other words, these extra tests 
allow us to deal with potential endogeneity concerns because of an omitted variable 
when building the OLS regression model (see also Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003).  
Moreover, as the strongest correlation between BLOCK and any of the board attributes 
equals only 0.31 (with the variable CEO DUALITY), we conclude that board structure 
is not uniquely driven by ownership structure.  A similar conclusion arises from studying 
the relations between board size and composition and firm performance.  This inference 
is also reflected in the maximum variance inflation factor (VIF), which is always well 
below five for every model and which is not largely affected after including BLOCK 
(model 8) or ROA (model 9). 
As to the control variables, we note that CROSS-BORDER has a significant positive 
effect on the acquirer CAR (p < 0.10), which suggests that listed firms in Continental 
Europe were able to take advantage of the imperfections in international capital, factor, 
and product markets when expanding their business into other countries/markets (see 
also Martynova & Renneboog, 2011).  In line with the literature (e.g., Amihud & Lev, 
1981; Defrancq et al., 2016), DIVERSIFICATION has a significant negative coefficient.  
RELATIVE DEAL SIZE, STOCK PAYMENT, and TARGET LISTED are never 
significant.  Finally, although most acquirer characteristics are not significant either, we 
do find that FIRM SIZE has a highly significant negative influence on shareholder 
abnormal returns surrounding the deal announcement date (p < 0.01 in most of the 
models), a result that is in line with the earlier findings of Moeller et al. (2004).  
Correspondingly, the larger acquirers in our sample engage in M&As that create 
significantly less shareholder value than the smaller sample firms. 
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Table 2.6: Board Characteristics and M&A Value Creation 
This table shows the OLS regression results as to the acquirer cumulative abnormal return over the [-1,+1] window.  Table 2.1 
presents a definition of all explanatory variables and their hypothesized effect on the acquirer CAR.  All the control variables are 
measured at fiscal-year end before M&A and are winsorized at 1%99%.  Year, country and industry fixed effects are included.  
Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively.  p-values are reported between 
parentheses. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                    
BOARD SIZE 
 
0.0006 0.0047 -0.0019 0.0006 -0.0000 0.0010 0.0007 0.0016   
(0.9572) (0.6438) (0.8093) (0.9363) (0.9945) (0.8918) (0.9278) (0.8230) 
GENDER DIVERSITY 
 
0.0155 0.0191 0.0346* 0.0301 0.0322* 0.0322* 0.0289 0.0304   
(0.6573) (0.4810) (0.0770) (0.1142) (0.0877) (0.0904) (0.1338) (0.1111) 
NATIONALITY DIVERSITY 
 
-0.2153** -0.1562** -0.0676 -0.0672 -0.2972 -0.0178 -0.0677 -0.0665   
(0.0385) (0.0304) (0.2247) (0.2075) (0.2262) (0.7582) (0.2074) (0.1964) 
NAT. DIVERSITY * CROSS-BORDER 
 
    
  
0.2997 
   
  
    
  
(0.2660) 
   
NAT. DIVERSITY * OVERLAPPING 
 
    
   
-0.1301 
  
  
    
   
(0.4755) 
  
AGE DIVERSITY 
 
0.0014 0.0016* 0.0005 
     
  
(0.2336) (0.0994) (0.4790) 
     
AVERAGE DIRECTOR AGE 
 
0.0012 0.0011 0.0006 
     
  
(0.2757) (0.1065) (0.2274) 
     
MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS 
 
0.2672*** 0.2337*** 0.0598 0.0601 0.0539 0.0726 0.0588 0.0644   
(0.0008) (0.0001) (0.3275) (0.3296) (0.3598) (0.2941) (0.3315) (0.2893) 
INDEPENDENCE 
 
0.0965** 0.0681*** 0.0324* 0.0325* 0.0321** 0.0333* 0.0334** 0.0324**   
(0.0404) (0.0038) (0.0506) (0.0525) (0.0484) (0.0561) (0.0458) (0.0470) 
CEO DUALITY 
 
0.0050 0.0042 -0.0048 -0.0043 -0.0053 -0.0044 -0.0059 -0.0049   
(0.6717) (0.6482) (0.4163) (0.4432) (0.3616) (0.4441) (0.3052) (0.4056) 
BLOCK 
 
    
    
0.0157 
 
  
    
    
(0.2656) 
 
ROA 
 
    
     
0.0200   
    
     
(0.7472) 
CROSS-BORDER 
 
0.0216* 0.0157* 0.0138** 0.0127** 0.0090* 0.0115** 0.0125** 0.0129**   
(0.0656) (0.0850) (0.0347) (0.0460) (0.0951) (0.0455) (0.0473) (0.0441) 
DIVERSIFICATION 
 
-0.0175** -0.0139** -0.0091* -0.0105** -0.0098** -0.0098** -0.0105** -0.0104**   
(0.0308) (0.0108) (0.0722) (0.0401) (0.0481) (0.0457) (0.0379) (0.0406) 
RELATIVE DEAL SIZE 
 
0.0080 0.0051 
      
  
(0.2918) (0.4107) 
      
STOCK PAYMENT 
 
0.0021   
      
  
(0.8530)   
      
TARGET LISTED 0.0024 0.0123 0.0124 0.0110 0.0097 0.0092 0.0106 0.0101 0.0099  
(0.5909) (0.3583) (0.2155) (0.1934) (0.2287) (0.2617) (0.2021) (0.2194) (0.2104) 
CASH RATIO -0.0046 0.0150 0.0177 -0.0152 -0.0159 -0.0142 -0.0150 -0.0189 -0.0169  
(0.7152) (0.7706) (0.6599) (0.6093) (0.5802) (0.6225) (0.6025) (0.5280) (0.5897) 
LEVERAGE 0.0127 -0.0432 -0.0184 -0.0205 -0.0127 -0.0084 -0.0095 -0.0131 -0.0099  
(0.2299) (0.3445) (0.4896) (0.3582) (0.5655) (0.6842) (0.6431) (0.5577) (0.6523) 
M/B 0.0001 0.0019 0.0016 0.0009 0.0012 0.0010 0.0012 0.0009 0.0010  
(0.8643) (0.6293) (0.4544) (0.5855) (0.4687) (0.5384) (0.4792) (0.6036) (0.4848) 
FIRM SIZE -0.0041*** -0.0094** -0.0092*** -0.0064*** -0.0061*** -0.0058*** -0.0062*** -0.0060*** -0.0064***  
(0.0000) (0.0176) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0011) 
Constant 0.0458*** 0.0421 0.0462 0.0513 0.0788** 0.0745** 0.0796** 0.0673* 0.0841**  
(0.0003) (0.4939) (0.2549) (0.1810) (0.0196) (0.0261) (0.0184) (0.0568) (0.0249)   
    
      
Observations 2,206 200 279 439 448 448 448 448 448 
Adjusted R² 0.0555 0.3810 0.2618 0.1530 0.1490 0.1593 0.1517 0.1520 0.1500 
Log likelihood 0.0236 0.151 0.0756 0.0133 0.0119 0.0214 0.0125 0.0129 0.0106 
Maximum VIF 1.18 2.87 2.69 2.37 2.22 4.23 2.22 2.23 2.35 
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2.4.2 Impact of Board Characteristics in Domestic versus Cross-Border 
M&As 
Given the above-outlined importance of whether an M&A is cross-border in nature or 
not (in Tables 2.3 and 2.4) and the role of nationality diversity in explaining the acquirer 
CAR (in Table 2.66), we next separately examine the influence of board size and 
composition in the subsamples of domestic versus cross-border transactions.  In those 
models, we obviously need to eliminate the dummy CROSS-BORDER from the 
analyses.  To further save on degrees of freedom, we also remove most of the acquirer-
level control variables, except for FIRM SIZE, as they proved insignificant in the 
analyses; this latter result is in line with our previous findings in Table 2.6.  Hereafter, 
we concentrate the discussion of our findings on how the effects of the test variables 
differ across the two subsamples. 
First, we note that GENDER DIVERSITY and NATIONALITY DIVERSITY are no longer 
significant in the subsamples, which likely is related to the reduced sample size on 
which those extra analyses are run.  Nonetheless, the results in Table 2.7 still seem in 
line with our earlier conclusion from Table 2.6 that the negative effect of 
NATIONALITY DIVERSITY is driven by the purely domestic M&As in the sample (see 
Panel A of Table 2.7). 
Next, the earlier-found positive effect of AGE DIVERSITY appears to be driven by the 
domestic takeovers as well (p < 0.10 in model 2 of Panel A), thereby suggesting that a 
board more heterogeneous in terms of director age may prevent group-thinking and be 
more effective especially in not-too-complex M&A transactions.  In cross-border 
M&As, which are surrounded by larger information asymmetries and risk, it might be 
more difficult to reach a consensus when the age diversity among directors is large. 
In contrast, the significant positive effect of MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS in Table 
2.6 appears to be driven by the cross-border M&As in the sample.  We indeed find a 
significant positive influence only in Panel B of Table 2.7, i.e. in the cross-border 
subsample (p < 0.05 in models 5 and 6).  The results in Panel A generally point in the 
same direction, yet are not significant.  Overall, this outcome suggests that more 
reputable, well-informed and -connected directors are an asset to build on particularly 
in the most complex takeovers.  Apparently, those directors with multiple board 
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positions prove able to effectively curb the (larger) uncertainties associated with cross-
border M&As. 
Finally, we find that INDEPENDENCE has a significant positive impact only in the 
subsample of domestic takeovers (p < 0.10 in models 1 and 2).  As INDEPENDENCE 
is typically more related to the monitoring function of the board and as cross-border 
M&As are usually surrounded by more uncertainties, thereby increasing also the need 
for strategic advice by the firm’s directors, the latter finding might not be so surprising. 
 
Table 2.7: Board Characteristics and M&A Value Creation: Domestic vs. 
Cross-Border Transactions 
This table shows the OLS regression results as to the acquirer cumulative abnormal return over the [-1,+1] 
window.  Table 2.1 presents a definition of all explanatory variables and their hypothesized effect on the acquirer 
CA.  All the control variables are measured at fiscal-year end before M&A and are winsorized at 1%99%.  Year, 
country and industry fixed effects are included.  Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are marked 
with *, ** and ***, respectively.  p-values are reported between parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Domestic transactions Panel B: Cross-border transactions  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
BOARD SIZE 0.0144 0.0122 0.0067 0.0061 0.0002 0.0024 -0.0042 -0.0043  
(0.5945) (0.5421) (0.6466) (0.6629) (0.9923) (0.8807) (0.7033) (0.6985) 
GENDER DIVERSITY -0.0101 0.0498 0.0431 0.0395 0.0228 0.0188 0.0179 0.0179  
(0.9265) (0.5317) (0.3662) (0.4186) (0.6243) (0.5702) (0.3860) (0.3916) 
NATIONALITY DIVERSITY -0.3986 -0.4479 -0.3505 -0.3421 -0.0924 -0.0660 0.0121 0.0123  
(0.2140) (0.1892) (0.2048) (0.2068) (0.3530) (0.4657) (0.8302) (0.8273) 
AGE DIVERSITY 0.0045 0.0033* 0.0019 0.0014 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003  
(0.1038) (0.0794) (0.1425) (0.3171) (0.6944) (0.9215) (0.7150) (0.7084) 
AVERAGE DIRECTOR AGE 0.0011 0.0009 0.0011 0.0012 -0.0000 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003  
(0.6057) (0.4536) (0.2436) (0.2267) (0.9777) (0.8216) (0.6795) (0.6707) 
MULTIPLE DIRECTORS 0.2765 0.2342 0.0261 0.0367 0.2488** 0.2057** 0.0639 0.0643  
(0.2040) (0.2013) (0.7472) (0.6459) (0.0323) (0.0188) (0.3409) (0.3401) 
INDEPENDENCE 0.1861* 0.1589* 0.0513 0.0515 0.0704 0.0352 0.0242 0.0241  
(0.0822) (0.0909) (0.3834) (0.3737) (0.1781) (0.2499) (0.1786) (0.1811) 
CEO DUALITY -0.0113 0.0030 -0.0094 -0.0113 0.0056 0.0050 0.0014 0.0016  
(0.7136) (0.8949) (0.4634) (0.3683) (0.7375) (0.6597) (0.8432) (0.8313) 
BLOCK 
   
0.0406   
  
-0.0016     
(0.2110)   
  
(0.9270) 
DIVERSIFICATION -0.0255 -0.0155 -0.0142 -0.0137 -0.0118 -0.0105 -0.0047 -0.0046  
(0.2032) (0.2794) (0.2219) (0.2194) (0.1320) (0.2368) (0.4227) (0.4230) 
RELATIVE DEAL SIZE 0.0095 0.0082 
  
-0.0073 -0.0033 
  
 
(0.6165) (0.6229) 
  
(0.4673) (0.6976) 
  
STOCK PAYMENT -0.0012 
   
0.0029 
   
 
(0.9446) 
   
(0.8710) 
   
FIRM SIZE -0.0120* -0.0102** -0.0051* -0.0055** -0.0058 -0.0062* -0.0043* -0.0043*  
(0.0756) (0.0336) (0.0595) (0.0385) (0.2731) (0.0860) (0.0758) (0.0763) 
Constant 0.0295 0.0141 -0.0213 -0.0303 0.0490 0.0690 0.0816* 0.0830*  
(0.8463) (0.8415) (0.6984) (0.5929) (0.5404) (0.1974) (0.0673) (0.0855)      
  
   
Observations 82 101 161 161 118 178 278 278 
R-squared 0.6006 0.5282 0.2823 0.2930 0.4296 0.2680 0.1789 0.1789 
Log likelihood 0.2110 0.1870 -0.0162 -0.0101 0.0858 -0.0122 -0.0064 -0.0108 
Maximum VIF 1.82 1.75 1.50 1.52 2.62 2.41 1.91 1.91 
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2.4.3 Impact of Board Characteristics in Industry-related vs. -Diversifying 
M&As 
Table 2.8 reports the OLS regression results explaining the acquirer CAR for the 
subsamples of industry-related and industry-diversifying M&As, respectively.  Table 
2.6 already revealed a significant negative influence of DIVERSIFICATION on M&A 
value creation, which suggests that industry-diversifying takeovers may provide a 
channel through which managers and/or controlling shareholders could expropriate 
value from a firm’s minority investors.  We again remove the dummy 
DIVERSIFICATION and the acquirer-level control variables, except FIRM SIZE, from 
those split-sample regression models.  Hereafter, we concentrate the discussion of our 
findings once more on how the effects of the test variables differ across the two 
subsamples. 
First, in line with the results in Table 2.7, GENDER DIVERSITY and NATIONALITY 
DIVERSITY are generally not significant in Table 2.8.  However, we do find a weak 
negative coefficient on NATIONALITY DIVERSITY in the subsample of industry-
related M&As (p < 0.10 in model 2).  So, this outcome seems to suggest that the 
negative effect of NATIONALITY DIVERSITY in Table 2.6 is driven especially by the 
subsample of industry-related M&As (Panel A of Table 2.8).  However, the size of the 
parameter estimates in Panels A and B of Table 2.8 are largely comparable and so we 
do not want to infer too strong conclusions from our subsample findings as to the role 
of NATIONALITY DIVERSITY. 
AGE DIVERSITY proves significantly positive only in the subsample of industry-related 
takeovers (p < 0.10 in models 2 to 4), thereby indicating once more that a board more 
heterogeneous in terms of director age might prevent group-thinking and be more 
effective especially in the not-too-complex M&A transactions.  So, in line with our 
earlier findings as to the effects of AGE DIVERSITY in domestic vs. cross-border deals, 
it might be more difficult to reach a consensus in industry-diversifying M&As when the 
age diversity among directors is large. 
In contrast, the significant positive effect of MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS in Table 
2.6 appears to be driven by the industry-diversifying M&As in the sample.  We indeed 
find a highly significant positive coefficient on this variable in Panel B of Table 2.8 (p 
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< 0.01 in almost all models).  Overall, this outcome again suggests that the more 
reputable, well-informed and -connected directors are an asset to build on particularly 
in the most complex takeovers. 
As far as the fraction of independent directors is concerned, we identify a significant 
positive impact of INDEPENDENCE on the acquirer CAR in the subsample of industry-
related as well as industry-diversifying M&As, yet the effect is not significant in all of 
the models.  As such, this result thus indicates that acquirers with a larger fraction of 
independent directors create more shareholder value regardless of the industry-
diversifying nature of the deal. 
Finally, we now also identify for the first time a significant negative coefficient on CEO 
DUALITY in Panel B of Table 2.8 (p < 10% in model 8).  So, this outcome provides 
empirical support for the idea that firms with a powerful CEO-chairman may engage in 
self-dealing behavior by pursuing industry-diversifying takeovers.  Industry-
diversifying M&As may indeed allow those CEO-chairmen to diversify their own 
wealth and human capital, thereby expropriating value from the firm’s minority 
investors (see also Amihud and Lev, 1981).  Interestingly, once we interact CEO 
DUALITY with a dummy variable that equals one if at least 20% of the firm’s voting 
rights is controlled by an individual or a family shareholder (in model 9), we find that 
this negative CEO DUALITY effect is entirely offset.  So, lone founders or family 
representatives who combine the positions of CEO and board chairman are less likely 
to pursue objectives that destroy shareholder value, as this could jeopardize their control 
of the company and the family’s socioemotional wealth (see also Aktas et al., 2016; 
Defrancq et al., 2016).  Moreover, from including extra interactions with other types of 
large shareholders (in model 10), we conclude that those other dominant owners – 
institutional investors or corporate shareholders in particular – prove unable to curb an 
entrenched CEO’s self-dealing behavior.12 
                                              
 
12 The dummy INSTITUTIONAL equals one if the acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder is an institutional 
investor controlling at least 20% of acquirer voting rights, while the dummy CORPORATE equals one if the 
acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder is an industrial/service firm controlling at least 20% of acquirer voting 
rights.  The number of sample firms controlled by a government proved too small to interact CEO DUALITY with 
a dummy that equals one for the acquirers in which the government is the largest ultimate shareholder controlling 
at least 20% of acquirer voting rights. 
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Another remarkable finding is the significant positive impact of BLOCK on acquirer 
shareholder announcement returns for the subsample of industry-diversifying 
transactions in Panel B of Table 2.8 (models 8 to 10).  Stock market investors thus even 
seem enthusiastic when acquiring firms invest in a takeover target in an industry that is 
not related to their own when acquirers have a large controlling shareholder.  Having a 
large blockholder is thus perceived as a positive signal for those industry-diversifying 
M&As.  Once we interact BLOCK with each of the dummies capturing the identity of 
the firm’s largest ultimate shareholder (not reported in the table), we find that this 
positive effect is driven uniquely by the sample firms controlled by an individual or a 
family. 
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Table 2.8: Board Characteristics and M&A Value Creation: Industry-Related vs. Industry-Diversifying Transactions 
This table shows the OLS regression results as to the acquirer cumulative abnormal return over the [-1,+1] window.  Table 2.1 presents a definition of all explanatory variables and their 
hypothesized effect on CAR.  All control variables are measured at fiscal-year end before M&A and are winsorized at 1%99%.  Year, country and industry fixed effects are included.  Coefficients 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively.  p-values are reported between parentheses. 
  
Panel A: Industry-related transactions Panel B: Industry-diversifying transactions  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
BOARD SIZE -0.0173 -0.0117 -0.0071 -0.0071 -0.0004 0.0261 -0.0012 -0.0012 0.0046 0.0043  
(0.3971) (0.4854) (0.5034) (0.5074) (0.9851) (0.1630) (0.9208) (0.9123) (0.6874) (0.7090) 
GENDER DIVERSITY -0.0055 0.0033 0.0072 0.0072 -0.0518 -0.0542 0.0278 0.0244 0.0067 0.0085  
(0.9078) (0.9266) (0.7612) (0.7745) (0.6699) (0.2749) (0.4317) (0.4332) (0.8105) (0.7708) 
NATIONALITY DIVERSITY -0.1943 -0.1587* -0.0300 -0.0301 -0.1153 -0.1946 -0.0604 -0.0747 -0.0577 -0.0602  
(0.1763) (0.0951) (0.6803) (0.6854) (0.5968) (0.2063) (0.5144) (0.4533) (0.6082) (0.5947) 
AGE DIVERSITY 0.0017 0.0025* 0.0020** 0.0021* 0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0014 -0.0014  
(0.2428) (0.0756) (0.0219) (0.0501) (0.6404) (0.3996) (0.4309) (0.3126) (0.1594) (0.1740) 
AVERAGE DIRECTOR AGE -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0044 0.0015 0.0012 0.0014* 0.0014 0.0014  
(0.9646) (0.5061) (0.7272) (0.7257) (0.1884) (0.1994) (0.1313) (0.0749) (0.1040) (0.1025) 
MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS 0.1972 0.1755 -0.0182 -0.0182 0.2829** 0.2031*** 0.1939*** 0.1909*** 0.2017*** 0.2029***  
(0.3430) (0.3114) (0.7802) (0.7805) (0.0424) (0.0074) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
INDEPENDENCE 0.0384 0.0482** 0.0096 0.0096 0.1774 0.0705* 0.0436 0.0442* 0.0475** 0.0480**  
(0.2250) (0.0274) (0.5006) (0.5044) (0.1303) (0.0911) (0.1018) (0.0755) (0.0330) (0.0302) 
CEO DUALITY 0.0150 0.0154 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0077 -0.0114 -0.0134 -0.0151* -0.0232*** -0.0197  
(0.3222) (0.2315) (0.9797) (0.9853) (0.7864) (0.3993) (0.1153) (0.0588) (0.0059) (0.2875) 
CEO DUALITY * FAMILY 
        
0.0290* 0.0243          
(0.0501) (0.2601) 
CEO DUALITY * INSTITUT          0.0058 
          (0.7589) 
CEO DUALITY * CORPORATE          -0.0104 
          (0.5962) 
BLOCK 
   
-0.0004 
   
0.0326* 0.0331* 0.0323*     
(0.9850) 
   
(0.0877) (0.0686) (0.0794) 
CROSS-BORDER 0.0111 0.0106 0.0108* 0.0108* 0.0579 0.0261 0.0212 0.0208* 0.0205 0.0192  
(0.2955) (0.2038) (0.0957) (0.0967) (0.1992) (0.3968) (0.1036) (0.0987) (0.1369) (0.1771) 
RELATIVE DEAL SIZE 0.0015 0.0036 
  
0.0153 0.0024 
  
   
(0.8771) (0.6825) 
  
(0.5346) (0.8656) 
  
  
STOCK PAYMENT 0.0022 
   
-0.0088 
   
   
(0.8865) 
   
(0.7236) 
    
 
FIRM SIZE -0.0070 -0.0074** -0.0057** -0.0057** -0.0101 -0.0119*** -0.0077*** -0.0077*** -0.0075*** -0.0075***  
(0.1130) (0.0249) (0.0219) (0.0246) (0.2021) (0.0084) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0019) 
Constant 0.1188 0.0788 0.0946** 0.0948** -0.1641 0.0229 0.0451 0.0211 0.0022 0.0020  
(0.1132) (0.1428) (0.0361) (0.0343) (0.3481) (0.7180) (0.2291) (0.5582) (0.9594) (0.9644)          
  
Observations 128 181 277 277 72 98 162 162 155 155 
R-squared 0.4362 0.3296 0.2429 0.2429 0.5871 0.3550 0.3155 0.3264 0.3488 0.3516 
Log likelihood 0.1270 0.0718 0.0545 0.0502 0.0229 -0.1800 0.0500 0.0570 0.0627 0.0490 
Maximum VIF 2.01 2.14 1.85 1.86 2.55 2.28 2.09 2.09 2.20 10.18 
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2.4.4 Robustness Checks 
In order to assess the robustness of our findings, we perform several additional tests, 
for which we discuss the most important findings hereafter.  The output from those extra 
tests is thus not presented in a table, but can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
First, we analyse the results when using various non-linear model specifications for the 
test variables.  Second, we include a few extra explanatory variables that could 
potentially alter our above conclusions.  Next, we re-estimate our models for event 
windows longer than the [-1,+1] window.  Finally, we examine the robustness of our 
findings when categorizing the sample into other subsamples. 
First, to test for a potential non-linear relation between board size and composition and 
M&A value creation, we construct squared terms for the test variables BOARD SIZE, 
GENDER DIVERSITY, NATIONALITY DIVERSITY, AGE DIVERSITY, MULTIPLE 
DIRECTORSHIPS, and INDEPENDENCE.  Yet, as the correlation between the simple 
terms and their squared terms often proves larger than 0.8, we could not include both 
terms in our various regression models.  So, as an alternative, we replace all the test 
variables, except for CEO DUALITY, by dummy variables that equal one if the 
corresponding test variable has a value larger than the sample median and zero 
otherwise.  The results point in the same direction as in Table 6, although p-values are 
always higher.  In addition, we compute dummy variables that equal one when the board 
has a non-zero value for GENDER DIVERSITY, NATIONALITY DIVERSITY, 
MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS, and INDEPENDENCE, respectively.  Those dummy 
variables typically prove significantly related to the acquirer CAR, but do not help to 
increase our model’s explanatory power (adjusted R-square).  Arguably, the above 
results indicate that the effects of the test variables are truly linear in nature. 
In subsequent analyses, we incorporate extra explanatory variables.  Our results are not 
affected after adding TARGET INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE, a dummy variable that 
captures whether at least one acquirer board member has developed prior director 
experience in the target industry.  Further, our results prove robust when measuring the 
explanatory variables in alternative ways (e.g., using acquirer total assets instead of 
market value to define FIRM SIZE and RELATIVE DEAL SIZE, using four-digit SIC 
codes to capture DIVERSIFICATION, etc.). 
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As already pointed out above, ownership and board structure may not be independent 
constructs (see also Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003).  Moreover, the influence of board 
characteristics on M&A value creation may be contingent upon other factors that could 
affect the board decision process, of which ownership structure likely is an important 
one.  Hence, in addition to including the fraction of voting rights controlled by the 
acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder (BLOCK), we further add separate dummy 
variables that account for the identity of the firm’s largest controlling shareholder 
(FAMILY, INSTITUTIONAL, and CORPORATE).  From these extra analyses, we learn 
that those ownership variables are not significantly related to the acquirer CAR, while 
they do not alter our prior conclusions.  Likewise, all the test variables point in the same 
direction once BLOCK is interacted with those three ownership-type dummies; yet, the 
p-values for the variables GENDER DIVERSITY and NATIONALITY DIVERSITY no 
longer meet the 10% threshold for statistical significance in this case. Interestingly, the 
interaction term between BLOCK and INSTITUTIONAL is significantly negative, which 
implies that M&A value creation is considerably smaller when the acquirer is controlled 
by this type of major owner (see also Duggal & Millar, 1999).  Overall, we can conclude 
that our findings are not solely driven by the acquirer’s ownership structure. 
We also perform two different sets of extra subsample analyses.  First, we estimate 
separate regression models for the subsample of acquirers with a blockholder 
controlling less versus more than 20% of the firm’s voting rights.  In addition, we run 
those models based upon a 50% voting-rights cutoff.  Most of our earlier conclusions 
remain valid, except that MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS and INDEPENDENCE are 
now only significantly positive in the subsample of acquirers with a large shareholder 
controlling less than 50% of the firm’s voting rights.  Second, we divide the sample into 
two groups, depending upon whether the relative transaction size is either below or 
above the sample median.  Unfortunately, as we miss a lot of data on RELATIVE DEAL 
SIZE, we lose quite some observations when performing this extra test.  Remarkably, 
we find that BOARD SIZE has a significant positive impact on the acquirer CAR for the 
smaller M&As in our sample, though only with a p-value just below 10%.  Apparently, 
for those smaller transactions, the larger collective body of information in larger boards 
helps concluding better M&A deals.  For the larger transactions in our sample, this 
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positive effect could be offset by any of the countervailing forces we pointed out before, 
to motivate a potentially negative influence of BOARD SIZE on M&A value creation.  
In addition, we infer that the effects of GENDER DIVERSITY and AGE DIVERSITY are 
driven by the larger transactions in our sample. 
Finally, we also re-run the models when measuring M&A value creation over longer 
event windows.  For the [-5,+5] event window, the results are generally comparable 
although p-values are somewhat higher.  The variable MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS 
is no longer significant at the 10% level (p = 0.12).  For the event window is even further 
extended (i.e. to [-10,+10], [-35,+5]), we find that the results for our variables of interest 
still point in the same direction, yet significance generally fades away over those longer 
windows.  Possibly, confounding news releases introduce noise into our measurement 
of M&A value creation as the event window is extended beyond [-5,+5]. 
 
2.4.5 Endogeneity 
As argued by others (e.g. Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Schmidt, 2015), corporate 
boards and firm value are potentially endogenous variables.  One should therefore 
exercise care when interpreting contemporaneous relations between these two 
constructs.  However, in the context of M&A decisions, Schmidt (2015) argues that 
boards are not necessarily composed ex ante to deal with a particular transaction.  
Indeed, boards do not adjust instantaneously to changes in the economic environment 
that prompt an M&A opportunity.  Moreover, M&As are in general not much 
predictable that far in advance, while boards are sticky.  As such, endogeneity likely is 
less of a problem in a study on M&As.  Nonetheless, we also implement an instrumental 
variable (IV) approach to test the robustness of our results to alternative model 
specifications.  So, we look for instruments for the board construct variables that have 
a significant impact on M&A announcement returns.  To that end, we build on the study 
by Lei and Deng (2014), who use industry averages of the endogenous board variables.  
They conjecture that an endogeneity problem could exist at the firm level, but not at the 
industry level.  Table 9 shows the results from the IV-approach that is applied for the 
significant and potentially endogenous variables.  As far as the first-stage regressions 
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are concerned, we find that our instrumental variables have a significant impact (p < 
0.01) on the corresponding endogenous variables.  The F-statistics for the partial R² are 
significant, thereby indicating that the instruments are strong.  The second-stage 
regressions show that the impact of the instrumented variables is in line with our main 
regression results in Table 6, yet we only find a significant negative effect for the 
instrumented NATIONALITY DIVERSITY. 
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Table 2.9: Endogeneity: Instrumental Variables approach. 
This table reports the results of two stage IV least squares (dependent variables are equal to the acquirer CAR over the window [-
1,+1] and the acquirer relative returns). The averages of year, industry and country are used as instruments for NATIONALITY 
DIVERSITY, INDEPENDENCE, MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS, GENDER DIVERSITY, and AGE DIVERSITY. Table 2.1 presents 
a definition of all explanatory variables.  All control variables are measured at fiscal-year end before M&A and are winsorized at 
1%99%.  Year, country and industry fixed effects are included.  Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are marked 
with *, ** and ***, respectively.  p-values are reported between parentheses. 
                                    (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)         (6)     
First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage Second 
Stage 
  NATIONALITY 
DIVERSITY 
INDEPENDENCE MULTIPLE 
DIRECTORSHIPS 
GENDER 
DIVERSITY 
AGE 
DIVERSITY 
CAR 
Constant  -0.0235      0.3623*    -0.0740     -0.4045**   -0.9087      0.0516    
                               (0.6666)    (0.0983)    (0.4374)    (0.0331)    (0.8333)    (0.5774)    
NATIONALITY DIVERSITY (YEAR INDUSTRY COUNTRY)   1.2795***  -0.5044      0.0511     -0.4770     -4.1773                 
(0.0000)    (0.4174)    (0.6605)    (0.1445)    (0.6692)                
INDEPENDENCE (YEAR INDUSTRY COUNTRY)   0.0162      0.7106***  -0.0088      0.0161      0.2649                 
(0.4497)    (0.0000)    (0.6231)    (0.7857)    (0.8547)                
MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS (YEAR INDUSTRY COUNTRY)   0.1844     -0.7162      0.8155***  -0.3451     -9.3443                 
(0.3006)    (0.3535)    (0.0001)    (0.5348)    (0.5953)                
GENDER DIVERSITY (YEAR INDUSTRY COUNTRY)  -0.0049     -0.0655      0.0144      0.8634***  -1.1601                 
(0.8863)    (0.8046)    (0.7641)    (0.0000)    (0.6324)                
AGE DIVERSITY (YEAR INDUSTRY COUNTRY)   0.0025     -0.0039      0.0008      0.0018      0.9310***              
(0.1734)    (0.5686)    (0.6336)    (0.6984)    (0.0000)                
NATIONALITY DIVERSITY                                                              -0.3843**   
                                                            (0.0132)    
INDEPENDENCE                                                               0.0539     
                                                            (0.2752)    
MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS                                                               0.1414     
                                                            (0.6564)    
GENDER DIVERSITY                                                              -0.0922     
                                                            (0.1329)    
AGE DIVERSITY                                                               0.0023    
                                                                                           (0.3293)    
BOARD SIZE   0.0030     -0.0359     -0.0112     -0.0613      0.5885     -0.0085    
                               (0.7615)    (0.3141)    (0.4319)    (0.3604)    (0.5189)    (0.4928)    
AVERAGE DIRECTOR AGE   0.0001     -0.0023     -0.0003      0.0016      0.0846      0.0012    
                               (0.9220)    (0.4284)    (0.6780)    (0.4219)    (0.2473)    (0.1661)    
CEO DUALITY   0.0044     -0.1178**   -0.0159      0.0427      0.2964      0.0019    
                               (0.7551)    (0.0262)    (0.2787)    (0.3285)    (0.7345)    (0.9129)    
CROSS-BORDER   0.0024      0.0302     -0.0013      0.0379*     0.6881      0.0278*** 
                               (0.7214)    (0.3848)    (0.8900)    (0.0661)    (0.2269)    (0.0020)    
DIVERSIFICATION   0.0193**   -0.0019      0.0070     -0.0100      0.2559     -0.0151*   
                               (0.0263)    (0.9525)    (0.4152)    (0.6579)    (0.5937)    (0.0548)    
RELATIVE DEAL SIZE  -0.0018     -0.0434     -0.0061     -0.0012     -0.2965      0.0058    
                               (0.7863)    (0.1197)    (0.4986)    (0.9522)    (0.6126)    (0.5031)    
STOCK PAYMENT  -0.0117**    0.0046      0.0043      0.0088     -0.0112     -0.0003    
                               (0.0389)    (0.9052)    (0.2917)    (0.6447)    (0.9842)    (0.9773)    
TARGET LISTED   0.0054     -0.0329     -0.0113     -0.0436     -0.4727      0.0003    
                               (0.4976)    (0.4445)    (0.1862)    (0.1091)    (0.4950)    (0.9839)    
CASH RATIO   0.0029     -0.2644*     0.0605      0.1774     -1.7622      0.0415    
                               (0.9414)    (0.0578)    (0.2711)    (0.4585)    (0.6693)    (0.4135)    
LEVERAGE   0.0026     -0.4368**   -0.0542     -0.0206      2.5034     -0.0664    
                               (0.9393)    (0.0141)    (0.2399)    (0.8369)    (0.3540)    (0.1645)    
M/B  -0.0003     -0.0055     -0.0039**   -0.0157**    0.2003     -0.0008    
                               (0.8566)    (0.4774)    (0.0190)    (0.0202)    (0.1357)    (0.7897)    
FIRM SIZE  -0.0014      0.0099      0.0062      0.0263**   -0.2959     -0.0056    
                               (0.5858)    (0.3056)    (0.1186)    (0.0213)    (0.1259)    (0.1698)    
N                              201 201 201 201 200 200 
r2                             (0.5653) (0.8613) (0.2803) (0.5427) (0.5291) (0.3068) 
Durbin score (Chi²)                                                             8.59476 
p                                                                                          (0.1264) 
Wu-Hausman                                                             1.2573 
P                                                             (0.2859) 
F-test (partial R²) 15.3348 8.08602 3.02489 9.11206 11.4974 
 
P (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0126) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
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2.5 Discussion and conclusions 
This study investigates the influence of the size and composition of acquirer boards on 
M&A value creation for acquirer shareholders in a Continental European M&A setting.  
To develop our hypotheses, we start from the two supervisory (i.e., monitoring and 
advising) functions performed by acquirer boards in M&A transactions.  We find that the 
number of directors on acquirer boards is not related to M&A announcement returns.  Our 
research further challenges the myopic view that more diversity in board composition 
leads to better monitoring by Continental European boards.  While gender and age 
diversity contribute only weakly to M&A value creation for acquirer shareholders, 
nationality diversity is found to negatively affect shareholder value in domestic M&As.  
This result thus indicates that foreign directors on average encounter hard times in 
gathering the information needed to properly execute their supervisory role in purely 
domestic M&As.  Directors with multiple board appointments and independent directors 
do have a significant positive influence on acquirer announcement returns.  Directors with 
multiple board seats have developed a more extensive expertise in monitoring and advising 
companies and also have their reputation at stake; as such, they likely contribute to better 
deal outcomes.  Interestingly, we find that this effect manifests especially in the more 
complex M&As in our sample, that is cross-border and industry-diversifying transactions.  
Independent directors are expected to better withstand the pressure from the firm’s 
management and various stakeholders.  In contrast to Anglo-Saxon research, we find that 
CEO duality is not associated with lower M&A value creation, unless those firms with a 
combined CEO-chairman engage in industry-diversifying takeovers.  Nonetheless, this 
latter effect appears to arise only for the firms that are not controlled by an individual or a 
family. 
Interestingly, we demonstrate differing effects of board characteristics on shareholder 
value, depending upon the specific M&A context.  Domestic board members seem to have 
superior supervisory capabilities in domestic takeovers, while the knowledge and skills of 
directors with multiple board appointments prove to be highly valuable especially in cross-
border M&As.  The latter highly reputable and well-connected directors also prove a 
valuable source in industry-diversifying M&As.  In contrast, age diversity seems to matter 
especially in the not-too-complex domestic and industry-related transactions.  Finally, 
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CEO duality is not necessarily negatively related to M&A value creation for acquirer 
shareholders.  Only CEO-chairmen in firms not controlled by an individual or a large 
family blockholder seem to destroy shareholder value by pursuing industry-diversifying 
M&As.  This latter finding thus also indicates that the board of directors in Continental 
European listed firms is not always able to mitigate the self-dealing behaviour of 
managers, who may rely upon industry-diversifying takeovers to diversify their own 
wealth and human capital. 
Overall, our research adds to a better understanding of the role of board diversity and its 
impact on M&A value creation and is therefore of interest to regulators, managers, and 
stock market investors.  It illustrates that today’s call for more diversity does not 
automatically result in more value for acquirer shareholders.  In addition, the ideal 
composition of a board is shown to depend upon the specific M&A context, with varying 
conclusions in domestic versus cross-border and industry-related versus industry-
diversifying M&As.  Also, some prior conclusions obtained from Anglo-Saxon M&A 
samples appear not to consistently hold in a Continental European setting, with most 
strikingly the effects of CEO duality on M&A value creation. 
Our research is, of course, also subject to some limitations.  First, as firm performance 
might influence board size and composition, the issue of reverse causality is always a 
concern.  Although we cannot fully rule out reverse causality, we do believe that by 
examining major strategic decisions, like M&As, this concern can be largely downplayed.  
Indeed, the concern of reverse causality is only likely to endure when the board of directors 
was designed upfront so as to pursue particular corporate takeovers.  We are not aware of 
any research pointing at firms systematically reorganizing their board in anticipation of 
particular types of takeovers.  Moreover, the results from an instrumental variable 
approach at least point in the same direction.  A second caveat of our study is that the 
ultimate act of monitoring and assisting a firm’s management on M&As cannot be 
observed in the data that we use, as we can only observe the deals that were eventually 
announced and completed.  As such, we could not incorporate disapproved deals in our 
analyses, which obviously reflect the ultimate act of monitoring as executed by the board.  
Hence, directly analysing the M&A decision-making process within corporate boards 
through, for example, in-depth interviews might provide an interesting avenue for future 
research. 
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Chapter 3: Influence of family ownership on the industry-
diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy: Empirical 
evidence from Continental Europe 
 
3.1 Introduction 
“Fortunes are made through concentration and are kept through diversification.” 
de Visscher, 2003 
 
The ownership structure of many listed companies in Continental Europe (CE) is 
characterized by high concentration and family control (e.g., Faccio and Lang, 2002; 
La Porta et al., 1999).  Those families are usually also active in the management, occupy 
board positions, and hold a long-term investment horizon vis-à-vis their firm (e.g., 
Caprio et al., 2011; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007).  Recent research on European listed 
firms provides evidence of a non-linear relation between family ownership and firm 
performance/value (Kowalewski et al., 2010; Maury, 2006; Poutziouris et al., 2015).  
Specifically, for non-majority family ownership, firms exhibit greater profitability and 
higher stock market valuation.  At majority family ownership, these positive effects no 
longer arise, which could indicate that a value-expropriation effect now offsets the 
positive monitoring and/or incentive-alignment effect (Maury, 2006).  However, none 
of these earlier studies has examined mechanisms through which such ownership effects 
could develop. 
In this study, we focus on one specific channel, that is, the influence of family 
ownership on the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy.  The family’s 
view on this issue may indeed diverge from that of the firm’s other shareholders.  Stock 
market investors – either retail or professional – can diversify their investment portfolio 
directly, by buying shares in various listed firms.  Hence, they likely prefer each listed 
company to follow a highly focused value strategy, thereby concentrating on its core 
competencies.  In contrast, the wealth of a large family owner is usually undiversified 
and heavily tied up in the family firm (e.g., Eisenmann, 2002; Hautz et al., 2013), 
forcing families to think about more creative ways to achieve a lower risk profile for 
their investment portfolio.  Once having decided to expand the family business, 
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powerful families can thus induce their firm to engage in industry-diversifying M&As 
(Aktas et al., 2016).  Firms controlled by other types of large shareholders, such as lone 
founders, institutional investors, and industrial corporations, are unlikely to exhibit this 
same desire for diversification. 
Relying on a large sample of 3,485 M&As during 2005–2013, we find that family-
controlled acquirers prefer industry-focused deals at low, i.e., non-majority levels of 
family ownership.  Because those horizontal M&As are associated with greater 
shareholder abnormal returns on average, we infer that non-majority family control is 
beneficial for the family firm’s minority investors.  However, as the size of the family 
stake increases, family-controlled acquirers become more eager to select an unrelated 
target firm.  The latter result thus indicates that dominant family owners may use their 
power to pursue an M&A strategy that allows realizing a lower risk profile for their 
firm.  However, we do not find that shareholder abnormal returns at deal announcement 
are significantly smaller for industry-diversifying M&As made by firms with majority 
family ownership.  Those unrelated M&As, although still representing a conflict of 
interest with minority investors, thus do not destroy shareholder value on average. 
Our study makes a number of important contributions to the literature on family firms.  
First, by focusing on a firm’s M&A strategy, our study offers a potential rationale for 
the earlier-detected non-linear relation between family ownership and firm 
performance/value in European listed firms.  Our findings prove consistent with this 
non-linear relation but may also invite other researchers to further open the black box 
by exploring other channels.  Second, our study is also a response to the claim that scant 
empirical research has examined the impact of family control on corporate 
diversification (e.g., Steier et al., 2004).  The scarce and US-based research as to how 
family ownership affects the industry-diversifying nature of corporate investments has 
found conflicting results (see Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; 
Miller et al., 2010).  While the study by Miller et al. (2010) is the most related to ours, 
it encompasses a very broad M&A definition, including all stock purchases of at least 
five percent.  Many small deals in the Miller et al. sample could have been motivated 
by a financial-investment rationale and thus were not long-term strategic investments.  
In contrast, we only investigate transactions in which the acquirer obtained majority 
89 
 
control of the target firm.  Next, from a theoretical point of view, we note that different 
types of large shareholders (‘principals’) behave differently.  Our study therefore also 
endorses the recent direction in empirical family business research to separate true 
family firms from lone-founder firms (e.g., Miller et al., 2007; Cannella et al., 2015).  
Another theoretical contribution arising from our study is that a family’s various 
objectives appear to receive different priorities, depending upon the family’s ownership 
stake. 
The remainder of our article is organized as follows.  First, we present an overview of 
the relevant literature and develop our hypotheses.  We thereafter introduce the sample 
and variable measurements and report and discuss the results from our empirical 
analyses.  Finally, the last section presents our conclusions. 
 
3.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
In this section, we first briefly review the literature as to how industry-diversifying 
corporate investments, which include unrelated M&As, can affect shareholder value.  
We focus on M&As because they involve major strategic decisions with a clearly 
defined announcement date.  Next, we present what the literature so far has argued and 
found as to why managers and large share-holders may pursue this type of investments.  
Finally, we develop our own hypotheses as to the impact of a large family owner on the 
odds that its firm follows an industry-diversifying M&A strategy.  We also infer the 
implications for acquirer shareholder value at M&A announcement. 
 
3.2.1 Literature review 
Until now, the finance literature has noted that corporate diversification and firm value 
tend to be negatively associated.  Although some scholars have emphasized the 
financial synergy benefits of diversification (e.g., Stein, 1997), the prevailing wisdom 
in the finance literature is that diversified firms sell at a discount (e.g., Martin and 
Sayrak, 2003; Rajan et al., 2000).  Specifically related to M&As, both Andrade et al. 
(2001) and Betton et al. (2008) conclude in their review article that industry-focused 
transactions produce higher post-deal cash flows than unrelated M&As.  Likewise, 
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Martynova and Renneboog (2011) find for a sample of 2,419 M&As in Europe during 
1993–2001 that the takeover of a related target firm results in positive abnormal returns 
for acquirer shareholders at deal announcement, whereas M&A diversification seems to 
destroy shareholder value on average.  Potentially negative value consequences arising 
from corporate diversification – which can also arise from conglomerate M&As – 
encompass extra organizational complexity, cross-subsidization, and limited operating 
synergy potential.  Diversified firms are also more difficult to understand compared to 
highly industry-focused firms.  The ensuing information asymmetries can then shield 
those diversified firms from the scrutiny and discipline of capital markets (Bruner, 
2004).  In the end, stock market investors will account for the enlarged threat of agency 
problems by discounting the firm’s stock price. 
Given the above negative value consequences of diversification, a number of scholars 
have sought to explain why firms may nonetheless engage in it, for example by means 
of industry-diversifying M&As.  In the M&A literature, most attention has gone to the 
principal–agent (P–A) conflict of interest that is driven by a separation between 
ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  When firm ownership is widely 
dispersed, management may have the incentive and the power to pursue its own interests 
(e.g., Enriques and Volpin, 2007; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).  As regards M&As, 
managers can initiate transactions not only to increase their power, prestige, and 
compensation but also to diversify their own wealth and improve their job security.  
Because managers’ income and occupation are closely related to firm performance, the 
risks associated with their income and employment cannot easily be separated from the 
firm’s business risk.  Moreover, because their human capital is relatively illiquid, 
managers cannot easily diversify their employment risk either (Amihud and Lev, 1981; 
Morck et al., 1990).  As a result, by buying a target firm whose cash flows are less than 
perfectly correlated with those of their own firm, managers may aim to reduce the firm’s 
risk.13  However, those unrelated M&As are not necessarily in the best interests of the 
                                              
 
13 Amihud and Lev (1981) investigate in more detail the role of managerial motives in conglomerate M&As, using 
data on 309 transactions by US listed firms during 1961–1970.  They find that management-controlled firms, i.e. 
firms in which no single party holds at least 10% of the firm’s shares outstanding, initiate a significantly larger 
number of industry-diversifying M&As on average (i.e. 1.10) as compared to firms that are weakly (0.77) or 
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firm’s shareholders, who can diversify their investment portfolio directly by buying 
shares in various listed companies.14 
While corporate diversification could indicate a P–A agency problem, other scholars 
have argued that it might also hint at a conflict between majority and minority 
shareholders, i.e., a principal–principal (P–P) conflict of interest.  Thereby, the role of 
large family owners has received special attention because a family’s wealth is usually 
undiversified and heavily tied up in the family business (e.g., Eisenmann, 2002; Hautz 
et al., 2013).  However, Anderson and Reeb (2003a) find for a sample of 319 S&P 500 
firms that founding families adhere to a highly focused investment strategy.  Gomez-
Mejia et al. (2010), using data on 360 US listed firms, confirm this negative relation 
between family control and corporate diversification.  In contrast, Miller et al. (2010) 
reach the opposite conclusion from examining the industry-diversifying nature of firms’ 
M&As for 898 Fortune-1000 firms.  They conclude that although family firms are 
generally less likely to engage in M&As, family ownership positively affects a firm’s 
propensity to make an unrelated M&A.  While this study is most closely related to ours, 
Miller et al. use a very broad definition of M&As, including all stock purchases of at 
least five percent.  Many small deals in the Miller et al. sample could thus have been 
motivated by a financial-investment rationale and were therefore outside the firms’ core 
industry.  Moreover, investing a company’s resources in highly liquid assets is not 
diversification any more than having cash is diversification.  Additionally, research as 
to the effects of family ownership on corporate diversification has focused solely on 
listed firms in the USA. 
Next, prior research suggests that concentrated ownership and particularly ownership 
by insiders can help reduce the P–A conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders.  Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find for a sample of 142 NYSE listed 
                                              
 
strongly (0.36) controlled by a single large shareholder.  These findings thus confirm the idea that management 
hinges on M&As to implement a risk-reduction strategy in order to protect its own wealth and occupation. 
14 The agency theory of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) implies that especially managers with easy access to 
financial resources may rely upon M&As to pursue their own goals.  Accordingly, the stock market returns for 
M&As announced by cash-rich firms with dispersed ownership are conjectured to be negative.  In line with this 
idea, Harford (1999) finds that cash-rich acquirers in the USA between 1950 and 1994 on average destroyed seven 
cents in shareholder value for every excess dollar of cash reserves held. 
92 
 
firms that corporate value (Tobin’s Q) increases with ownership by managers and 
directors for insider stakes between 5% and 20%.  For insider stakes above 20%, 
Tobin’s Q wanes with it, which likely reflects insider entrenchment.  McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) find a similar non-linear relation but conclude that the turning point is 
50% for firms sampled in 1976 and 40% for firms sampled in 1986.  Other scholars 
have specifically explored the role of family ownership, also reporting evidence of a 
non-linear relation.  Anderson and Reeb (2003b) show for 329 US listed firms that firms 
in which the founding family retains an equity stake and/or is represented in the 
management or board outperform non-family firms, using return on assets (ROA) and 
Tobin’s Q as dependent variables.  However, those positive family effects gradually 
disappear as the family’s ownership stake increases to above 30%.  Anderson and Reeb 
explain their findings by a changing incentive structure as the family becomes too 
dominant, from value maximization to entrenchment.  This change may even result in 
various forms of minority-investor expropriation.15  Villalonga and Amit (2006), 
examining 508 Fortune-1000 companies, confirm that family ownership creates value 
but only when the founder serves as CEO or as Chairman with a hired CEO.  Those 
effects already manifest for non-majority family ownership because the average family 
stake equals only 16% in their sample, with a standard deviation of 18%.16  More recent 
research by Miller et al. (2007) reveals that any positive family effects in US listed 
firms disappear once lone-founder firms are no longer blended with true family firms. 
A few other scholars have analyzed how family ownership relates to firm performance 
and value in Europe.  Maury (2006) investigates a sample of 1,672 non-financial listed 
firms in Western Europe with financial data from 1998 and ownership data from 2003 
and finds that non-majority family ownership is associated with a 16% higher ROA and 
                                              
 
15 Faccio et al. (2001) empirically investigate nepotism, i.e., the act of favoritism granted to relatives, for a sample 
of Western European and East Asian listed firms.  They find that 68.12% (57.10%) of Europe’s (Asia’s) families 
appoint a family member as CEO or Chairman for the companies in which they control at least 20 percent of 
voting rights.  Expropriation through tunneling refers to the transfer of assets and profits out of the listed company 
for the benefit of its dominant owner (Johnson et al., 2000).  Tunneling can be realized in various ways: outright 
theft or fraud, asset sales at non-market-conforming prices, loans at non-market interest rates, excessive executive 
compensation, or an expropriation of corporate opportunities. 
16 The summary statistics on family ownership in other US-based studies (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003a, 2003b; 
Miller et al., 2010) prove highly comparable. 
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a 7% larger Tobin’s Q.  Kowalewski et al. (2010) reach similar conclusions for a sample 
of 217 Polish listed firms during 1997–2005.  Poutziouris et al. (2015) also obtain 
evidence of a positive family effect for 107 UK listed firms, provided that family 
ownership remains below 31%.  Finally, some researchers have linked family 
ownership to shareholder value effects at the time an M&A is first publicly announced, 
yet with no consistent results.  While Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo (2010) detect 
a positive family effect for a sample of 124 majority-acquisitions of European listed 
firms during 2002–2004, Caprio et al. (2011) find no influence at all for a much larger 
sample of 2,145 M&As by 777 CE listed companies between 1998 and 2008.  However, 
that research does not specifically integrate the potential relation between family 
ownership and the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&As into the analyses. 
 
3.2.2 Theory and hypotheses 
To develop our hypotheses as to the influence of a large family shareholder on the odds 
that its firm adheres to an industry-diversifying M&A strategy conditional upon 
pursuing external growth, we integrate the P–A and P–P theoretical frameworks.  
Specifically, we posit that family control can be a mechanism to mitigate the P–A 
incentive problem at low levels of family ownership but may evolve to a P–P conflict 
of interest when family control is too dominant.  We consider the turning point from 
low to too-large family ownership an empirical question but, based upon our literature 
review, expect it to fall in a range from 20% to 50%. 
When a family shareholder holds a non-trivial but non-dominant ownership stake in its 
firm, it should be able to restrain management’s self-interested behavior when engaging 
in M&As.  Hence, this large family shareholder will prevent management from pursuing 
M&As that do not maximize value, such as in industry-diversifying M&As.  First, when 
its stake remains limited, the family is unlikely to occupy a majority of executive and 
director positions, and, hence, a P–A conflict of interest could surface.  Nonetheless, 
the family, possibly with the support of other non-family shareholders, should be able 
to curb it.  Indeed, the family will have the incentive and the power to induce 
management to maintain the firm’s focus on its core competencies, which is to the 
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benefit of all shareholders.  However, the family will not be so powerful that it can 
pursue its own interests, particularly when its firm is publicly listed.  For one thing, if 
the family were to induce managers/directors to deviate from maximizing shareholder 
value and collude with them to share the ensuing private benefits, the family firm could 
become subject to a hostile takeover bid (see also Caprio et al., 2011).  With its limited 
stake, the family might not be able to prevent a majority of the firm’s other shareholders 
selling out to the corporate raider.  This mechanism by itself is likely to impose 
discipline on the listed family firm, especially because families also esteem the non-
pecuniary aspects of family ownership (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Handler et al., 
1990; Schulze et al., 2003a).  Moreover, their more altruistic attitude vis-à-vis the 
family firm as its steward, their long-term investment horizon, and their wish to transfer 
the business to future generations (e.g., Cannella et al., 2015; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) 
may motivate families to concentrate on maximizing the firm’s stock market valuation 
to realize their other objective, i.e., maintaining control.  The above rationales likely 
play a crucial role in M&As, which are major strategic decisions for a corporation, 
thereby providing family firms with a strong incentive to pursue deals that add to 
shareholder value.  As a result, we expect stock market investors to respond positively 
to M&As by acquirers controlled by a family with a non-trivial but non-dominant 
ownership stake. 
In contrast, non-family firms, either widely held or controlled by another type of large 
shareholder, often prove unable to induce management to focus on maximizing 
shareholder value when engaging in M&As.  Chen et al. (2007) and Duggal and Millar 
(1999) argue that banks, pension funds, and other financial entities may not be able to 
play an independent monitoring function in M&As because they may also consider their 
current and potential future business relations with the listed firm.  Hence, those large 
non-family shareholders may consent to lower-value deals if the benefits from doing so 
outweigh the costs.  As to lone-founder firms, Miller et al. (2007) note that they spend 
more on R&D and capital investment and achieve higher rates of revenue growth than 
family firms.  Likewise, Cannella et al. (2015) contend that lone-founder firms often 
include an entrepreneurial or growth orientation.  When expanding through M&As, we 
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therefore expect those lone-founder firms to pursue deals that contribute to shareholder 
value, regardless of whether the target firm is inside or outside their core industry. 
In sum, we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: If family ownership is not too dominant, then the likelihood that 
a family-controlled firm will pursue an industry-diversifying M&A strategy is 
low. 
Hypothesis 1b: If family ownership is not too dominant, then the impact of family 
ownership on acquirer shareholders’ abnormal returns at deal notification will 
be positive. 
 
When a family shareholder holds a too-large ownership stake, it can (ab)use its power 
to put pressure on the firm’s managers or directors to steer particular corporate 
decisions, resulting in a P–P conflict of interest with the firm’s minority investors.  A 
dominant family owner could thus induce its firm to adhere to an industry-diversifying 
M&A strategy to reduce overall company risk (Aktas et al., 2016).  The family firm 
might also be better able to achieve this diversification since it can buy unlisted 
companies.  First, both academic and business consulting studies agree that, in contrast 
to other types of large shareholders, families’ wealth in particular is usually largely tied 
into the family business.  Anderson and Reeb (2003a) show that families appearing on 
Forbes’ list of the 400 Wealthiest Americans and in the ownership structure of S&P 500 
listed firms typically have over 69% of their wealth invested in their firm.  McCullough 
(2010) argues that the undiversified nature of family wealth is the main reason for the 
existence of family offices that help families manage the shift from creating wealth to 
sustaining it, thereby engaging primarily in diversification.  Notably, Gomez-Mejia et 
al. (2007) contend that family wealth includes not only a financial component, i.e., cash 
flow rights, but also a socioemotional component, which represents the ability to 
exercise authority, the conservation of the family’s social capital, and the opportunity 
to be altruistic to family members (see also Handler et al., 1990; Schulze et al., 2003b).  
This latter component might further strengthen the family’s aversion toward corporate 
risk, inducing it to focus on maintaining control.  More surprisingly, these authors 
further contend that family firms could be reluctant to diversify their business because 
doing so indirectly poses a hazard to the family’s socioemotional wealth (SEW).  
Specifically, they contend that the greater complexity arising from a diversifying 
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growth strategy enhances the need for delegation and outside managerial talent, thereby 
potentially threatening the family’s SEW (see also Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Muñoz-
Bullón and Sánchez-Bueno, 2012; Sánchez-Bueno and Usero, 2014).  Moreover, they 
note that diversification requires raising extra capital, usually by means of debt.  
Because family firms are more averse to the risk of losing control than other firms and 
because a higher debt ratio increases that risk, Gomez-Mejia et al. claim that family 
firms might be less willing to diversify and take on this extra debt (see also Mishra and 
McConaughy, 1999; Schulze et al., 2003a).  However, in the context of M&As, the 
above arguments could apply just as well to industry-related transactions; it is indeed 
growth by itself that may induce firms to seek external financing and involve non-family 
executives.  In support of our arguments, the M&A literature has highlighted that 
acquiring firms must think about how to finance and pay for their M&As, regardless of 
whether a deal is inside or outside their core industry (e.g., Faccio and Masulis, 2005; 
Martynova and Renneboog, 2009).  Likewise, firms’ execution of an M&A alone is 
often followed by top-management turnover (e.g., Lehn and Zhao, 2006; Walsh, 1988).  
In sum, industry-diversifying M&As are unlikely to expose family firms to a larger debt 
ratio or to a greater need for outside managerial talent and expertise than industry-
focused M&As; however, they could help reduce the family firm’s overall risk profile. 
Now turning to the relation between family ownership and a firm’s M&A strategy, we 
expect that family shareholders with a too-large ownership stake can pursue their own 
interests when engaging in M&As.  Hence, those family blockholders can force their 
company into buying an unrelated target firm.  When such a risk-reducing or wealth-
preserving strategy is pursued, a P–P conflict of interest with the firm’s minority 
investors arises.  Indeed, the latter shareholders can diversify their investment portfolio 
directly, without lengthy negotiations and without having to pay an acquisition 
premium, by buying shares in various listed firms.  Hence, they likely prefer each listed 
company to follow a highly focused value strategy, thereby concentrating on its core 
competencies.  We expect this P–P conflict of interest to emerge especially when the 
family holds a very large ownership stake in its firm.  Only when families control a 
sufficiently large fraction of voting rights do they have the power to force decisions that 
could be harmful to other investors.  Moreover, only when their stake is large enough 
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can those family shareholders afford not to worry about an outside control event, i.e., a 
hostile takeover bid on their firm (see also Caprio et al., 2011).  Accordingly, stock 
market investors might respond less positively to industry-diversifying M&As 
announced by acquirers with a dominant family owner.  However, this is not to argue 
that listed firms with a large family owner will always engage in lower-value M&As.  
In many cases, the magnitude of the family financial wealth at stake will be sufficient 
to impose discipline on the M&A strategy of those firms. 
In contrast, dominant shareholders in non-family firms – perhaps with the exception of 
lone founders – usually hold a far better diversified investment portfolio and, thus, 
should be less inclined to use their power in the firm to pursue an industry-diversifying 
M&A strategy.  While lone founders also have a strong desire to retain 
discretion/control, for themselves rather than for their offspring, Cannella et al. (2015) 
emphasize that lone founders also view their firm as an extension of themselves; hence, 
they are more committed to innovation and economic pursuits relative to family firms 
and may find more alignment with the goal of shareholder value maximization, even 
when controlling a very large fraction of their firm’s voting rights. 
In sum, we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: If family ownership is too dominant, then the likelihood that a 
family-controlled firm will pursue an industry-diversifying M&A strategy is 
high. 
Hypothesis 2b: If family ownership is too dominant, then the impact of family 
ownership on acquirer shareholders’ abnormal returns at deal notification will 
be positive, unless the firm pursues an industry-diversifying M&A strategy. 
 
3.3 Data and methods 
3.3.1 Sample 
Our sample includes all M&As made by listed acquiring firms with corporate 
headquarters in Continental Europe and announced between January 1, 2005 and April 
30, 2013.17  As a sample selection criterion, we only select M&As that are included in 
                                              
 
17 We remove acquirers headquartered in the UK and Ireland, as those firms operate in a different legal and 
institutional environment (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998).  In Continental Europe, minority-investor protection and 
disclosure standards are typically weaker, which also engenders a lower stock market development.  Such a 
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the Zephyr database.18  We next only retain deals for which the acquirer held a stake 
less than 50% before deal announcement and obtained majority control of the target 
firm as a result.  Moreover, the acquirer must be listed on a stock exchange so that we 
can compute acquirer shareholder value effects upon deal announcement.  The above 
criteria result in an initial sample of 9,710 M&As.  We subsequently remove the 
acquirers active in the financial services industry (US SIC code 6) because those firms 
are often subject to specific regulations and because they file their financial reports 
under different accounting standards (1,888 deals).  Finally, we only retain M&As for 
which acquirer ownership data are available in the Amadeus database.  The above 
selection criteria result in a final sample of 3,485 M&As.  So, the unit of analysis in our 
study is the M&A transaction.  The average M&A in our sample has a value of 351.8 
million EUR (median of 17.7 million EUR). 
 
3.3.2 Variable measurements 
In this section, we present our variables of interest.  First, we explain how we identify 
a family-controlled acquiring firm.  We also elaborate on our various measures 
capturing the magnitude of family ownership for the subsample of family-controlled 
firms.  Next, we explain in more detail our definition of an industry-diversifying M&A.  
Finally, we introduce the event study methodology to compute acquirer shareholder 
value effects upon deal announcement. 
Miller et al. (2007) provide an overview of the myriad of definitions of family firms in 
academic research, finding it difficult to reach a consensus on the most appropriate one.  
In this study, we define a family firm as one in which multiple members of the same 
family are involved as major owners, directors, or managers, either contemporaneously 
                                              
 
context thus provides an ideal setting for agency problems to thrive.  Besides, ownership concentration and family 
control are also much more important in Continental Europe (e.g., Faccio and Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999). 
18 The Zephyr database is commercialized by Bureau van Dijk and contains information on more than one million 
transactions worldwide, with pan-European deals dating back to 1997.  Compared to Thomson Financial and 
Mergerstat, Zephyr has a larger coverage of European and smaller M&As.  Furthermore, it can be linked easily 
to the Amadeus database (also Bureau Van Dijk), including the annual accounts and ownership data of more than 
18 million European firms.  We started data collection in 2005, as listed firms in the EU henceforth had to rely on 
the same accounting standards (IFRS).  Also, the coverage of ownership data in Amadeus is much better as of 
2005. 
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or over time (see also Cannella et al., 2015).  To operationalize it, we first identify each 
sample firm’s largest ultimate shareholder.  To that end, we only consider blockholders 
ultimately controlling at least 5% of voting rights (see also Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; 
Miller et al., 2007, 2010).19  In contrast to prior research assuming stable ownership 
stakes over time (e.g., Maury, 2006), we collect each firm’s ownership data as close as 
possible to but before the M&A announcement date.  We also account for each 
shareholder’s total, i.e., direct as well as indirect ownership.  For the firms on which 
Amadeus only reports direct equity stakes, we assume that the corresponding owners 
hold no indirect voting rights.  To identify the family-controlled acquirers in our sample, 
we next check whether the firm’s largest ultimate shareholder is categorized as one or 
more named individuals or families in Amadeus.  We require that at least two owners, 
two directors, or two managers have the same surname to separate true family firms 
from lone-founder firms.  However, we also recognize that firms not meeting this last 
criterion could still be family firms, for example when sons-in-law or daughters-in-law 
became involved as owners, directors, or managers over time.  To also correctly classify 
those last remaining firms, we manually inspect their websites (company history, annual 
reports, and other contents) to verify whether they meet our above criteria for family 
firms.  Lone-founder firms thus relate to businesses in which no relatives of the 
founder(s) are involved. 
To separate family-controlled acquirers from non-family acquirers, we set the dummy 
FAM5 equal to one for acquirers in which the largest ultimate shareholder is a family 
controlling at least 5% of voting rights.  To analyze the effects of family ownership, we 
compute FAMBLOCK as the fraction of direct and indirect voting rights controlled by 
the firm’s family.  Additionally, we construct dummy variables to distinguish between 
limited and dominant family ownership.  Starting from the results in our literature 
review, we put forward two cutoffs, one based on 20% and another on 50%.  This results 
in three extra dummy variables: FAM5_20, FAM20_50, and FAM50_100 equal one for 
                                              
 
19 When relying on a 10% cutoff (e.g., Caprio et al., 2011), only 23 out of the 547 M&As made by a family-
controlled acquirer (4.2%) were re-classified as being initiated by a non-family-controlled acquirer.  Increasing 
this threshold from 5% to 10% did not materially affect the conclusions from our multivariate analyses. 
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acquirers with a fraction of family voting rights in the ranges of [5,20], ]20,50], and 
]50,100], respectively.  The 50% cutoff allows us to distinguish between minority and 
majority family ownership (see also Caprio et al., 2011; Maury, 2006).  We also 
implement robustness checks with other cutoffs (see further).  Finally, we create the 
dummy variables OTHER5, OTHER5_20, OTHER20_50, and OTHER50_100 to 
identify acquirers with another, i.e., non-family large shareholder.  Those dummy 
variables equal one when the acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder is a non-family-
related one controlling a specific fraction of voting rights.  For acquirers without a 
shareholder holding at least 5% of voting rights, the variables FAMx_y and OTHERx_y 
have a value of zero. 
To identify the industry-diversifying nature of the M&As in our sample, we note that 
prior research has often relied on US SIC codes (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2010).  Although the Fama and French (1997) 
classification into 49 industries seems more manageable than a categorization based on 
three-digit or four-digit US SIC codes, it in fact also relies on those SIC codes.  Next, 
the TNIC classification of industries, as proposed by Hoberg and Philips (2010), draws 
on a text-based analysis of 10-K product descriptions.  However, those 10-K reports are 
not readily available for listed firms in Continental Europe; the same applies to the 
input-output data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, which are collected only for 
the US economy.  In sum, because US SIC codes are widely used and easily accessible 
for the firms in our sample, we rely on three-digit US SIC codes to identify industry-
diversifying M&As.  Hence, we set the dummy DIVERSIFICATION equal to one if 
none of the acquirer’s three-digit SIC codes equals one of the target firm’s three-digit 
SIC codes.20  We later implement robustness checks based on four-digit US SIC codes. 
                                              
 
20 A number of examples can clarify our procedure.  In 2007, Hunter Douglas NV (active in US SIC industries 
179, 259, and 871) acquired Electronic Solutions Inc. (active in US SIC industry 369).  This deal is thus classified 
as an industry-diversifying transaction (DIVERSIFICATION = 1).  In 2006, Telekom Austria AG (active in US 
SIC industries 481 and 737) bought Etel Austria AG (active in US SIC industries 481 and 737).  This deal is 
classified as industry-focused (DIVERSIFICATION = 0).  Our procedure differs somewhat from that used by 
Miller et al. (2010), who classify an M&A as industry-diversifying if the acquirer’s primary US SIC code differs 
from that of the target firm.  So, unlike Miller et al. (2010), we still categorize a deal as industry-focused if the 
acquirer, realizing 60% of its sales in US SIC industry A and 40% of its sales in US SIC industry B, buys a target 
firm that realizes 100% of its sales in US SIC industry B. 
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Finally, we rely on the event study methodology to evaluate the value creation in each 
M&A from the point of view of acquirer shareholders.  Research in corporate finance 
typically posits that stock market investors impound the economic gains from synergies 
and/or a change in corporate control in the stock price of the combining companies at 
deal notification.  The most important advantage of the event study methodology is 
indeed that it is forward looking, implicitly accounting for the present value of all future 
M&A gains.  Also, it can be manipulated less easily than accounting-based performance 
metrics, and it is unrelated to the quality of deal implementation, i.e., post-M&A 
integration.  To capture the perceived value creation in each deal for the acquirer’s 
minority investors, we calculate acquirer shareholder abnormal returns surrounding the 
deal announcement date (day 0).  Those abnormal returns are computed as the 
differences between realized and expected returns.  Expected returns are obtained from 
the market model, which is estimated over a clean period [-250,-51] relative to the event 
date: 
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑗𝑡 is the realized return on the stock of company j on day t, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the realized 
return on MSCI Europe on day t, 𝛼𝑗 is the intercept and 𝛽𝑗 is a measure of firm j’s 
systematic risk. 
The acquirer shareholder abnormal returns are summed over the event window [𝑇1, 𝑇2] 
to produce a cumulative abnormal return (CAR).  We use the [-1,+1] event window in 
our main tests but also work with other windows to account for a potential stock price 
run-up before deal notification (e.g., Craninckx and Huyghebaert, 2011; Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2011).  However, a drawback of extending the event window is that 
confounding events could impact the CAR.  We examine the statistical significance of 
the CAR by means of the test statistic developed by Dodd and Warner (1983).  For each 
security i, the standardized abnormal return on day t (𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) is computed by dividing 
the abnormal return on that date (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) by its standard deviation (𝑠𝑖𝑡).  The standardized 
CAR over the window [𝑇1, 𝑇2] is then calculated as follows: 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
1
√𝑇2 − 𝑇1 + 1
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
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For a sample of N events, the test statistic (𝑡) that examines the null hypothesis of a zero 
cumulative abnormal return is obtained as: 
𝑡 = √𝑁
1
𝑁
∑𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Table 3.1 provides an overview of our study’s dependent and test variables, with their 
hypothesized sign on the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&As and on the 
abnormal returns for acquirer shareholders at M&A announcement.  Table 3.1 also 
reports on our control variables because M&A decisions can be influenced by many 
factors: firm financial strength, industry conditions, and external governance 
characteristics.  Hence, we specify our models to also control for those forces.  Because 
agency problems are likely more severe when firms have plenty of cash that can be 
spent at the discretion of managers or large shareholders, we include CASH RATIO.  
Conversely, a high debt ratio (LEVERAGE) could reduce those problems because it 
implies regular debt-service payments (Jensen, 1986).  In line with Moeller et al. (2004), 
we expect conflicts of interest with managers to be more serious in large listed firms 
(FIRM SIZE).  In a similar vein, managers of glamor acquirers (high M/B firms) are 
more likely to be infected by hubris (e.g., Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Roll, 1986).  
Managers who overestimate their own capabilities could then pursue M&As in 
unfamiliar industries.  The incentives of managers and large shareholders to reduce their 
firm’s risk may also depend upon its current risk (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a).  We 
capture this idea by means of the variables TOTAL RISK and CONGLOMERATE.  Next, 
firms in a low-growth or highly concentrated industry may opt for an industry-
diversifying M&A strategy (e.g., Huyghebaert and Luypaert, 2013; Powell and 
Yawson, 2005).  Finally, we control for differences in investor protection and disclosure 
standards across countries by means of MARKETCAP_GDP (La Porta et al., 1998).  In 
countries with a stronger corporate governance regime, as reflected by their superior 
stock market development, it may be more difficult or more costly to expropriate 
minority investors. 
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Table 3.1: Dependent and explanatory variables 
Table 3.1 presents definitions of all the dependent and explanatory variables, with the hypothesized effect of the explanatory 
variables on the incidence of industry diversification and on acquirer shareholder abnormal returns at deal announcement. 
 
Dependent variables Definition 
   
       
DIVERSIFICATION Dummy variable that equals one if none of the three-digit US SIC 
industries in which the acquirer is active equals one of the three-digit US 
SIC industries of the target firm, and zero otherwise. 
   
 
CAR The cumulative abnormal return for acquirer shareholders over the [-1,+1] 
event window, with day 0 being the M&A announcement date. 
   
      
 
Explanatory variables 
 
DIVERSI- 
FICATION 
CAR 
Acquirer ownership characteristics 
  
 
FAM5 Dummy variable that equals one if the largest ultimate shareholder is 
recorded as ‘Individual, Individual(s) or family(ies)’, ‘One or more 
named individuals or families’, or ‘Unnamed private shareholder’ in the 
Amadeus database, and if that shareholder controls at least 5% of acquirer 
voting rights.  Additionally, at least two owners, two directors, or two 
managers should have the same surname or, if not, should be related to 
each other by means of a family bond, either contemporaneously or over 
time. 
+/– +/– 
 
FAMBLOCK Fraction of voting rights controlled by the acquirer’s largest ultimate 
family shareholder (minimum of 5%).  The sum of direct and indirect 
voting rights is used if the family also holds indirect voting rights; direct 
voting rights are used otherwise. 
+ + 
 
FAMx_y Dummy variable that equals one if a family blockholder controls >=x% 
and <y% of acquirer voting rights. 
+/– +/– 
 
OTHERx_y Dummy variable that equals one if a non-family blockholder controls 
>=x% and <=y% of acquirer voting rights. 
  
    
Interaction terms 
   
 DIVERSIFICATION * FAM5  +/– 
 DIVERSIFICATION * FAMBLOCK  +/–  
DIVERSIFICATION * FAMx_y 
 
+/–    
Control variables 
   
 
CASH RATIO Cash and cash equivalents / total assets at year-end before M&A 
announcement. 
+ – 
 
LEVERAGE Long-term debt / total assets at year-end before M&A announcement. – +  
FIRM SIZE Natural log of total assets (thousands of euro) at year-end before M&A 
announcement. 
+ – 
 
M/B Market-to-book ratio: market value of common equity divided by the 
balance sheet value of common equity before M&A announcement. 
+ – 
 
TOTAL RISK Standard deviation of monthly stock returns [months -60 to -1] before 
M&A announcement. 
+ – 
 
CONGLOMERATE Number of industries (measured at the three-digit US SIC level) in which 
the acquirer is active before M&A announcement. 
– + 
 
IND. GROWTH Median of the one-year lagged sales growth rate in the acquirer’s primary 
three-digit US SIC industry, constructed from all the consolidated 
financial statements available in the Amadeus database in the year before 
M&A announcement. 
– + 
 
IND. CONC Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index of sales in the acquirer’s 
primary three-digit US SIC industry, constructed from all the consolidated 
financial statements available in the Amadeus database in the year before 
M&A announcement. 
+ – 
 
MARKETCAP_GDP Market capitalization of all the publicly listed companies in the acquirer 
country as a percentage of GDP at year-end before M&A announcement. 
– + 
      
 
 
 
104 
 
3.3.3 Summary statistics 
Table 3.2 displays the yearly, industry, and geographical distribution for the full sample 
(Panel A) and for the subsamples of M&As by family-controlled versus non-family-
controlled acquirers (Panel B) and for the subsamples of industry-diversifying versus 
industry-focused M&As (Panel C).  The 3,485 M&As in our sample were made by 
1,156 distinctive acquirers, whereas the 1,231 industry-diversifying deals (35.3% of the 
sample) were pursued by 422 unique acquirers.  Table 3.2 shows that every sample year 
has a non-trivial number of M&As, with most deals occurring in the year 2007 (11.1% 
of the sample).  Approximately half of the acquirers are active in manufacturing or in 
personal and business services.  The geographical distribution of the acquirers is highly 
dispersed, with a considerable fraction of acquirers domiciled in France (17.3%), 
Sweden (12.1%), and Germany (9.6%). 
For 547 sample deals (15.7% of the sample), we identify a family as the largest acquirer 
shareholder, controlling at least 5% of the firm’s voting rights.  Most of the family-
controlled acquirers in our sample are active in personal and business services.  The top 
three countries in terms of M&As initiated by family-controlled firms are France (204 
deals; 23.0%), Sweden (98 deals; 15.8%), and Germany (87 deals; 17.7%).  The fraction 
of M&As initiated by family-controlled acquirers in those countries is always larger 
than the sample average of 15.7%. 
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Table 3.2: Time, industry and geographical distribution of the sample 
Table 3.2 displays the absolute and percentage distribution of the year of M&A announcement, acquirer industry, and acquirer country for the full sample, for the subsamples of family-controlled 
and non-family-controlled acquirers, and for the subsamples of industry-diversifying and industry-focused M&As. 
 Panel A: Full sample 
 
Panel B: Family-controlled versus non-family-controlled acquirers 
 
Panel C: Industry-diversifying versus industry-focused M&As     
Family-controlled acquirers   Non-family-controlled acquirers 
 
Industry-diversifying M&As   Industry-focused M&As 
  N Col%   N Row%   N Row%   N Row%   N Row% 
Year of announcement 
         
  
 
  
2005 426 8.29% 
 
56 13.15% 
 
370 86.85% 
 
140 32.86% 
 
286 67.14% 
2006 482 9.38% 
 
66 13.69% 
 
416 86.31% 
 
153 31.74% 
 
329 68.26% 
2007 572 11.13% 
 
107 18.71% 
 
465 81.29% 
 
183 31.99% 
 
389 68.01% 
2008 522 10.16% 
 
77 14.75% 
 
445 85.25% 
 
196 37.55% 
 
326 62.45% 
2009 289 5.62% 
 
35 12.11% 
 
254 87.89% 
 
114 39.45% 
 
175 60.55% 
2010 444 8.64% 
 
73 16.44% 
 
371 83.56% 
 
167 37.61% 
 
277 62.39% 
2011 395 7.69% 
 
70 17.72% 
 
325 82.28% 
 
137 34.68% 
 
258 65.32% 
2012 171 3.33% 
 
29 16.96% 
 
142 83.04% 
 
68 39.77% 
 
103 60.23% 
2013 184 3.58% 
 
34 18.48% 
 
150 81.52% 
 
73 39.67% 
 
111 60.33% 
               Acquirer industry 
         
  
 
  
SIC 0: Agriculture, forestry, fishing 31 0.60% 
 
5 16.13% 
 
26 83.87% 
 
19 61.29% 
 
12 38.71% 
SIC 1: Mining 191 3.72% 
 
19 9.95% 
 
172 90.05% 
 
93 48.69% 
 
98 51.31% 
SIC 2: Food 448 8.72% 
 
59 13.17% 
 
389 86.83% 
 
187 41.74% 
 
261 58.26% 
SIC 3: Manufacturing 924 17.98% 
 
109 11.80% 
 
815 88.20% 
 
441 47.73% 
 
483 52.27% 
SIC 4: Transportation 353 6.87% 
 
24 6.80% 
 
329 93.20% 
 
120 33.99% 
 
233 66.01% 
SIC 5: Wholesale 288 5.60% 
 
59 20.49% 
 
229 79.51% 
 
134 46.53% 
 
154 53.47% 
SIC 7: Personal and business services 874 17.01% 
 
212 24.26% 
 
662 75.74% 
 
148 16.93% 
 
726 83.07% 
SIC 8: Health, legal and social services 372 7.24% 
 
58 15.59% 
 
314 84.41% 
 
89 23.92% 
 
283 76.08% 
SIC 9: Public administration 4 0.08% 
 
2 50.00% 
 
2 50.00% 
 
0 0.00% 
 
4 100.00%           
  
 
  Acquirer country 
         
  
 
  
AT: Austria 64 1.25% 
 
5 7.81% 
 
59 92.19% 
 
26 40.63% 
 
38 59.38% 
BE: Belgium 131 2.55% 
 
10 7.63% 
 
121 92.37% 
 
42 32.06% 
 
89 67.94% 
BG: Bulgaria 11 0.21% 
 
2 18.18% 
 
9 81.82% 
 
7 63.64% 
 
4 36.36% 
CZ: Czech Republic 6 0.12% 
 
0 0.00% 
 
6 100.00% 
 
2 33.33% 
 
4 66.67% 
DE: Germany 491 9.55% 
 
87 17.72% 
 
404 82.28% 
 
182 37.07% 
 
309 62.93% 
DK: Denmark 78 1.52% 
 
0 0.00% 
 
78 100.00% 
 
21 26.92% 
 
57 73.08% 
EE: Estonia 6 0.12% 
 
0 0.00% 
 
6 100.00% 
 
4 66.67% 
 
2 33.33% 
ES: Spain 163 3.17% 
 
18 11.04% 
 
145 88.96% 
 
46 28.22% 
 
117 71.78% 
FI: Finland 298 5.80% 
 
51 17.11% 
 
247 82.89% 
 
100 33.56% 
 
198 66.44% 
FR: France 887 17.26% 
 
204 23.00% 
 
683 77.00% 
 
314 35.40% 
 
573 64.60% 
GR: Greece 1 0.02% 
 
1 100.00% 
 
0 0.00% 
 
1 100.00% 
 
0 0.00% 
HU: Hungary 1 0.02% 
 
0 0.00% 
 
1 100.00% 
 
1 100.00% 
 
0 0.00% 
IT: Italy 168 3.27% 
 
29 17.26% 
 
139 82.74% 
 
62 36.90% 
 
106 63.10% 
LT: Lithuania 6 0.12% 
 
0 0.00% 
 
6 100.00% 
 
4 66.67% 
 
2 33.33% 
LU: Luxembourg 6 0.12% 
 
0 0.00% 
 
6 100.00% 
 
2 33.33% 
 
4 66.67% 
LV: Latvia 3 0.06% 
 
0 0.00% 
 
3 100.00% 
 
0 0.00% 
 
3 100.00% 
NL: Netherlands 300 5.84% 
 
10 3.33% 
 
290 96.67% 
 
75 25.00% 
 
225 75.00% 
PL: Poland 183 3.56% 
 
31 16.94% 
 
152 83.06% 
 
92 50.27% 
 
91 49.73% 
PT: Portugal 32 0.62% 
 
1 3.13% 
 
31 96.88% 
 
12 37.50% 
 
20 62.50% 
RO: Romania 5 0.10% 
 
0 0.00% 
 
5 100.00% 
 
4 80.00% 
 
1 20.00% 
SE: Sweden 621 12.08% 
 
98 15.78% 
 
523 84.22% 
 
221 35.59% 
 
400 64.41% 
SI: Slovenia 21 0.41% 
 
0 0.00% 
 
21 100.00% 
 
13 61.90% 
 
8 38.10% 
SK: Slovakia 3 0.06% 
 
0 0.00% 
 
3 100.00% 
 
0 0.00% 
 
3 100.00%           
  
 
  Total 3,485 100.00% 
 
547 15.70% 
 
2,938 84.30% 
 
1,231 35.32% 
 
2,254 64.68% 
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Table 3.3 provides an overview of the ownership distribution for the family-controlled 
and non-family-controlled acquirers in the sample.  All the CE listed acquirers in our 
sample have a single large shareholder ultimately controlling at least 5% of voting 
rights.  The table further reveals that family ownership is 20% or less for 23.6% of 
family firms.  Notably, 19.7% of family firms have majority family ownership, 
indicating considerable cross-sectional variation in family ownership across the family-
controlled acquirers in our sample.  In contrast, Cannella et al. (2015) emphasize that 
minority family ownership is the rule in US listed family firms.  Finally, we observe a 
similarly high variation in ownership stakes for the non-family-controlled acquirers in 
our sample. 
 
Table 3.3: Ownership held by the acquirer’s largest shareholder 
Table 3.3 displays the distribution of the fraction of direct and indirect voting rights held by the acquirer’s largest 
ultimate shareholder over various voting-rights brackets for the subsamples of family-controlled and non-family-
controlled acquirers. 
 
 Family-controlled acquirers Non-family-controlled acquirers 
Ownership bracket N Col% Cumul%  N Col% Cumul% 
[5,10] 23 4.2% 4.2%  368 12.5% 12.5% 
]10,15] 51 9.3% 13.5%  378 12.9% 25.4% 
]15,20] 55 10.1% 23.6%  244 8.3% 33.7% 
]20,25] 69 12.6% 36.2%  263 9.0% 42.7% 
]25,30] 47 8.6% 44.8%  239 8.1% 50.8% 
]30,35] 57 10.4% 55.2%  234 8.0% 58.8% 
]35,40] 20 3.7% 58.9%  156 5.3% 64.1% 
]40,45] 30 5.5% 64.4%  173 5.9% 70.0% 
]45,50] 26 4.7% 69.1%  158 5.4% 75.4% 
]50,55] 61 11.2% 80.3%  189 6.4% 81.8% 
]55,60] 17 3.1% 83.4%  104 3.5% 85.3% 
]60,65] 42 7.6% 91.0%  129 4.4% 89.7% 
]65,70] 13 2.4% 93.4%  90 3.1% 92.8% 
]70,75] 18 3.3% 96.7%  68 2.3% 95.1% 
]75,80] 7 1.3% 98.0%  24 0.8% 95.9% 
]80,85] 6 1.1% 99.1%  41 1.4% 97.3% 
]85,90] 5 0.9% 100.0%  39 1.3% 98.6% 
]90,95] 0 0.0% 100.0%  12 0.4% 99.0% 
]95,100] 0 0.0% 100.0%  29 1.0% 100.0% 
Total 547 100.0%   2,938 100.0%  
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Table 3.4 shows the average and median acquirer CAR over different event windows.  
The largest acquirer stock price reaction takes place in the [-1,+1] event window, with 
a significant abnormal price jump of 0.97% on average for the full sample (p ≤ 0.01).  
Over the [-5,+5] event window, acquirer shareholders realize a significant average CAR 
of 0.80% (p ≤ 0.01).  The average CAR is also significantly positive over the [-35,+5] 
event window (p ≤ 0.05).  Median acquirer CARs are lower but still highly significant.  
Arguably, the above numbers indicate that stock market investors perceive M&As by 
listed acquirers in Continental Europe in the 2005–2013 time frame to create 
shareholder value on average.  When comparing the family-controlled and non-family-
controlled subsamples in Panel B, we detect an average acquirer CAR of 1.16% over 
the [-1,+1] event window for the family-controlled acquirers, which is not significantly 
different from the 0.93% for non-family-controlled acquirers.  This outcome also arises 
for the other event windows.  When comparing the industry-diversifying and industry-
focused subsamples in Panel C, we note that the average acquirer CAR equals a 
significant 0.70% for conglomerate M&As over the [-1,+1] window, whereas it equals 
a significantly larger 1.11% for related M&As.  This conclusion also emerges from the 
other event windows; however, the difference in average acquirer CAR is no longer 
statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 3.4: Acquirer abnormal returns for different event windows 
This table presents the acquirer CAR over different event windows.  The significance of the average acquirer CAR 
is tested by means of the Dodd and Warner (1983) parametric test.  The significance of the median acquirer CAR 
is tested by means of the non-parametric Corrado test.  CARs significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked 
with *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
   Event window 
   [-1,+1]  [-5,+5]  [-35,+5]  
Panel A: Full sample      
 Averages       
  CAR% 0.9671 *** 0.8013 *** 0.6334 ** 
  p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0175  
         
 Medians       
  CAR% 0.3750 *** 0.3918 *** 0.0644 *** 
  p-value 0.0000 
 0.0000  0.0000  
   
 
 
 
   
Panel B: Family-controlled versus non-family-controlled acquirers 
 Family-controlled acquirers 
   
 Averages       
  CAR% 1.1586 *** 0.6227 
 0.9048  
  p-value 0.0000  0.1436  0.2114  
         
 Non-family-controlled acquirers 
   
 Averages       
  CAR% 0.9314 *** 0.8346 *** 0.5829 * 
  p-value 0.0000 
 0.0000  0.0417  
         
 Comparison of family-controlled and non-family-controlled acquirers (difference in means) 
 Averages       
  CR -0.2272 
 0.2119  -0.3219  
  p-value 0.3528  0.6251  0.6605  
         
Panel C: Industry-diversifying versus industry-focused M&As    
 Industry-diversifying M&As 
     
 Averages       
  CAR% 0.6991 *** 0.4866 * 0.3574 
 
  p-value 0.0000  0.0791  0.4406  
  
  
   
 
 
 Industry-focused M&As 
     
 Averages       
  CAR% 1.1130 *** 0.9727 *** 0.7838 ** 
  p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0160  
         
 Comparison of industry-diversifying and industry-focused M&As (difference in means) 
 Averages 
 
   
 
 
  CR -0.4139 ** -0.4861  -0.4263  
  p-value 0.0262  0.1408  0.4447  
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Figure 3.1 depicts the average acquirer CAR surrounding the M&A announcement date.  
Before deal notification, the average acquirer CAR is slightly negative but close to zero.  
At M&A announcement, it exhibits a significant upward jump.  This pattern is highly 
comparable to that found by Martynova and Renneboog (2011, p. 232), who analyze 
2,419 M&As taking place in Europe between 1993 and 2001. 
 
Figure 3.1: Acquirer abnormal returns surrounding the M&A 
announcement date 
This figure shows the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for acquirer shareholders to the announcement of an 
M&A from 35 days before to 5 days after the deal announcement date (day 0).  The benchmark used in the market 
model is the MSCI Europe index; the model parameters are estimated over 200 days, starting 250 days before the 
event date. 
 
110 
 
Table 3.5 reports summary statistics for all the continuous explanatory variables, which, 
unless stated otherwise, are measured at fiscal year-end before M&A announcement to 
avoid reverse causality problems.  To limit the influence of outliers, all the variables – 
except the dummy variables – are winsorized at 1%99%.  Table 3.5, Panel A shows 
that the average voting-rights stake of the acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder equals 
34.3% (median BLOCK of 30.0%).  It differs significantly across the family-controlled 
(36.6%) and other (33.8%) acquirers in Panel B.  Family-controlled acquirers also have 
a significantly larger CASH RATIO (12.7%) but lower LEVERAGE (12.0%) than their 
non-family-controlled counterparts.  Their FIRM SIZE is also significantly smaller.  The 
average acquirer M/B equals 2.74 but is not hugely affected by the identity of the firm’s 
largest shareholder.  Likewise, TOTAL RISK of family firms (0.57) is only smaller based 
upon the non-parametric test.  Family-controlled acquirers are active in 1.98 three-digit 
US SIC industries on average.  IND. GROWTH is largely comparable across the two 
subsamples.  However, IND. CONC, i.e., the average Herfindahl-Hirschman 
concentration index in the acquirer’s primary industry, is significantly smaller for the 
family-controlled acquirers (15.1%).  Finally, MARKETCAP_GDP, measuring the total 
market cap relative to GDP in the acquirer country, suggests that family firms are 
equally represented in countries with a more versus less developed stock market. 
Table 3.5, Panel C shows that acquirers initiating industry-diversifying M&As have a 
significantly larger controlling shareholder (average BLOCK of 36.4%) than acquirers 
engaging in industry-focused M&As (33.2%).  Additionally, they have a significantly 
smaller CASH RATIO (10.2%), higher LEVERAGE (14.3%), a larger FIRM SIZE, a 
smaller market-to-book ratio (2.60), and larger TOTAL RISK (0.64).  However, they do 
not differ in terms of CONGLOMERATE and IND. GROWTH, although acquirers 
pursuing industry diversification are active in more highly concentrated industries 
(24.3%).  MARKETCAP_GDP also differs significantly across the two subsamples, 
thereby indicating that conglomerate M&As are initiated to a larger extent by acquirers 
located in a country with a less developed stock market.  The correlation matrix, which 
is in the Appendix, reveals relatively small correlations among the explanatory variables 
shown in Table 3.5. 
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Table 5: Summary statistics on the explanatory variables 
Table 5 reports summary statistics on the explanatory variables for the full sample, for the subsamples of family-controlled and non-family-controlled acquirers, and for the subsamples of industry-
diversifying and industry-focused M&As.  Table 1 presents definitions of all the variables.  The last two columns show the p-values of a two-group parametric and non-parametric comparison test. 
 
Variable  N Mean Median Std.dev   N Mean Median Std.dev  p-value on t-test 
p-value on 
Wilcoxon test 
Panel A: Full sample              
BLOCK  3,485 0.3429 0.3000 0.2179         
CASH RATIO  3,273 0.1134 0.0772 0.1133         
LEVERAGE  3,180 0.1354 0.1122 0.1236         
FIRM SIZE  3,291 13.3463 13.2550 2.3107         
M/B  3,304 2.7439 2.2000 2.1037         
TOTAL RISK  3,398 0.5969 0.3356 0.6853         
CONGLOMERATE  3,485 2.4850 2.0000 1.8209         
IND. GROWTH  3,055 0.0578 0.0653 0.0879         
IND. CONC  3,180 0.1927 0.1170 0.1913         
MARKETCAP_GDP  3,485 0.7817 0.7560 0.3440                      
 Panel B: Family-controlled versus non-family-controlled acquirers         
  Family-controlled acquirers  Non-family-controlled acquirers   
BLOCK  547 0.3659 0.3052 0.1986 2,938 0.3386 0.2968 0.2210  0.0071 0.0001 
CASH RATIO  527 0.1271 0.0992 0.2263 
 
2,746 0.1108 0.0735 0.1125  0.0026 0.0000 
LEVERAGE  525 0.1204 0.0898 0.1142 
 
2,655 0.1384 0.1153 0.1251  0.0023 0.0067 
FIRM SIZE  527 12.7343 12.5151 2.1859 
 
2,764 13.4630 13.4469 2.3158  0.0000 0.0000 
M/B  521 2.8130 2.3300 1.9727 
 
2,783 2.7309 2.1800 2.1274  0.4141 0.0867 
TOTAL RISK  527 0.5671 0.3169 0.6181 
 
2,871 0.6023 0.3376 0.6969  0.2783 0.0926 
CONGLOMERATE  547 1.9762 2.0000 1.2599 
 
2,938 2.5442 2.0000 1.8941  0.0000 0.0000 
IND. GROWTH  494 0.0531 0.0647 0.0797 
 
2,561 0.0587 0.0655 0.0893  0.1931 0.0863 
IND. CONC  508 0.1507 0.0938 0.1687 
 
2,672 0.2007 0.1282 0.1943  0.0000 0.0000 
MARKETCAP_GDP  547 0.7961 0.7584 0.3394 
 
2,938 0.7790 0.7560 0.3448  0.2858 0.2757              
 Panel C: Industry-diversifying versus industry-focused M&As          
  Industry-diversifying M&As   Industry-focused M&As    
BLOCK  1,231 0.3638 0.3170 0.2249  2,254 0.3315 0.2900 0.2131  0.0000 0.0001 
CASH RATIO  1,149 0.1020 0.0676 0.1033  2,124 0.1196 0.0823 0.1179  0.0000 0.0000 
LEVERAGE  1,124 0.1430 0.1154 0.1295  2,056 0.1312 0.1103 0.1200  0.0100 0.0249 
FIRM SIZE  1,157 13.4653 13.4469 2.3655  2,134 13.2818 13.1792 2.2784  0.0295 0.0140 
M/B  1,152 2.6024 2.1100 2.0202  2,152 2.8196 2.2700 2.1437  0.0047 0.0015 
TOTAL RISK  1,204 0.6381 0.3482 0.7245  2,194 0.5742 0.3277 0.6618  0.0093 0.0046 
CONGLOMERATE  1,231 2.4890 2.0000 1.8345  2,254 2.4366 2.0000 1.8136  0.4162 0.3013 
IND. GROWTH  1,039 0.0568 0.0647 0.0989  2,016 0.0583 0.0653 0.0816  0.6569 0.8481 
IND. CONC  1,102 0.2425 0.1774 0.2166  2,016 0.1663 0.0975 0.1706  0.0000 0.0000 
MARKETCAP_GDP  1,231 0.7548 0.7528 0.3585  2,254 0.7964 0.7584 0.3349  0.0006 0.0001 
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3.4 Empirical findings 
In the first part of this section, we examine how family ownership influences the 
industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy by means of a logistic regression 
model.  This methodology is appropriate when the dependent variable can take on one 
of only two possible values.  In our study, DIVERSIFICATION is a binary variable that 
equals one for conglomerate M&As and zero otherwise.  Next, we present results as to 
the impact of family ownership on acquirer shareholder value effects from the event 
study, by means of an OLS regression model.  Finally, we investigate the robustness of 
our results to alternative model specifications. 
 
3.4.1 Impact of family ownership on industry diversification 
Table 3.6 displays the output from the logistic regression analysis predicting the 
probability that DIVERSIFICATION equals one, given the values of the explanatory 
variables.  While Panel A shows the results for the full sample, Panels B and C compare 
family firms to lone-founder firms and to non-family non-lone-founder firms, 
respectively.  For each set of analyses, we first add the dummy variable FAM5 to 
explore whether a firm’s M&A strategy differs across family and non-family firms 
(model 1).  In model 2, we then investigate in more detail the influence of family 
ownership given that a firm is family-controlled, by means of the continuous variable 
FAMBLOCK.  Finally, model 3 relies on a non-monotonic model specification, by 
means of the dummy variables FAM5_20, FAM20_50, and FAM50_100.  In this model, 
we also control for the ownership stake of other, i.e., non-family large shareholders in 
non-family-controlled firms by means of OTHER5_20 and OTHER20_50.  Because all 
sample firms have a single large shareholder controlling at least 5% of voting rights, 
the reference category for model 3 thus represents the acquirers with a non-family 
majority shareholder (OTHER50_100 = 1). 
Next, all the models include firm-specific (CASH RATIO, LEVERAGE, FIRM SIZE, 
M/B, TOTAL RISK, and CONGLOMERATE), industry-specific (IND. GROWTH and 
IND. CONC), and country-specific (MARKETCAP_GDP) control variables.  The 
results prove robust once the industry-level control variables are replaced by industry 
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and year fixed effects (not reported in a table).  The results also remain valid after 
substituting MARKETCAP_ GDP by country and year fixed effects.  The maximum 
variance inflation factor (VIF) of each model, which is reported at the bottom of Table 
3.6, never exceeds ten and hence suggests no multicollinearity problems (Lomax, 
1992). 
Table 3.6, Panel A reveals that for firms engaging in M&As, the presence of a large 
family shareholder (FAM5 = 1) negatively affects the incidence of industry 
diversification but only significantly so in model 2 (p ≤ 0.01).  In contrast, the stake of 
the firm’s family shareholder (FAMBLOCK) has a significant positive effect (p ≤ 0.01 
in model 2).  From these two pieces of evidence, we infer that family-controlled 
acquirers are generally less inclined to pursue conglomerate M&As but are willing to 
abandon that M&A strategy as the size of family’s ownership stake increases.21  To 
further validate this latter outcome, we now turn to the results of model 3.  Acquirers 
with a family shareholder controlling either 5% to 20% or 20% to 50% of voting rights 
are less likely to buy an unrelated target firm than acquirers with a non-family majority 
shareholder.  The coefficient on FAM50_100 is not significant, thereby indicating that 
firms with a majority owner adhere to a similar industry-diversifying M&A strategy, 
regardless of the identity of their largest shareholder.  Notably, the parameter estimate 
on FAM5_20 is more negative than that on FAM20_50, which is in line with our earlier-
detected linear relation (model 2).  Finally, OTHER5_20 also has a negative and 
significant coefficient; however, its effect is far smaller than that on FAM5_20.22  We 
can thus also infer that acquirers controlled by a family with a non-majority stake are 
least likely to pursue industry diversification when engaging in M&As.  The results 
from a robustness check – which is not shown in Table 3.6 – reveal that a quadratic term 
in family ownership, added to either model 2 or model 3, is never significant, thereby 
confirming once more that the family ownership effect is linear in nature. 
                                              
 
21 When computing marginal effects based upon model 2, we find that family-controlled acquirers are 7.10% less 
likely to engage in industry-diversifying M&As than non-family firms.  The marginal effect of the variable 
FAMBLOCK amounts to 20.49%.  Both variables are thus also economically significant. 
22 We performed a Chi²-test to examine whether FAM5_20 = FAM20_50, FAM5_20 = OTHER5_20, and 
FAM20_50 = OTHER20_50.  This test resulted in a rejection of the null hypotheses, with p < 0.01. 
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Arguably, our findings provide strong empirical support for Hypothesis 1a, arguing that 
families with a non-trivial but non-dominant ownership stake induce their firms to adopt 
a highly focused M&A strategy, which is more likely to add to shareholder value.  We 
find that those effects arise uniquely for non-majority levels of family ownership.  
Therefore, families with a non-majority stake prove able to curb the P–A conflict with 
management in M&As because of their stricter monitoring of managers and/or because 
of their well-aligned incentives with the firm’s minority investors.  However, as the 
family’s ownership stake increases to above 50%, a P–P conflict with minority investors 
ensues, thereby offsetting the earlier-obtained beneficial family effects.  Rather than 
focusing on shareholder value maximization, families with majority ownership now 
induce their firms to embrace an M&A strategy that accomplishes another, i.e., family-
related objective.  In this study, we find that those family firms have a preference for 
conglomerate M&As, which can help diversify the family wealth.  Our findings thus 
also provide strong empirical support for Hypothesis 2a.  Overall, our results are not 
consistent with earlier findings by Anderson and Reeb (2003a) and Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2010).  While our findings, despite our reliance on divergent definitions of M&As and 
diversification, are more in line with those of Miller et al. (2010), they also refine those 
scholars’ conclusions by showing an intrinsic preference of family-controlled firms for 
industry-focused M&As, which is only abandoned when the family controls a majority 
of the firm’s voting rights. 
Next, our findings as to family ownership in Panels B and C of Table 3.6 are highly 
comparable to those in Panel A.  The weaker statistical significance of some of the 
relations in Panel B is probably due to the reduced sample size in that panel; the 
parameter estimates are indeed still highly comparable.  We therefore infer that the most 
important categorization of acquirers as to the industry-diversifying nature of their 
M&A strategy is that into family-controlled versus non-family-controlled firms.  
Accordingly, and in line with our theoretical arguments, lone-founder firms are much 
more akin to other types of non-family businesses than to family firms in reference to 
the industry-diversifying nature of their M&As.  In sum, while prior research has shown 
that firm performance/value differs significantly across family firms and lone-founder 
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firms (e.g., Miller et al., 2007), our study is the first to show that they also embrace a 
divergent M&A strategy. 
As regards the firm-level control variables, we find that CASH RATIO and LEVERAGE 
are not significant in Panel A of Table 3.6.  If anything, the borderline-significant 
negative coefficient on CASH RATIO, which also appears in Panel C, indicates that 
cash-rich listed firms in Continental Europe are less inclined to diversify their 
operations when engaging in M&As.  FIRM SIZE is never significant – not even 
borderline.  The acquirer market-to-book ratio shows a negative and significant 
association with DIVERSIFICATION in all the panels.  Acquirers that are valued more 
highly by stock market investors thus tend to engage less in industry-diversifying 
M&As.  Possibly, these firms still have access to many valuable growth opportunities 
in their own industry and, hence, do not aim to invest across industry boundaries.  
TOTAL RISK is significantly positive, but only in Panels A and C.  Acquirers with a 
more volatile business thus choose more often to diversify their operations when buying 
another company.  In contrast, CONGLOMERATE is never significant. 
Of the industry-level control variables, IND. GROWTH is never significant.  In contrast, 
IND. CONC proves highly significant in all models (p ≤ 0.01).  So, CE listed firms 
active in a highly concentrated industry prefer takeover targets active in another 
industry.  Possibly, firms in those industries are pushed outside their own when pursuing 
growth via M&As (see also Huyghebaert and Luypaert, 2010). 
MARKETCAP_GDP, if significant, has a negative coefficient.  If anything, acquirers in 
countries with a more developed stock market thus tend to diversify less.  Because stock 
market development is associated with better investor protection and more stringent 
disclosure standards, this finding could indicate that firm managers and large 
shareholders find it more difficult or costly to expropriate minority investors by means 
of their firm’s M&A policy if their country’s corporate governance regime is stricter.  
Nonetheless, we also emphasize that the explanatory power of this variable, which 
proved highly significant in the univariate analysis, is far smaller in the multivariate 
analyses.  From this outcome, we infer that firm-level attributes – and a firm’s 
ownership structure in particular – are much more influential than this country-level 
corporate governance indicator to explain the nature of a firm’s M&As. 
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Table 3.6: Explaining the incidence of industry diversification in M&As 
Table 3.6 shows the logistic regression results as to the incidence of industry diversification in M&As.  Panel A compares family 
firms to non-family firms, while Panel B compares family firms to lone-founder firms and Panel C compares family firms to non-
family non-lone-founder firms.  Table 1 presents definitions of all the explanatory variables and their hypothesized effects on 
DIVERSIFICATION.  All the control variables are measured at the prior fiscal year-end before M&A announcement and are 
winsorized at 1%99%.  Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively.  p-
values are reported in parentheses. 
  
Panel A: Family versus non-family firms Panel B: Family versus lone-founder firms 
Panel C: Family versus non-family non-lone-
founder firms  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)    
       
FAM5 -0.2687 -1.0659***  -0.1689 -1.0425**  -0.2743 -1.0723***  
(0.1061) (0.0040)  (0.6104) (0.0196)  (0.1016) (0.0039)  
FAMBLOCK 
 
2.1123***   2.2072***   2.1174***   
(0.0072)   (0.0064)   (0.0070)  
FAM5_20 
  
-1.2255***   -1.2378*   -1.2231***   
(0.0018)   (0.0750)   (0.0018) 
FAM20_50 
  
-0.5222**   -0.5368   -0.5274**   
(0.0489)   (0.4303)   (0.0488) 
FAM50_100 
  
0.0141   0.0659   0.0147   
(0.9575)   (0.9239)   (0.9558) 
OTHER5_20 
  
-0.4057***   -0.4360   -0.4071**   
(0.0087)   (0.5471)   (0.0102) 
OTHER20_50 
  
-0.2011   -0.2254   -0.1986   
(0.1916)   (0.7507)   (0.2086) 
CASH RATIO -0.9782* -0.9341 -0.9064 -0.8176 -0.7134 -0.5809 -1.1934** -1.1454* -1.1084* 
(0.0878) (0.1053) (0.1184) (0.4645) (0.5441) (0.6228) (0.0481) (0.0594) (0.0697) 
LEVERAGE -0.2014 -0.1522 -0.2930 -2.1816* -1.8149 -1.7930 -0.2468 -0.1965 -0.3353 
(0.6973) (0.7691) (0.5669) (0.0703) (0.1283) (0.1471) (0.6392) (0.7093) (0.5191) 
FIRM SIZE 0.0332 0.0364 0.0418 -0.0064 0.0077 0.0052 0.0334 0.0369 0.0426 
(0.2752) (0.2401) (0.1733) (0.9423) (0.9385) (0.9575) (0.2899) (0.2501) (0.1797) 
M/B -0.0665** -0.0736** -0.0770** -0.1391** -0.1786*** -0.1861*** -0.0669** -0.0747** -0.0778** 
(0.0275) (0.0172) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0046) (0.0051) (0.0337) (0.0212) (0.0140) 
TOTAL RISK 0.2216*** 0.2189*** 0.2085** 0.1906 0.1937 0.2203 0.2206*** 0.2180** 0.2063** 
(0.0075) (0.0091) (0.0127) (0.3198) (0.3546) (0.2678) (0.0093) (0.0111) (0.0157) 
CONGLOMERATE -0.0144 -0.0167 -0.0191 0.0739 0.0549 0.0772 -0.0157 -0.0181 -0.0203 
(0.6367) (0.5867) (0.5246) (0.5276) (0.6839) (0.5841) (0.6058) (0.5574) (0.4994) 
IND. GROWTH -0.5425 -0.5222 -0.6038 1.1440 1.2228 1.1597 -0.6788 -0.6585 -0.7415 
(0.3397) (0.3570) (0.2955) (0.4318) (0.3918) (0.4161) (0.2334) (0.2467) (0.2005) 
IND. CONC 2.0202*** 1.9976*** 2.0039*** 3.1052*** 3.0268*** 2.9761*** 1.9298*** 1.9045*** 1.9166*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
MARKETCAP_GDP -0.3370* -0.3079* -0.2410 -0.1317 0.0092 0.0404 -0.3335* -0.3014 -0.2321 
(0.0635) (0.0879) (0.1827) (0.7494) (0.9822) (0.9205) (0.0740) (0.1042) (0.2125) 
Constant -0.9442** -0.9917** -0.8642** -0.7075 -0.8634 -0.6384 -0.8862** -0.9408** -0.8247* 
(0.0217) (0.0177) (0.0408) (0.4990) (0.4624) (0.6056) (0.0418) (0.0340) (0.0638)  
  
 
         
Observations 2,574 2,574 2,574 535 535 535 2,475 2,475 2,475 
Nagelkerke R² 0.0725 0.0795 0.0856 0.1001 0.1336 0.1397 0.0715 0.0787 0.0849 
Maximum VIF 1.29 3.96 1.79 1.31 1.96 8.68 1.28 3.94 1.78 
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3.4.2 Impact of family ownership on the abnormal returns for acquirer 
shareholders 
Table 3.7 reports the OLS regression results modeling the acquirer CAR over the [-1,+1] 
event window.  This table has the same structure as Table 3.6, except that we now also 
include DIVERSIFICATION and its interaction with our various family ownership 
variables. 
Table 3.7, Panel A reveals that acquirers embracing an industry-diversifying M&A 
strategy realize a significantly lower CAR (p ≤ 0.05 in models 1–3).  This finding 
supports the idea that those conglomerate deals are to the detriment of the firm’s 
minority investors.  However, from the parameter estimate (-0.53% in models 1 and 2), 
we cannot conclude that those deals are perceived to destroy shareholder value on 
average; they only do not create as much value as the average transaction in the sample, 
which is 0.97% over the [-1,+1] event window.  Next, the interaction term 
DIVERSIFICATION * FAM5 is significant in model 1 (p ≤ 0.1); from its coefficient, 
we infer that the presence of a large family shareholder fully reverses the negative 
impact of DIVERSIFICATION on the acquirer CAR.  Arguably, and considering that 
family firms with non-majority family ownership are less likely to pursue conglomerate 
M&As (as revealed in Table 3.6), the above findings are in line with the earlier-
documented non-linear relation between family ownership and firm value/performance 
in European listed firms (e.g., Kowalewski et al., 2010; Maury, 2006; Poutziouris et al., 
2015). 
Next, the results of model 2 indicate that the mitigating effect of family ownership for 
the negative relation between DIVERSIFICATION and the acquirer CAR is linear in 
nature.  Put otherwise, this negative effect tends to be weaker when the family controls 
a larger fraction of the firm’s voting rights.  This relation also arises in model 3, which 
accounts for any interaction effects by means of DIVERSIFICATION * FAMx_y.  In 
line with our earlier findings in model 2, the coefficient on DIVERSIFICATION * 
FAM50_100 has the largest magnitude, although it is not significant at the 10% level (p 
= 0.12).  Arguably, we thus find no confirmation for the idea that the conglomerate 
M&As made by family firms are to the detriment of the firm’s minority investors.  As 
regards the support for Hypothesis 1b, we consider the above evidence to be only 
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indirect at best.  Indeed, family firms with non-majority family ownership are far less 
likely to engage in conglomerate M&As, which do not create as much shareholder value 
on average.  As to Hypothesis 2b, our results allow us to refute that hypothesis because 
the sum of the coefficients on DIVERSIFICATION and DIVERSIFICATION * 
FAM50_100 is not different from zero.  Possibly, families with majority ownership keep 
in mind that excessive minority-investor expropriation could harm the reputation of the 
family firm and the family name; those reputation effects might therefore introduce a 
self-imposed constraint on the level of minority-investor expropriation in which large 
families are willing to engage.  Alternatively, the magnitude of the family financial 
wealth at stake could impose discipline on family firms. 
Finally, FAM5 itself is not significant in model 1.  FAMBLOCK and the FAMx_y 
dummies are not significant in models 2 or 3.  The mere fact that an acquirer is 
controlled by a large family shareholder thus has no effect on acquirer shareholder value 
on top of its effect via the industry-diversifying nature of the firm’s M&A strategy.  This 
same conclusion arises from examining the role of the ownership stake held by this 
large family shareholder. 
The results as to the effects of DIVERSIFICATION and family ownership in Panels B 
and C of Table 3.7 indicate that the most important split is that between family-
controlled firms and non-family non-lone-founder firms.  Indeed, because none of our 
test variables is significant in Panel B, we conclude that family firms are more 
comparable to lone-founder firms than to non-family non-lone founder firms when 
seeking to explain the shareholder value creation in M&As.  This conclusion is in line 
with earlier findings by Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo (2010), who show that the 
abnormal returns for acquirer shareholders upon deal announcement do not differ 
significantly across family firms and lone-founder firms. 
Analyzing the role of the control variables, we note that CASH RATIO is significantly 
negative in Panels A and C of Table 3.7.  A negative coefficient is consistent with the 
findings of Harford (1999), who argues that it reflects an agency problem.  From the 
size of the parameter estimates, we infer that stock market investors in Continental 
Europe perceive this conflict to destroy shareholder value on average.  However, our 
results as to the impact of CASH RATIO on DIVERSIFICATION in Table 3.6 reveal that 
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such value destruction does not predominantly come from cash-rich acquirers buying a 
target firm in another industry.  Table 3.6 indeed indicates that CASH RATIO, if 
significant, is negatively related to the odds of a conglomerate deal. 
Next, LEVERAGE is never significant.  FIRM SIZE has a significant negative impact in 
all the models, in line with Moeller et al. (2004).  The latter authors contend that the 
incentives of managers in smaller listed firms are better aligned with those of 
shareholders than is the case in large listed firms.  Moreover, managers in large listed 
firms could be more prone to hubris.  The acquirer M/B ratio is significantly negative 
in Panels A and C, which indicates that stock market investors are concerned about 
managers over-extrapolating past performance when subsequently engaging in M&As 
(see also Rau and Vermaelen, 1998).  TOTAL RISK also has a negative sign but is only 
borderline significant in Panel C.  All the other control variables, i.e., 
CONGLOMERATE, IND. GROWTH, IND. CONC, and MARKETCAP_GDP, have no 
significant effect on the abnormal returns for acquirer shareholders at deal 
announcement.  The models’ maximum VIF, at the bottom of Table 3.7, never indicate 
a multicollinearity problem. 
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Table 3.7: Explaining the acquirer shareholder abnormal returns at M&A announcement 
Table 3.7 shows the OLS regression results as to the acquirer CAR over the [-1,+1] window.  Panel A compares family firms to non-family firms, while Panel B compares family firms to lone-founder firms and Panel C compares family firms to non-family non-lone-founder firms.  Table 1 presents definitions of all the 
explanatory variables and their hypothesized effects on CAR.  All the control variables are measured at fiscal year-end before M&A announcement and are winsorized at 1%99%.  Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively.  p-values are reported in parentheses. 
  
Panel A: Family versus non-family firms Panel B: Family versus lone-founder firms Panel C: Family versus non-family non-lone-founder firms  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)           
DIVERSIFICATION -0.0053** -0.0053** -0.0051** 0.0003 -0.0010 0.0006 -0.0056** -0.0057*** -0.0054** 
(0.0219) (0.0175) (0.0288) (0.9900) (0.9357) (0.9776) (0.0109) (0.0081) (0.0141) 
DIVERSIFICATION * FAM5 0.0086*   0.0036   0.0089*   
(0.0961)   (0.8595)   (0.0867)   
FAM5 -0.0020   -0.0134   -0.0010   
(0.4895)   (0.2859)   (0.7410)   
DIVERSIFICATION * FAMBLOCK  0.0225*   0.0169   0.0229*  
 (0.0610)   (0.5403)   (0.0564)  
FAMBLOCK 
 
-0.0076   -0.0238   -0.0052   
(0.3024)   (0.1418)   (0.4690)  
DIVERSIFICATION * FAM5_20   -0.0026   -0.0057   -0.0033 
  (0.7521)   (0.8044)   (0.6913) 
FAM5_20 
  
0.0061   -0.0029   0.0068   
(0.2453)   (0.8653)   (0.1965) 
DIVERSIFICATION * FAM20_50   0.0095   0.0035   0.0100 
  (0.1760)   (0.8687)   (0.1493) 
FAM20_50 
  
-0.0019   -0.0090   -0.0014   
(0.5985)   (0.5956)   (0.7034) 
DIVERSIFICATION * FAM50_100   0.0133   0.0087   0.0137 
  (0.1205)   (0.6868)   (0.1115) 
FAM50_100 
  
-0.0013   -0.0110   -0.0006   
(0.8140)   (0.5206)   (0.9120) 
OTHER5_20 
  
0.0042   0.0118   0.0034   
(0.1196)   (0.5028)   (0.1944) 
OTHER20_50 
  
0.0027   0.0025   0.0022   
(0.3298)   (0.9204)   (0.3753) 
CASH RATIO -0.0193* -0.0194* -0.0197* 0.0108 0.0110 0.0098 -0.0248** -0.0249** -0.0253** 
(0.0598) (0.0586) (0.0545) (0.6515) (0.6506) (0.6786) (0.0171) (0.0168) (0.0148) 
LEVERAGE 0.0099 0.0097 0.0112 0.0006 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0113 0.0111 0.0123 
(0.3361) (0.3444) (0.2819) (0.9783) (0.9844) (0.9999) (0.2749) (0.2808) (0.2398) 
FIRM SIZE -0.0030*** -0.0030*** -0.0031*** -0.0037** -0.0041** -0.0038** -0.0027*** -0.0027*** -0.0027*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0234) (0.0204) (0.0143) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
M/B -0.0013** -0.0012** -0.0012** -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0013** -0.0012** -0.0012** 
(0.0159) (0.0171) (0.0193) (0.6899) (0.8586) (0.7921) (0.0151) (0.0156) (0.0174) 
TOTAL RISK -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0031* -0.0031* -0.0030 
(0.1611) (0.1622) (0.1862) (0.9298) (0.9013) (0.8452) (0.0927) (0.0932) (0.1092) 
CONGLOMERATE -0.0005 0.0099 -0.0004 0.0014 -0.0220 0.0014 -0.0004 0.0131 -0.0004 
(0.2839) (0.3379) (0.3260) (0.4491) (0.4854) (0.4616) (0.3755) (0.1922) (0.4111) 
IND. GROWTH 0.0100 -0.0025 0.0107 -0.0228 -0.0016 -0.0235 0.0131 -0.0026 0.0137 
(0.3337) (0.5651) (0.3053) (0.4634) (0.8971) (0.4322) (0.1896) (0.5325) (0.1755) 
IND. CONC -0.0026 -0.0005 -0.0025 -0.0034 0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0026 -0.0004 -0.0027 
(0.5497) (0.2691) (0.5550) (0.7879) (0.3693) (0.9104) (0.5259) (0.3480) (0.5233) 
MARKETCAP_GDP 0.0012 0.0011 0.0004 0.0041 0.0011 0.0033 0.0020 0.0020 0.0013 
(0.7150) (0.7288) (0.9098) (0.5827) (0.8864) (0.6607) (0.5066) (0.5138) (0.6629) 
Constant 0.0567*** 0.0568*** 0.0549*** 0.0667* 0.0680* 0.0621* 0.0507*** 0.0508*** 0.0492*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0664) (0.0512) (0.0555) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
        
Observations 2,565 2,565 2,565 535 535 535 2,466 2,466 2,466 
Adjusted R² 0.0267 0.0270 0.0284 0.0333 0.0330 0.0364 0.0286 0.0290 0.0305 
Maximum VIF 1.54 1.68 1.83 5.45 3.59 9.84 1.55 1.69 1.84 
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3.4.3 Alternative model specifications 
To assess the robustness of our findings, we perform a number of additional tests.  First, 
we re-run all the models with the dummy DIVERSIFICATION defined at the four-digit 
US SIC level.  The results of these extra tests are generally consistent with those shown 
in Table 6.  Robustness also emerges when DIVERSIFICATION is defined in a more 
categorical way.  To that end, we set it equal to one when the acquirer and the target 
firm share no two-digit US SIC code and equal to 0.75 (0.5) when none of their three-
(four-)digit US SIC codes overlap.  Alternatively, we re-examine the results as to the 
acquirer CAR when using the other event windows to compute CAR, particularly the [-
5,+5] and [-35,+5] windows.  For those longer event windows, the parameter estimates 
on DIVERSIFICATION and its interaction with family ownership point in the same 
direction as in Table 7 but do not always meet the 10% threshold for statistical 
significance.  Running the models with other thresholds to distinguish between limited 
and dominant family ownership does not generate any new insights.  In fact, the 20% 
and 50% cutoffs prove most informative because they result in models with the highest 
Nagelkerke R-square.  Next, adding extra control variables in the CAR regressions, such 
as relative deal size, a dummy that equals one for cross-border M&As, and a dummy 
that equals one for deals that are fully paid in acquirer shares, does not add novel 
insights.  Moreover, those variables are never significant at the 10% level (see also 
Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo, 2009).  Because the data needed to compute those 
extra control variables are not always available in Zephyr, we decided not to include 
them in our main regression models of Table 7.  Particularly the deal-payment data are 
missing to a large extent (for 68.4% of sample deals). 
Next, we replace MARKETCAP_GDP with a number of other country-level corporate 
governance indicators.  To that end, we make use of the RULE OF LAW variable from 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2010); it captures the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, police, and courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence.  We also gather information on the GOVERNMENT 
EFFECTIVENESS index (Kaufmann et al., 2010).  Lastly, we consider the La Porta et 
al. (1998) rule-of-law variable.  Including those alternative country-level governance 
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variables does not alter our conclusions as to the variables of interest.  However, those 
country-level governance indicators now also become significantly positively related to 
the acquirer CAR in some of the models in Table 7.  We next run a robustness check 
after splitting the sample into M&As initiated by acquirers operating under the French, 
Scandinavian, and German civil-law legal system.  We infer that the relations between 
family ownership and DIVERSIFICATION are not unique to one of these subsamples. 
Finally, we investigate the robustness of our findings within the subsample of family-
controlled acquirers (FAM5 = 1).  We again find that the fraction of voting rights 
controlled by a firm’s family bears a positive and significant influence on that firm’s 
propensity to initiate an industry-diversifying M&A.  Next, and in line with the results 
in Panel B of Table 7, we infer that DIVERSIFICATION is never significantly related 
to the acquirer shareholder value effects within this subsample.  We therefore conclude 
once more that especially the comparison of family firms and non-family non-lone-
founder firms matters in explaining the acquirer CAR. 
 
3.5 Discussion and conclusions 
The starting point of our study was the non-linear relation between family ownership 
and the performance/value of listed companies in Europe (e.g., Kowalewski et al., 2010; 
Maury, 2006; Poutziouris et al., 2015).  To demystify it, we explored the role of one 
specific channel, that is, the influence of family ownership on the industry-diversifying 
nature of a firm’s M&A strategy.  We examined this topic for a large sample of 3,485 
M&As made by listed acquirers in Continental Europe.  The cross-sectional variation 
in family ownership across the listed firms in our sample proved extensive, which 
allowed us to implement the type of analyses that arose from our integrated P–A and 
P–P theoretical frameworks. 
First, we find that family ownership has a negative effect on the odds that a family-
controlled firm will initiate an industry-diversifying M&A, provided that the family 
stake is 50% or less.  Our results are thus in line with the existence of a positive 
monitoring and/or incentive-alignment effect at non-majority levels of family 
ownership.  For stakes above 50%, families no longer induce their firm to pursue an 
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industry-focused M&A strategy.  Rather, their stake now proves large enough to push 
the family business to M&As that allow safeguarding the family’s financial and 
socioemotional wealth.  We therefore conclude that an expropriation effect ensues when 
the family becomes too dominant, thereby neutralizing the earlier-detected positive 
family effect.  However, family firms with majority family ownership are not more 
likely to engage in conglomerate M&As than lone-founder and other types of non-
family firms. 
Next, our analyses of acquirer shareholder value effects at deal announcement engender 
extra insights.  First, we show that industry-diversifying M&As produce lower 
abnormal returns on average, which indicates that they are detrimental to the firm’s 
minority investors.  However, family control does not seem to reinforce this negative 
effect of industry diversification on the acquirer CAR.  On the contrary, the 
conglomerate M&As pursued by firms with majority family ownership produce an 
abnormal return that is not significantly different from the sample average.  Possibly, 
families keep in mind that excessive minority-investor expropriation could harm the 
reputation of the family firm and the family name.  Alternatively, the magnitude of the 
family financial wealth at stake could impose discipline on the family firm.  In 
aggregate, our findings are in line with the earlier-detected non-linear relation between 
family ownership and firm performance/value in European listed firms.  They have 
important implications for stock market investors considering buying a stake in a 
family-controlled CE listed firm. 
The results in our article also clearly require reconsidering earlier theoretical arguments 
that family firms may be reluctant to diversify their business because doing so indirectly 
poses a hazard to the family’s socioemotional wealth.  Rather, and capitalizing on the 
M&A literature, we argue that it is growth by itself that may induce firms to raise extra 
financing and delegate responsibilities.  Future research should therefore also better 
disentangle the influence of family ownership on company growth versus company risk.  
Next, our findings indicate that family control can help curtail the P–A conflict of 
interest with management at low, i.e., non-majority levels of family ownership.  In 
contrast, when the family controls a majority of voting rights, family businesses no 
longer focus uniquely on shareholder value maximization but rather also adhere to 
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other, familial goals, thereby provoking a P–P conflict with the firm’s minority 
investors.  Research on family firms to date recognizes family businesses’ multiple 
goals; yet another theoretical contribution that arises from our results is that a family’s 
various objectives appear to receive different priorities depending upon the family’s 
ownership stake.  Finally, our study shows that different types of large shareholders 
(‘principals’) behave differently and therefore also endorses the recent direction in 
empirical family business research to separate true family firms from lone-founder 
firms (e.g., Miller et al., 2007; Cannella et al., 2015). 
Future empirical research could examine the influence of family ownership on other 
channels of shareholder value creation than a firm’s M&A strategy to obtain a more 
complete understanding of why and when family firms are valued more highly in the 
stock market.  Other researchers could also integrate the role of large countervailing 
shareholders, like institutional investors, and how they interact with the controlling 
family shareholder.  Additionally, future empirical research might wish to account for 
information on top of the family firm’s ownership structure, for example whether family 
members take up key positions in the management or board and how those positions 
potentially strengthen or weaken some of the relations that we have already 
documented.  In a similar vein, other researchers could integrate the effects of family 
relationships, thereby exploring the role of family cohesion and conflict.  Next, future 
research could delve deeper into the effects of firm age and the family generation.  
Those data were not readily available for our study, and we consider those lacking data 
to be the primary limitation of our research.  Another major limitation arises from the 
fact that we only had access to US SIC codes to identify industry-diversifying M&As.  
Although well-accepted in the M&A literature, such a definition fails to capture that 
cross-industry transactions can still involve considerable operating synergies.  
Likewise, while acquirer shareholder abnormal returns are widely used to measure 
M&A value creation, this metric fails to account for the acquisition premium paid for 
target control.  To date, it is unclear whether family firms are more or less conservative 
when fixing takeover prices.  Finally, as the firms in our sample were required to be 
publicly listed, we are not sure to what extent the findings in our article would also 
apply to privately-held family firms. 
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